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JURISDICTIONAL
 S T A T E M E N T 
Appeal herein is from a Jury Trial, October 2C), I W fiiiclni}* clrfciiiltfif )»uillv nf 
"Assault," a Class B Misdemeanor. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Utah R. App. PT Rule 3 [Appeal as of right: hpw taken.] 
Utah R. App, P, Rule 4 [Appeal as ol iigMi when taken.] 
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(fl [Court of Appeals Jurisdiction f!993 Cumulative Supplement] 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Reversal of judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case herein involves a charge of "Aassault" by the Moab City Attorney alleging 
that the defendant assaulted his then wife [at time of trial, ex-wife] and alleging specifically 
as set out in the Information as follows: 
COMES NOW William L. Benge, Moab City Attorney, and states on 
information and belief that the Defendant committed in the above named city 
and county, the crime(s) of: 
ASSAULT - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE in violation of Moab City 
Ordinance #92-06 (Section 76-5-102, UCA), in that the said Defendant, 
MICHAEL BRUCE GIOLAS, on the 10th day of April, A.D., 1993, at 
approximately 7:12 p.m., at 549 North Main, Moab, Grand County, State of 
Utah, did attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
Rebecca M. Giolas, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
DATED this 14 day of APRIL , A.D.. 1993. 
/S/SIGNED 
William L. Benge, 
Moab County Attorney 
Defendant entered a "NOT GUILTY" plea to the charge and jury trial was held 
October 29, 1993 in the District Court of Grand County, Moab, UT. Jury found the 
defendant "GUILTY" of the offense; however, had to be sent out twice to agree upon a 
verdict, and indicated that they felt constrained by the law as they had been instructed, but 
made a specific request on their own that the punishment of the defendant be minimal. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POLICE REPORT ADMISSIBLITI Lu idant 
to introduce into evidence police reports of (he IIK idem 
BOOKING SHEF -* • ,^»>%t ^u ..,: court error by refusing to allow 
the defendant to introduce into evident uiw uuoKmg MICCI? 
FALSE
 I M P R E S S I O N . . PROSECUTION DUTY Did the prosecution allow 
false testimony - - * • - . * * . . messes and allow same to go 
uncorrected, thereb „ _ the defendant? 
DEFENDA: rHEORY OF CASE - CROSS-EXAMINATION Was the 
defendant denied due process b him | IIIIII iiiiii iirtiiMiiiu IUJIIUVI IIIC ucicuuant to cross-
examine the officer with rega „ a t alcohol in her report or allow the 
defer -s- -, w line regarding intoxylizer test, showing no alcohol? 
TIME & PLACE OF OFFENSE Did t o 
instruct the jury exactly as the Information was worded v* no» -*un ig _iat the jur> liuu A^* 
the of fen . .,., v)rmation? 
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CLOSING ARGUMENT When the prosecutor brought to the attention of the jury 
matters which they should not appropriately consider in the case, was the court in error for 
not specifically instructing the jury that the prosecutor was wrong and to disregard those 
things? 
CUMULATIVE ERROR Does the sum total of errors in this case undermine the 
confidence in the verdict or the belief that the result may have been different had they not 
been committed? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Standard of Review with regards to the p ase are 
articulated for each point and set out as follows: 
POLICE REPORT UNVIISMIJII 11 Y 
"CLEAR ERROR" 
State v. Bertul 664 P. 2d 1181 CUT 1983^ 
BOOKING SFFF «sv-
"Ci h 
State \ . lP.2d1181rtJT1983^ 
FALSE IMPRESSION - PRf - • * Y 
B; 1 ~^i3HAVEAFlT ;CTi:D 
JUDGMENT OF JURY 
Walker v. State 624 P. 2d 687 «JT 198D 
State v. Schnoor 845 P. 2d 947 i Utah App 199Ji 
DEFENDANTS THEORY OF CASE - CROSS-EXAMINATION 
"HAKMI I'SS \\i\il Mi m\ \ UNI i ,r>ONABLE DOUBT" 
Olden v. Kentucky 488 US 227. 102 L Ed .!d 5L ._. _ ^ , . ^ j _ 
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TIME & PLACE OF OFFENSE 
"STANDARD OF REVIEW UNKNOWN; CONSTITUTIONAL 
GAURANTEE REQUIRES SPECIFICITY AND ABILITY TO 
PLEAD JEOPARDY FROM FACE OF INFORMATION" 
Article I Section 12. Utah Constitution 
[Rights of Accused Persons] 
U.R.C.P. Rule 9 TPleading Special Mattersl 
U.C.A. 76-8-501 "Definitions" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 81(e) [Application In Criminal Proceedings] 
Brigham Citv v Valencia 779 P.2d 1149 (UT App. 1989) 
State v Anderson 797 P.2d 1114 (UT App. 1990) 
State v Topham 41 Utah 39. 123 P. 888 (UT 1912) 
State v Fisher 79 Utah 115. 8 P.2d 589 (UT1932) 
Ballaine v District Court 107 Utah 247. 153 P. 2d 265 (UT 1944) 
McNair v Havward 666 P.2d 321 (UT 1983) 
State v Wilson 105 Utah 516. 143 P.2d 907 (UT 1943) 
State v Jessun 98 Utah 482. 100 P.2d 969 (UT 1940) 
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CLOSING ARGUMENT 
"REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT IN ABSENCE OF STATEMENTS 
THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE FAVORABLE RESULT" 
State v. Cummins 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah App. 1992^ 
State v. Dibello 780 P. 2d 1221 (Utah 1989> 
State v, Tillman 75Q PT 2d $4$ (Utah 1987) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES & RULES 
Provisions upon which the defendant relies are set out in body of brief. 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 9317-97 Page xiii 
City of Moab v Giolas Utah Court of Appeals 
** TRANSCRIPT & RECORD REFERENCES HFACTSl 
Facts in this case are police department was called to a domestic disturbance at the 
Days Inn Motel in Moab, Utah. Factual assertions are identified herein by transcript and 
line. ** IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE RELEVENT PAGES OF THE 
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD ARE ENCLOSED IN THE ADDENDUM HERETO 
AND HAVE BEEN MARKED FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE COURT TO 
QUICKLY LOCATE IN ONE PLACE ALL REFERENCES TO TRANSCRIPT OR 
RECORD RELEVENT TO APPELLANTS ARGUMENT. 
Officer Becky Mallon arrived at the Motel and interrogated complaining witness, 
Rebecca Giolas [at the time of trial, defendants ex-wife]. She indicated that parties had 
returned to the Day's Inn parking lot and two of them had been drinking and that the 
defendant had been drinking heavily. Ms. Giolas indicated that the reason she knew this was 
because she had been drinking with defendant, and that these events occurred between 6:30 
and 7:30 p.m. in the parking lot. She asserts that she was assaulted by the defendant. 
Police were called. Upon the arrival of Officer Mallon, she indicated she could smell the 
odor of alcohol on the defendants breath and his person. She talked to the complaining 
witness. Defendant was subsequently placed under arrest by Officer Mallon for 
"Intoxication" and "Domestic Assault." 
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He was transported to the Grand County Jail, at which time a breathalyzer test was 
taken by Trooper Dennis Lund, which showed 0.000, and that there was no alcohol present. 
A number of reports made by Officer Mallon indicated intoxication or drinking by defendant. 
At time of trial the only witnesses to testify were Officer Mallon and defendants ex-wife, and 
they both insisted that he had been drinking, and that there was alcohol. Defendant was 
prohibited from introducing into evidence the reports to refute such testimony, which 
affected credibility and was not allowed to cross-examine in terms of the alcohol allegations 
in reports. After the verdict was returned, prosecutor did stipulate that such reports existed 
and that it would show no alcohol. 
Hereafter, the facts are simply set out by category, transcript and line, or record. 
as follows: 
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(A) POLICE REPORT ADMISSIBILITY 
Testimony of Rebecca Giolas as to defendants drinking and intoxication: 
TRANSCRIPT LINE 
T65 
T66 
T67 
T79 
T80 
T81 
Ti l l 
L23-25 
Ll-4 
L8-18 
L16-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-17 
L14-18 
Testimony of Officer Mallon as to defendants drinking and intoxication: 
T122 
T123 
T128 
T129 
T130 
T131 
T140 
T142 
T144 
L10-18 
L10-13 
L13-17 
L21-25 
Ll-13; 23-25 
L9-10; 20-25 
L14-25 
Ll-25 
L7-21 
Court ruling with regards to non-admissiblity to police reports by defendant: 
T131 
T132 
T134 
T135 
T136 
T137 
T138 
T157 
T158 
T159 
T160 
T161 
T162 
L20-25 
Ll-19 
Ll-16 
L7-18 
L10-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-25 
L6-24 
Ll-20 
LI 1-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-23 
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(B) BOOKING SHEET ADMISSIBILITY 
Court ruling that defendant could not examine officer about alcohol in her booking 
statement or police reports. 
TRANSCRIPT 
T131 
T132 
T140 
T141 
T146 
T147 
T159 
T160 
T161 
T162 
LINE 
L20-25 
Ll-2 
L14-25 
Ll-7 
L2-25 
Ll-7 
LI 1-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-25 
SEALED MATERIALS RECORD ON APPEAL. 
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(D) DEFENSE THEORY OF CASE - CROSS-EXAMINATTON 
Police reports establishing no alcohol present: SEALED MATERIALS RECORD 
ON APPEAL. 
Defendants theory of the case based upon charge in the information as filed stating 
specific time and specific place. 
Record Page: 4, 9, 10, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28. 
TRANSCRIPT LIME 
T157 
T158 
T159 
T160 
T161 
T162 
T168 
T169 
T170 
T171 
T172 
T173 
T175 
T176 
T177 
T178 
T179 
T180 
L6-24 
Ll-25 
LI 1-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-25 
L13-25 
Ll-11 
L16-21 
L10-22 
L2-24 
L10-25 
Ll-4; 16-22 
Lll-18 
L14-25 
Ll-7; 20-25 
Ll-19 
L6-15 
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(E) TIME & PLACE OF OFFENSE 
Record and transcript evidence as to defendants reliance on specific time and place as 
alleged in the Information and refusal of court to charge jury in the same language as the 
Information. 
Record Page: 4, 9, 10, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28. 
TRANSCRIPT 
T79 
T80 
T81 
T168 
T169 
T170 
T171 
T172 
T173 
T174 
T175 
T176 
T177 
T178 
T179 
T180 
LINE 
L16-25 
Ll-25 
Ll-17 
L13-25 
Ll-11 
L16-21 
L10-22 
L2-24 
L10-25 
LI 1-25 
Ll-4; 16-22 
Lll-18 
L14-25 
L20-25 
Ll-19 
L6-15 
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(F) CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Prosecution improper closing argument and defendant objection thereto. 
TRANSCRIPT LJNE 
T193 L16-17 
T208 LI 1-24 
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ADDENDUM 
SECTION DESCRIPTION 
I Selected Pages From Trial Transcript [10/29/93] 
II Selected Pages from Record On Appeal 
III Selected Jury Instructions Given At Trial 
IV Copies of Selected Cases As Follows: 
State v Tppham 41 Utah 39, 123 P, 888 (UT 19)2) 
State v. Bertul 664 P. 2d 1181 (TTT 19831 
Walker v, State 624 P, 2d 687 (UT 1981) 
State v. Schnoor 845 P. 2d 947 (Utah App. 19931 
Olden v. Kentucky 488 US 227. 102 L Ed 2d 513. 
109 S Ct. 480 (19881 
State v. Palmer 860 P. 2d 339 (Utah App. 19931 
V Documents received per Judge Anderson for purpose of 
Appellate Review. Not admitted or received into 
evidence. [Photocopies provided to both counsel 
prior to being sealed by court.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial court denied the defendant the right to introduce into evidence police reports 
despite clear holding from Utah Court of Appeals that a defendant is allowed to due so. 
Denial by the court of said right, coupled with limitation of cross-examination of defendant 
to refer to instances of alcohol in the reports was an error that would substantially undermine 
the verdict given that there were only two witnesses and that the evidence was inconclusive 
as to any assault. These errors, coupled with the fact the court refused to instruct the jury 
exactly as the information read as to the specific time and place of offense that they needed to 
find, and the prosecutor's referring to what the jurors see every day in newspaper articles 
about domestic violence and assaults involving husbands assaulting wives, warrants reversal 
of the judgment. 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 9317-97 Page xxii 
City of Moab v Giolas Utah Court of Appeals 
THERE EXISTED MULTIPLE ERRORS OF LAW IN THE 
CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL; ANY ONE OF WHICH 
JUSTIFIES REVERSAL AND THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT 
OF WHICH REQUIRES REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT. 
(A) POLICE REPORT ADMISSIBILITY 10 
(B) BOOKING SHEET ADMISSIBILITY 19 
(C) FALSE IMPRESSION [PROSECUTION DUTY] . . . 25 
(D) DEFENSE THEORY OF CASE -
CROSS EXAMINATION 41 
(E) TIME & PLACE OF OFFENSE 50 
(F) CLOSING ARGUMENT 55 
(G) CUMULATIVE ERRORS 
(H) CONCLUSION 
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ARGUMENT 
THERE EXISTED MULTIPLE ERRORS OF 
LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL; 
ANY ONE OF WHICH JUSTIFIES REVERSAL 
AND THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
WHICH REQUIRES REVERSAL OF 
JUDGMENT. 
(A) POLICE REPORT ADMISSIBILITY 
State v. Bertul 664 P. 2d 1181 OJT 1983) 
" . . . @ 1185-86 . . . [8,9] After a careful and 
scholarly analysis of many cases under the business records 
exception involving the admissibility of police records, United 
States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir. 1975), synthesized the 
rule, to which we adhere, that police reports of crimes should 
ordinarily be admitted when offered by the defendant in a 
criminal case to support his defense. When offered by the 
prosecution, however, they should ordinarily be excluded, 
except when offered to prove simple routine matters which are 
based on first-hand knowledge of the maker of the report and do 
not involve conclusions, and when the "circumstances of their 
preparation indicate their trustworthiness. . . ."(Emphasis 
Added) 
" . . . @ 1186 . . . Since the booking sheet was offered 
by the defendant, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
excluding the booking sheet in the instant case even though it 
contained what might be considered a conclusion. . . . " 
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Commentary 
The totality of the evidence in the trial consisted of two witnesses offered by 
the prosecution, they being the ex-wife of the defendant and the arresting officer. Both of 
those witnesses testified that defendant had been drinking, there was an odor of alcohol about 
his breath and person, and asserted were that he was "intoxicated" at the time of the 
incident. Defendant sought to introduce three (3) reports into evidence citing the above-
referenced case to the court, those reports being as follows: 
1) Arresting officer's report of the incident obtained from the prosecutor's 
office in response to discovery. fState v. Bertul 664 P. 2d 1181 (UT 1983)1 
2) Booking sheet containing "probable cause" statement that the officer 
filled out at the time the defendant was booked into jail. 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin 500 US - . 114 L Ed 2d 49. 
I l l g . q . ~ (1991) 
{Citrich Ppwgll vT Nevato $10 US - ,12$ L Ed 2d 1, 114 $ . q - (1994) 
3) Report of intoxilizer test and operation checklist. 
[Taken by UHP Trooper, Dennis Lund] 
TState v. Bertul 664 P. 2d 1181 (UT 1983^ 1 
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The court ruled all were NOT admissible because they were hearsay and 
furthermore that the defendant would have to establish foundation under the rules of 
evidence. The prosecutor at the conclusion of the trial, acknowledged on the record that the 
breathalyzer test would show "0.000" even though both witnesses testified defendant had 
been drinking. The failure of the court in not allowing these reports to be admitted and also 
the courts refusal to allow defense counsel to examine the arresting officer about statements 
contained in her reports relating to alcohol was clear error. Court furthermore would not 
allow defendant to examine arresting officer about statements in the "probable cause 
statement" referring to alcohol and would not allow any reference by defendant to the 
intoxilyzer test record results. 
Upon conclusion of trial, and after verdict, the court indicated to the jury that 
such test existed but that it felt they would be confused by that particular item. Given that 
there is clear case law, that the defendant has the right to introduce police reports into 
evidence, the court was clearly in error for not allowing the admission of the reports, 
examination of the officer about statements regarding alcohol contained in those reports, and 
admission of booking sheet. Defendant cited to the court State v. Bertul. supra: however, 
the court remained unpursuaded. 
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(B) BOOKING SHEET ADMISSIBILITY 
State v. Bertul 664 P. 2d 1181 TUT 1983^ 
" . . . @ 1185-86 . . . [8,9] After a careful and 
scholarly anaysis of many cases under the business records 
exception involving the admissibility of police records, United 
States v. SmitK 521 F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir. 1975), synthesized the 
rule, to which we adhere, that police reports of crimes should 
ordinarily be admitted when offered by the defendant in a 
criminal case to support his defense. When offered by the 
prosecution, however, they should ordinarily be excluded, 
except when offered to prove simple routine matters which are 
based on first-hand knowledge of the maker of the report and do 
not involve conclusions, and when the "circumstances of their 
preparation indicate their trustworthiness. . . . " 
* . . . @ 1186 . . . Since the booking sheet was offered 
by the defendant, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
excluding the booking sheet in the instant case even though it 
contained what might be considered a conclusion. . . . " 
(Emphasis Addefl) 
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Commentary 
Court ruled that the defendant could not cross-examine the arresting officer 
even about the "probable cause statement" made out at the time the defendant was booked 
into jail insofar as there were statements related to alcohol, nor was the defendant allowed to 
introduce the "booking sheet" into evidence. Even if the court was not persuaded by 
BertuL supra, regarding admission of police reports, clearly the admission of the "booking 
sheet" was something that the defendant should have been allowed to introduce into 
evidence, particularly since the Utah Supreme Court in Burtul held that it was error not to 
admit it at the defendant's request. 
In this case, where the booking sheet contained information which was clearly 
contrary to testimony of the witnesses, which affected the credibility of both witnesses, and 
literally could have made the difference between acquittal and conviction, it was error not to 
admit it into evidence at defendants request. It is furthermore significant that jury had to be 
called back twice given its inability to agree. Finally, the jury felt compelled to volunteer 
that they felt constrained by the law as they had been instructed but that any penalty imposed 
should be minimal because they were sympathetic to the defendant. 
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(C) FALSE IMPRESSION [PROSECUTION DUTY] 
Wglkgr vT gtate 024 P. 2d $37 (VT 1931) 
" . . . @ pg 691 . . . [5] The false impression which the 
prosecution knowingly fostered in the present case constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct which seriously interferred with the 
trial court's truth seeking function. We believe this to be 
analogous to the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony 
and therefore subject to the same standard of materiality used in 
those cases. 
[6,7] Applying this standard to the present case, we 
believe there exists a reasonable likelihood the false impression 
fostered by the prosecutor could have affected the judgment of 
the jury. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 691-92 Therefore, the prosecution's actions 
have deprived the defendant of a fair trial and constitute a 
denial of due process. As we explained in State v. JarrelL "In 
a criminal trial it is essential that evidence which tends to 
exonerate the defendant be aired as fully as that which tends to 
implicate him." In the present case this has not occurred and 
the defendant is entitled to have that error rectified. . . . " 
(Emphasis Added) 
State v. Schnoor 845 P. 2d 947 (Utah App. 1993) 
" . . . @ pg 949 . . . [1] A state may not knowingly use 
false evidence to obtain a conviction, even where the false 
evidence goes only to the credibility of the witness. Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d 
1217 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S. 
Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). "The jurv's estimate of 
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle 
factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely 
that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." Napue, 360 
U.S. at 269, 79 S. Ct. at 1177. . . ."(Emphasis Added) 
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Commentary 
Prosecutor in this case really did not have an opportunity to say a lot because 
the court was extremely aggressive toward defendants counsel. The written transcript does 
not do justice to the courts overbearing tenor and tone of voice toward defense counsel, a 
fact which was not lost upon the jury, and which apart from any other errors would warrant 
reversal for the manner in which the court conducted the proceedings. 
Bunnell v Industrial Commission of Utah 740 P.2d 1331 (UT 1987^ 
" • • - @ pg 1333 . . . Our review of the record 
persuades us that the manner in which the administrative law 
judge conducted this hearing was sufficiently unfair as to 
constitute a denial of plaintiffs constitutional right to a fair 
hearing. 
[T]he record reflects an atmosphere in which plaintiffs 
witnesses were inhibited and intimidated by the judge's conduct 
and felt defensive and hesitant to testify; the judge interferred 
with plaintiffs counsel's ability to make a record and argue the 
evidence: and the judge gave the appearance of having decided 
the case without even considering the medical records. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 1334 . . . We also comment with concern 
on the atmosphere created by administrative law judge. 
Although the record cannot fully capture the demeanor of the 
administrative law judge, it does capture his comments and the 
verbal reactions of the witnesses to him . . . 
The administrative law judge was also intolerant of 
counsel's argument on behalf of plaintiff. . . ."(Emphasis 
Added) 
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Andean v Industrial Com'n of Utah $96 P.2d 1219 (UT 1985) 
" . . . @ pg 1221 . . . One of the fundamental principles 
of due process is that all parties to a case are entitled to an 
unbiased, impartial judge." A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process. 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 
L.Ed. 942 (1955). Fairness requires not only an absence of 
actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of 
unfairness. 
This principle applies with as much force tQ 
administrative proceedings as it does to judicial trials. Gibson v 
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 
488 (1973); Vali Convalescent & Care Institution v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 649 P.2d 33, 37 (1982)... 
We therefore set aside the Commission's order and 
remand this case for submission of the issue to another 
administrative law judge. 
Reversed and remanded. . . ."(Emphasis Added) 
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The prosecution, however, had a duty to acknowledge the existence of the 
reports and that they in fact contradicted both witnesses. By presenting witnesses and 
testimony when the prosecution knew that in its own files was evidence contrary to that 
testimony, the prosecution effectively conveyed a "false impression" to the jury and the 
court. Duty of the prosecution is that of "fairness to all parties." 
Berggr v United Sfrtgg 293 U,$. 7g, 79 U Ed 1314 (1933) 
" . . . @ 1321 . . . The United States Attorney is 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of 
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense that servant of the law, the twofold aim 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. . . . " 
The arresting officer indicated that the defendant had not been arrested for 
intoxication when in fact the report clearly shows to the contrary. The prosecution took 
advantage of a situation at a time when it had a higher duty to the law to speak up given that 
all documents and reports came from the prosecutors own files in response to discovery. 
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(D) DEFENSE THEORY QF CASE - CROSS EXAMINATION 
Olden v. Kentucky 488 US 227. 102 L Ed 2d 513. 109 S Ct. 480 (1988^ 
" . . . @ pg 514 . . . (b) [A] reasonable jury might have 
received a significantly different impression of the witness' 
credibility had the accused's counsel been permitted to pursue 
the proposed line of cross-examination 
" . . . @ pg 514 . . . (2) [T]he violation was not 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, where (a) the 
woman's testimony was essential, indeed crucial, to the 
prosecution's case. . . . " 
" • - • @ pg 516 . . . 3. An accused's right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against the accused, under the 
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, as incorporated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to conduct 
reasonable cross-examination. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 517 . . . [T]hg correct inquiry is whether, 
assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination 
were fully realized, & reviewing court might nonetheless gay 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 519 . . . Petitioner appealed, asserting, inter 
alia, that the trial court's refiisual to allow him to impeach 
Matthews' testimony by introducing evidence supporting a 
motive to lie deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses against him. . . . " 
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" . . . @ pg 519 . . . Sixth Amendment right "to be 
confronted with the Witnesses against him." That right, 
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore 
available in state proceedings, Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 13 
L Ed 2d 923, 85 S Ct 1065 (1965), includes the right to conduct 
reasonable cross-examination. Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 
315-316, 39 L Ed 2d 347, 94 S Ct 1105 (1974). 
In Davis v Alaska, we observed that, subject to "the 
broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and 
unduly harassing interrogation . . ., the cross-examiner has 
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i. e.. discredit, the 
witness." Id., at 316, 39 L Ed 2d 347, 94 S Ct 1105. We 
emphasized that "the exposure of a witness' motivation in 
testifying is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." Id., at 
316-317, 39 L Ed 2d 347, 94 S Ct 1105 citing Greene v 
McElroy, 360 US 474, 496, 3 L Ed 2d 1377, 79 S Ct 1400 
(1959). Recently, in Delaware v Van Arsdall 475 US 673, 89 
L Ed 2d 674, 106 S Ct 1431 (1986), we reaffirmed Davis, and 
told that "a criminal defendant States a viQijitiQn of the 
Confrontation OaPSe by showing that he was prohibited from 
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross examination designed 
to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, 
and thereby 'to expose' to the jury the facts from which jurors . 
. . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability 
of the witness.' "475 US, at 680, 89 L Ed 2d 674, 106 S Ct 
1431, quoting Davis, supra, at 318, 39 L Ed 2d 347, 94 S Ct 
1105 " 
" . . . @ pg 520 . . . It is plain to us that "[a] reasonable 
jury might have received a significantly different impression of 
fthe witness'1 credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted 
to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination." Delaware v 
Van Arsdall, supra, at 680, 89 L Ed 2d 674, 106 S Ct 1431. . . 
>9 
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" . . . @ pg 520 . . . While a trial court may, of course, 
impose reasonable limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the 
potential bias of a prosecution witness, to take account of such 
factors as "harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or 
interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only marginally 
relevant," Delaware v Van Arsdall, supra, at 679, 89 L Ed 2d 
674, 106 S Ct 1431, the limitation here was beyond reason. . . 
99 
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" . . . @ pg 520 . . . [Id, 5] In Delaware v Van Arsdall 
supra, we held that "the constitutionally improper denial of a 
defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other 
Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman v 
California, 386 US 18 [17 L Ed 2d 705, 87 S Ct 824, 24 
ALR3d 1065 (1967)] harmless-error analysis." Id., at 684, 89 
L Ed 2d 674, 106 S Ct 1431. Thus we stated: 
"The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that 
the damaging potential of the cross-examination 
were fully realized, a reviewing court might 
nonetheless say that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[488 US 233] 
Whether such an error is harmless in a a 
particular case depends upon a host of factors, all 
readily accessible to reviewing courts. These 
factors include the importance of the witness' 
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case." Ibid. . . . " 
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Commentary 
Trial court repeatedly denied the defendant opportunity to cross-examine the 
arresting officer on issues in the reports as they related to testimony that defendant had 
consumed alcohol and/or was intoxicated. This issue was critical and crucial to the 
credibility of both the arresting officer and the complaining witness for reason of the 
existence of the intoxylier report showing that there was no alcohol present when tested at 
the Grand County Jail less than two (2) hours after arrest and time of the alleged incident. 
Such restriction by the court on the right of cross-examination by the defendant denied due 
process and is subject to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" harmless error standard of review. 
In this case credibility of both witnesses was critical to the case. Furthermore, 
there was a lack of any clear physical evidence of assault by testimony of complaining 
witness, and her testimony and the arresting officer's testimony were at odds. It is also 
significant in the case that the defendants "theory of the case" [cross-examination] was 
built around the charge in the information as filed and alleged time (7:12 p.m.] and 
place [549 North Main, MoabL 
Defendant had a right to rely upon charge as stated in the information and 
shape his theory of the case around same. Cross-examination shaped the defendant's defense 
theory of the case and the court's intereferance with same violated due process. In this case, 
on this basis alone, reversal is warranted for errors of constitutional proportion given the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of review. 
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(E) TIME & PLACE OF OFFENSE 
Article I SeptiQn 12, Utah Constitution 
[Rights of Accused Persons] 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
pppy thereof. . . ."(Emphasis Added) 
U.R.CP. Rule 9 [Pleading Special Matter?] 
" . . . (f) Time and Place. For purpose of testing the 
sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are 
material and shall be considered like all other averments of 
material matter . . . ."(Emphasis Added) 
U.C.A. 76-8-501 "Definitions" 
" . . . (2) "Material" means capable of affecting the 
course or outcome of the prppeeding. A statement-is not 
material if it is retracted in the course of the official proceeding 
in which it was made before it became manifest that the 
falsification was or would be exposed and before it substantially 
affected the proceeding. Whether a statement is material is a 
question of law to be determined by the court. . . . " (Emphasis 
Added) 
U.R.C.P, Rule 31(e) [Application In Criminal Proceedings] 
" . . . (e) These rules of procedure shall also govern in 
any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute Qr rule, provided, that any rule so applied 
does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional 
requirement. . . ."(Emphagis Added) 
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Brigham Citv v Valencia 779 P.2d 1149 (UT App. 1989) 
" . . . @ pg 1150 . . . [T]he rules of civil procedure govern in 
criminal proceedings where not inconsistent with applicable rule 
or statute. 
UtahR.Civ.P. 81(e). ." 
State v Anderson 797 P.2d 1114 (UT App. 1990) 
" . . . @ pg 1116 . . . Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
81(e). which serves generally to unify civil and criminal 
procedure in Utah except where a statute or rule provides 
otherwise for criminal cases. . . . " (Emphasis Added) 
State v Topham 41 Utah 39. 123 P. 888 (UT 1912) 
" . . . @ pg 889 . . . The doctrine is fundamental, and, 
as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rosen v. 
United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 Sup. Ct. 434, 40 L. Ed. 606, 
that "the constitutional right of a defendant to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him entitles him 
to insist, at the outset, by demurrer or by motion to quash, and 
after verdict, by motion in arrest of judgment, that the 
indictment shall apprise him of the crime charged with such 
reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and protect 
himself after judgment against another prosecution for the same 
offense. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 889 . . . [I]t is essential to the validity of an 
indictment that it contain averments of the facts which constitute 
the offense it charges so certain and specific that upon 
conviction or acquittal thereon it, and the judgment upon it, will 
constitute a complete defense to a second prosecution of the 
defendant for the same offense. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 889 . . . [A]s every man is presumed to be 
innocent until proved to be guilty, he must be presumed also to 
be ignorant of what is intended to be proved against him, except 
as he is informed by the indictment or information. . . . " 
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" . . . @ pg 889 . . . [3] Does the information meet 
these requirements? If it does, it is good; If not, it is bad and 
will not support the judgment. . . . " 
" • . - @ pg 890 . . . The physical acts done towards the 
commission of the offense should be stated in the information or 
indictment, so that the court may see whether or not the law has 
been violated, and so that the accused may know to what he 
must make answer. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 892 . . . Where the definition of an offense, 
whether it be at common law or by statute, includes generic 
terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment should charge the 
offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it 
must state the species ~ it must descend to particulars. . . . " 
" . . . @ pg 894 . . . [5,6] Firstly, an Information 
wanting in essentials cannot be helped or aided by evidence, 
and its sufficiency in such regard cannot be determined by what 
the state proved or failed to prove. If anything is established 
and set at rest in the law, it is that defects in substance of an 
information or indictment are not cured by evidence or verdict. 
" . . . @ pg 894 . . . [P]leadings are the juridical means 
of investing a court with jurisdiction of a subject matter to 
adjudicate it, and, for res adjudicata, that matter must be 
described with reasonable certainty and particularity. . . . " 
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" . - - @ pg 897 . . . An Information or Indictment 
when assailed as to substance must stand or fall by its own 
structure. It is not a technical, but a sound and fundamental, 
rule in the law of criminal procedure that the accused be 
apprised, not by the evidence adduced, but, at the outset, by the 
indictment or information, with reasonable certainty of the exact 
nature of the accusation against him. This rule cannot be bent to 
meet exigencies of a particular case, nor the class or grade of 
the person accused. The Constitution and the statute prescribe 
the rules by which the sufficiency of an information may be 
determined, and they apply to all alike. . . ."(Emphasis Added) 
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State v Fisher 79 Utah 115, g P,2d 539 (UT1932) 
" . . . @ pg 591 . . . [T]he sufficiency of insufficiency 
of an information must be tested by its allegations and not by 
the evidence introduced at the 
trial " 
Blaine v District Court W Utah 247, 153 PT 2d 265 (UT 1944) 
" . . . @ pg 267 . . . In State v Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 8 
P.2d 589, in passing upon the sufficiency of an information, 
this Court declared that the sufficiency of the information must 
be tested by its allegations, not by evidence introduced at the 
trial " 
MgNair v Hayward m P,2d 321 (UT 1933) 
" . . . @ pg 326 . . . [T]ime is always an essential 
element of a crime 
in the sense that due process requires that an accused be given 
sufficiently precise notification of the date of the alleged crime 
that he can prepare his defense. . . . " 
State v Wilson 105 Utah 516. 143 P.2d 907 (UT 1943) 
" . . . @ pg 907 . . . There must, however, be some 
facts then supplied to identify the victim, to enable the 
defendant to prepare his defense, and to identify the crime, 
for the protection of defendant, in case defendant is acquitted 
or placed in jeopardy and again charged with the same 
offense. . . . " 
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State v Jessup 98 Utah 482. 100 P.2d 969 (TJT 1940) 
" . . . @ pg 971 . . . It is elemental that one accused is 
entitled to notice of the particular offense with which he is 
charged, that he may properly prepare his defense. Such notice 
is fatally defective if it merely specifies generally the kind of an 
offense committed. . . . " 
" . . . The function of a bill of particulars is not that of 
compelling the defense to aid the prosecution in stating a cause 
of action. The burden of stating such a cause rests upon the 
shoulders of the prosecution, and until it is stated to the extent 
required by our simple form of criminal pleading, the question 
of whether or not a bill of particulars is prerequisite to further 
action on behalf of the accused, has not arisen. . . . " 
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Commentary 
Time and place is always a material factor. In the Information charging the 
defendant there was a specific, exact time and place alleged that the offense occurred. That 
time and place became significant for reason that defendant is presumed to only know that 
with which he is charged by the Information. Time and place go to credibility issues 
surrounding alleged alcohol use by defendant. For the court to refuse to include the time and 
place as contained in the charge in jury instructions and furthermore refusal of the court to 
advise the jury exactly as the defendant had been charged in the information was an error. 
The jury could have found that no assault occurred at the TIME AND PLACE AS 
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION and therefore acquitted the defendant entirely of the 
charge on that basis alone. Court made specific inquiry of the defendant if the jury "must" 
and counsel in response to the courts inquiry pointed out that the jury "could" and that there 
was no reason to refuse to instruct the jury as the defendant had been charged. Court 
indicated it would only include the time and place if the prosecution agreed, which invitation 
the prosecution declined, even though it in fact had drafted the charge. 
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(F) CLOSING ARGUMENT 
State v. Cummin? 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah App. 1992) 
" . . . @ pg 49 . . . This court will reverse on 
the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if 
defendant has shown that 
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel 
call to the attention of the jury a matter it would 
not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, whether the error is substantial 
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have 
been a more favorable r e su l t . . . . 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990)). In determining 
whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, 
the statement must be viewed in light 
of the totality of the evidence presented at trial. Further, 
because the trial court is in the best position to determine the 
impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its rulings or 
whether the prosecutor's conduct merits a 
mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
Gardner, 
789P.2dat287 " 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 9317-97 Page 23 
City of Moab v Giolas Utah Court of Appeals 
State v. Dibello 780 P. 2d 1221 (Utah 1989) 
" . . . @ pg 1225 . . . Counsel for both sides have 
considerable latitude in their closing arguments. They have the 
right to fully discuss from their perspectives the evidence and 
all inferences and deductions it supports. State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988); State v. Valdez, 
30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). Nonetheless, 
counsel exceeds the bounds of this discretion and commits error 
if he pr she palls tQ the jury's attention material that the jury 
would not be justified in considering in reaching its verdict. 
E.g., State v. Troy, 688 P. 2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); Valdez, 
30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P. 2d at 426 " 
State v. Tillman 7$Q P. 2d 54$ (Utah 1937) 
" . - • @ pg 556 . . . [W]e concede that the prosecutor 
resorted 
to unwise and unnecessary hyperbole in his comments, but we 
are unable 
to identify any prejudicial reference to improper factors for jury 
deliberation. . . . " 
State v. Humphrey 793 P. 2d 918 (Utah App. 1990) 
" . . . @ pg 925 . . . [7] The Utah Supreme Court has 
established a two-part test to determine whether a prosecutor's 
remarks warrant reversal: (1) did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they could not properly 
consider in determining their verdict, and (2) was the error 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that without the error the result would have been 
more favorable for the defendant State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 
475, 478 (Uth 1989); Gardner 789 P.2d at 287; State v. 
Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) " 
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Commentary 
Prosecution in closing argument drew objection from the defense when it 
began to make emotional appeals to the jury about the amount of domestic violence and 
spouse abuse currently occurring. In response to objection, court admonished prosecutor; 
however, there clearly existed a duty to know the law and refrain from same argument and 
draw attention to matters which they should not properly consider. Clearly, grand statements 
about domestic violence were improper for the jury to consider and never should have been 
raised in closing argument. 
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(G) CUMULATIVE ERRORS 
State v Palmer $0Q P. 2d 339 (Utah App. 1993) 
" . . . @ pg 350 . . . [17] In summary, we conclude 
there were numerous errors in the trial of this case. 
Whether these errors can be classified as cumulatively 
harmful turns 
on whether the errors undermine our confidence in the verdict. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 09 (Utah 1993). 
While any one of these errors would in itself be 
harmless, their cumulative effect is not. The testimony in the 
ease basically consisted of E.N.'s assertions and descriptions of 
sexual encounters and defendant's denial of those encounters. 
This case turned primarily on the jury's assessment of the 
credibility of E.N. versus the credibility of defendant. Because 
of the nature of the evidence of guilt and the number of serious 
errors, we find foe grrprg cumulatively frarmfiil and pannot gay 
we have confidence in the verdiet. 
In light of the numerous errors in the prosecution of this 
case, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. Thus, we 
reverse defendants conviction. . . ."(Emphasis Added) 
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Commentary 
Even if alone any one error would not justify reversal, it has previously been 
held that cumulative errors may undermine a verdict and justify reversal thereof. In this 
case, there were multiple errors in the case they being articulated and set out as follows: 
1) POLICE REPORT ADMISSIBILITY Failure of the court to allow 
the defendant to introduce police reports and despite the fact that there exists clear case 
authority in Utah of the right of the defendant to do so. Such reports were not only 
exculpatory of the defendant, but also affected the credibility of the witnesses and were 
consistent with defendants theory of the case. 
2) FALSE IMPRESSION Prosecutor in this case, was aware of the 
existence of the reports, and that there were items contained in them directly contradictory to 
the testimony of the arresting officer as well as the complaining witness. This amounts to 
allowing false testimony to stand and thereby created a false impression when there existed a 
duty to correct and a higher duty to the system of justice. 
3) CROSS EXAMINATION Defendant was denied a right to 
adequately cross-examine witnesses and furthermore to develop his theory of the case which 
the United States Supreme Court has held is a denial of due process, particularly when cross-
examination is restricted and given the circumstances herein of denial by the trial court of 
right to introduce police reports. 
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4) TIME & PLACE Refusal of the court to instruct the jury exactly as 
the charge had been drafted and charged in the Information, and to which the defendant had 
plead NOT GUILTY, including therein the time, place, and location of the offense as had 
been set out. 
5) CLOSING ARGUMENT The prosecution bringing to the juries 
attention matters which it should not properly have considered was prejudicial, particularly 
when there was existing duty for prosecution to know the law and stay within the bounds of 
same. 
Any one of the errors alone would justify reversal, and the cumulative effect 
of these clearly justify reversal herein. 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 9317-97 Page 28 
City of Moab v Giolas Utah Court of Appeals 
(H) CONCLUSION 
Failure of the court to allow the police reports to be admitted into evidence 
upon the defendant motion was critical in the case and could have made the difference 
between conviction and acquital, particularly where the jury had to be sent out twice to 
confer and where it indicated that it felt it was bound by the law "as they had been 
instructed." Furthermore, the court's limitation of the defendnants cross-examination on 
issues involving alcohol in the arresting officers report and existence of and intoxylizer 
report of "no alcohol found" went to credibility. 
Prosecution took advantage of the court's ruling and the defendants inability to 
talk about the report of no alcohol and allowed testimony of drinking and intoxication to 
stand "unrefiited" despite the prosecutions knowledge of police reports to the contrary. 
Time and place of the offense were critical because the defendant had entered 
a plea of NOT GUILTY to a specific Information, alleging a specific offense, at a specific 
place, and at a specific time of day; therefore, he had a right to expect that the jury would be 
instructed or given the allegation out of the information exactly as charged without omitting 
any aspects thereof. 
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Finally, in closing argument, when the prosecution made argument regarding the 
amount of domestic violence occurring these days, it was clearly inappropriate, and given the 
limited testimony and evidence in this case, without such comments it could have made the 
difference in the jury's mind between conviction and acquital; however, it was impossible for 
the court to un-ring the bell. The cumulative effect of the errors in the case are such that 
there cannot be complete confidence in this verdict; accordingly, the conviction herein should 
be reversed. 
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going to be uncomfortable making that decision if the 
evidence requires it? You've all indicated -- No one 
has indicated having a close relationship with Mr. 
Benge. Is there anyone you want me to inquire of in 
particular about their relationship? 
MR. PAYTON: I don't remember particularly, 
other than just general conversation with Mr. Benge 
when I came in, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions, Mr. 
Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, in this case we 
anticipate and expect that there will be quite a bit of 
discussion about alcohol and what effect it did or did 
not have upon the incident in question. I wonder if 
the Court could inquire if there are any jurors who 
have any particular strong feelings about the use of 
alcohol, period, since it is central to this case. 
THE COURT: Well, this is -- this is not a 
case, members of the jury, where -- where someone is 
charged with having used alcohol to excess or having 
used alcohol and driven a vehicle while in an 
intoxicated state, and -- but apparently there will be 
some evidence that some alcohol was involved in some 
way. Different people have different views about --
about the wisdom of using alcohol. 
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All of you understand that it's perfectly 
legal as long as you're twenty-one in this state to use 
alcohol. Is there anyone here who has strong feelings 
that -- that -- that alcohol is something that people 
should not use, and if they do use it they deserve what 
they get? Okay. Anything else about that, Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
JfR. PAYTON: One other question. Are there 
any jurors here who believe that police officers may 
never make mistakes? One of the issues in this case 
will involve credibility of witnesses and potentially 
that a mistake was made. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's a fair question 
also. Members of the jury, this is a case where as you 
know four police officers may testify. You will have 
the opportunity to weigh their testimony against the 
testimony of -- well, you'll have the opportunity to 
weigh their testimony and -- and it may be contradicted 
by other testimony. The Defendant may take a 
different -- may describe a different set of affairs. 
Now, it's perfectly permissible for you to take 
into consideration all the things that I may list for 
you later on that bear on credibility of witnesses. 
You can take into consideration what interest a person 
26 
MR. BENGE: No, Your Honor. 
MR. PAYTON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT; Okay. The Clerk will now read the 
names_pf those of you who will serve on the Jury in 
^his case. If the Clerk reads your name, please don't 
leave. 
« M M L M H N £ ^ ! S ^ ^ l i " ' ££l*Lmmmimmm2£ ' 
Llojd^eirson, JosephBybee. 
THE COURT: That's it. That's the four of 
you. We -- We -- Those whose names were read will 
constitute the Jury in this case. At this time we will 
excuse the rest of you. That includes those of you 
here and those of you out in the audience. We 
appreciate you coming, but you are free to leave at 
this time. You may remain in the audience if you want 
to be a spectator, feel free to do that, we welcome the 
interest of our citizens. Thank you for coming this 
morning. Please make sure you remember to stop 
downstairs at the Clerk's Office and get your check for 
coming today. 
SPEAKER: I have a question. Now, are we, the 
people that were not selected, are we finished with 
this or we don't have --
THE COURT: You are finished. You're finished 
today. 
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to — to refresh your recollection about things. 
Please don't use them to try and coerce another juror 
to believe what you think the evidence said simply 
because you took notes and the other juror didn't take 
notes. Some -- Some people learn better if they take 
notes and some people learn better if they don't take 
notes. It's -- It's -- It's a difference between 
people. I went all the way through college without 
taking any meaningful notes whatsoever in school. Now 
that I'm a Judge, I find myself taking notes all the 
time, and I don't what happened to me that made me so I 
feel like I have to take so many notes, but take notes 
for your own benefit. They will be kept safe for you 
during any recesses, and they will ultimately be 
destroyed at the conclusion of the case, so we will now 
have the Clerk read the charges against the Defendant 
and announce his plea. 
COURT CLERK: The City of Moab vs. Michael 
Bruce Giolas come to know William L. Benge, Moab City 
Attorney, and State's own Information and belief that 
the Defendant committed in the above named city and 
county the 
Ordinance 
Annotated 
Giolas on 
crime 
No 
in 
92-
that 
of 
06 
Assault 
Section 
the said 
the 10th day of 
in 
76-
Def e 
Apr i 
violation of Moab City 
5--102 
ndant, 
1, 19S 
Utah Code 
Michael 
3 in Moab 
Bruce 
, Grand 
County, State of Utah, did attempt with unlawful force 
or violence to do bodily injury to Rebecca M. Giolas, 
dated the 14th day of April, 1993 and signed by William 
L. Benge, Moab City Attorney. 
THE COURT: The charges against the -- And did 
you announce the plea of not guilty? 
COURT CLERK: I'm sorry. And to the 
Information the Defendant has entered a plea of not 
guilty. 
THE COURT: The — The Information is read 
just to inform you of the nature of the charges against 
the Defendant. It is not evidence and it should not be 
considered by you to be any evidence of the Defendant's 
guilt. We will now permit each of the sides to make an 
opening statement. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, there is a 
preliminary matter we'd like to address. The Defense 
in this case would like to invoke the Exclusionary Ru]e 
with regards to witnesses. I likewise would indicate 
that apparently the -- Ms. Giolas a.k.a. Evans has come 
with a friend. I'm concerned about discussion between 
them if the friend is going to be a witness or 
discussion outside the courtroom about the case. 
Likewise, the admonition that if they're witnesses 
that they not participate, and I notice that Officer 
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Mallon has been with her, and of course the United 
States Supreme Court has ruled that the Court may even 
prohibit a witness who is in the course of testifying 
from discussing the matter with either Attorney until 
that is completed. We would like to invoke that 
Exclusion Rule and ask for admonitions for discussions 
at least between those three that I'm concerned about. 
MR. BENGE: First of all, the friend who may 
or may not be here is certainly not on my designated 
list of witnesses and I do not intend to call the same. 
The witnesses that I have called have already 
voluntarily excluded themselves with the exception of 
Ms. Rebecca Evans and Officer Becky Mallon, who is my 
Investigating Officer, 
THE COURT: All right. You are entitled to 
have one Officer with you representing the State, and 
you're designating Ms. -- Officer Mallon as that? 
MR. BENGE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you object to Ms. Giolas or Ms. 
Evans being excluded? I think --
MR. BENGE: Well, she will be my first 
witness. 
THE COURT: All right. So it's probably 
irrelevant anyway. 
MR. PAYTON: And I suppose after she testifies 
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tell anything, not to get into trouble. We are going 
to present testimony from Rebecca Evans as to what I've 
told you. We're going to present testimony from 
Officer Mallon as to what she observed. We probably --
We may or may not introduce one of the other officers 
depending on time constraints as her testimony may be 
(inaudible). I want you to listen to what they have to 
say, listen, of course, to what the Defense has to say, 
and I'm sure you'll do a good job. Thank you. 
MR. PAYTON; Gentlemen of the Jury, my name is 
Steven Lee Payton. You will hear a story today which 
is substantially in dispute. You will, in fact, hear, 
as Mr. Benge has indicated, testimony that Mr. and Mrs. 
Giolas were driving down the street. You will hear 
testimony that he attempted to keep her from jumping 
out of the jeep as she had attempted to do on other 
occasions. You will hear testimony from Mrs. Giolas 
that her assertion was that she was struck. 
You will likewise hear testimony that she will 
be adamant that this was as a result of the fact that 
Mr. Giolas had been drinking, that he had been drinking 
heavily, that he was drunk. She will admit to the fact 
that her version -- and the testimony she will give we 
anticipate will be that forty-five minutes before 
Officer Mallon arrived that they had been drinking 
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heavily. You will then hear Officer Mallon testify 
that she believed that the Defendant was intoxicated, 
tnat after a conference with other officers that she 
arrested him for Public Intoxication and for Assault. 
Officer Mallon will likewise testify that that's 
wiat it indicates in her report. However, you will 
-ear testimony and hear evidence that upon taking the 
Defendant to the Grand County Jail that Officer Mallon 
who was adamant as well as Mrs. Giolas was adamant that 
the Defendant had been drinking and drunk, that for 
some reason a Highway Patrol Officer at the Grand 
County Jail ran a breathalyzer test on Mr. Giolas. The 
results of that test were 000. 
Officer Mallon will then indicate that she 
changed her position, she did not cite him for Public 
Intox after she had been so adamant that he was 
intoxicated, she could smell alcohol upon hin and other 
matters. We,don't have an explanation, but nobody 
asserts that the test given by a third independent 
party is not accurate. 
You will hear testimony in this case from Ms. 
Giolas, now Ms. Evans, that she has testified to these 
facts in a prior hearing in connection with seeking a 
protective order, that she testified to those facts 
that in her own words that the case was dismissed for 
insufficient evidence. You will hear testimony from 
Ms. Mallon that the reason -- and her motivation in 
this case is the fact that she is involved in a custody 
fight with another ex-husband over her son, and 
therefore she has brought and continues to maintain 
that this incident happened with Mr. Giolas. 
Finally, you will hear from Ms. Giolas and 
from Officer Mallon that Mr. Giolas that night 
indicated there was nothing wrong with him, he had not 
been drinking, that Mrs. Giolas was the one who had 
been drinking and that she had also been using 
anti-depressant medication prescribed by her 
psychiatrist and that she became emotional and 
irrational when that took place. 
He at all times will indicate that he'd never 
been drinking, but nobody listened to him and it 
resulted in this charge. That is the testimony you 
will hear here today. It is in dispute. Some of it --
Much of it is indisputable, particularly the scientific 
evidence in this case. We would ask upon the 
conclusion, if the evidence is as I have represented it 
to you, that you find Mr. Giolas not guilty of the 
crime of Assault. 
THE COURT: Members of the Jury, the 
statements of Counsel in their opening statenents are 
not to be considered by you as evidence. You'll have 
to determine whether the evidence actually proves what 
they have stated to you that it would as the evidence 
itself comes in. The opening statements are merely 
intended as a kind of a road map to you to help you 
understand where they're coming from and what they hope 
to be able to prove as the evidence comes in. Mr. 
Benge, you may call your first witness. 
MR. BENGE: Call Ms. Evans. 
COURT CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in the matter pending 
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
MS. EVANS: I do. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By MR. BENGE: 
Q State your name for the Court, please. 
A Rebecca M. Evans. 
Are you employed, Ms. Evans? 
Yes. 
How? 
I am a Secretary for the Director of Special 
Education in the Alpine School District. 
Q Ms. Evans, were you known prior as Rebecca 
Giolas? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
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A 
Q 
Defendant, 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
1 JMr. Giolas 
A 
Q 
A 
9th. 
Q 
10th day o 
in Moab on 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
And were you married at one time to the 
Michael Giolas? 
Yes. 
When were you married? 
We were married August 1st, 1992. 
JDid you subsequently become divorced from 
? 
Yes. 
When? 
July 6th, 1993 — or it was finalized July 
Ms. Evans, calling your attention to the 
f April of this year, I ask you if you were 
that day? 
Yes. 
Were you with Mr. Giolas on that day? 
Yes. 
For what purpose were you in Moab? 
We came down to go jeeping with a bunch of 
friends that we met down here. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
When did you come down? 
The 8th of April. It was a Thursday. 
Where were you staying? 
Days Inn. 
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and we left. 
MR. PAYTON: Excuse me. 
THE COURT: Ms. Evans, when there's an 
objection by either party the witness needs to stop 
answering the question until such time as I can make a 
ruling. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. PAYTON: The question was where had you 
been jeep -- where had you — The question posed to her 
was where had you been jeeping, and her answer is 
non-responsive about the night before and whether being 
drunk. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Evans, confine 
your response to where you had been jeeping. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. The Park. We went up 
through the Park. 
Q (By MR. BENGE) Arches National Park or 
Canyonlands? 
A Yes. Yes. 
Q Do you recall what time you headed back or 
came back to Moab? 
A I believe it was around 4:00 o'clock. 
Q During this day of jeeping had you been 
drinking? 
A I drank a half a beer about 6:00 o'clock 
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that evening. 
Q Before you headed back into town? 
A
 -Wo» No. Hg_drinking took place until we 
rj^unjedjt^th^jjotelo^ 
Q Okay. And you had what? 
A A half a beer. 
Q And did you have anything else? 
A There was some kind of Schnopp's, somebody 
was passing a bottle around, and I had taken two 
swallows of that also. 
Q On that day had you taken any kind of 
medication? 
A None. 
Q On the prior day did you take any kind of 
medication? 
A None. 
Q Were you prescribed any kind of medication 
at that particular time, Rebecca? 
A I had been prescribed a prescription drug 
called Zoloft, which is anti-depressant, and I had — 
the last time I took that was a week prior to going 
down there, because the Psychiatrist --
MR. PAYTON: Objection. I think the 
guestion -- Excuse me. I think she's answered the 
guestion at this point. 
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THE COURT: Yeah. Just confine yourself to 
answering the question. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's an answer to the question. 
Q (By MR. BENGE) When was the last time you 
had taken that particular drug? 
A One week prior to April 8th. 
Q ^ow. vou stated that this — the drinks that 
you had were in the parking lot after you, returned from 
jeeping? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Who all »- Was Mr. Giolas present? 
Yes. 
And your friends? 
Yes. 
P-ijL-MjL^Giolas have anything to drink :tha_L 
day to your knowledge? 
A Very much. 
Q Now, calling your attention to some time 
after that, were you with Mr. Giolas again in the jeep? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was the purpose of that? 
A There was a certain trail that these --
those -- the really expensive jeeps, like forty 
thousand dollars, I don't know, and they were going to 
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getting out of the jeep, how nany times did Mr. Giolas 
hit you? 
A Three. 
Q And were all of them with the back of the 
hand or a fist or an open hand, or how would you — 
would you describe each particular blow and its effect 
on you if any? 
A The first blow was a semi closed fist, the 
second blow was a little bit less, because he only had 
one hand. He was trying to drive and hitting me with 
the other hand. And the third was hard also. 
Q Did you sustain any injuries as a result of 
those hits? 
I just had a red face. A 
Q 
motel? 
A 
Q 
Did these individuals take you back to your 
Yes. 
Did you ask them to alert any law 
enforcement authorities? 
A No. 
Q Why? 
A I didn't want thera to — I didn't want Mike 
to get them. I felt like Mike would get them. I 
didn't want to get them involved. 
MR. PAYTON: Objection, Your Honor. She 
A I was in the hallway. 
Q And where was the Defendant, Mr. Giolas? 
A On the other side of the door with his ear 
up against the door telling her how crazy I was. 
Q What then happened? 
A Some friends came up the hall and they took 
me into their room and they kept me there. I phoned 
home, which is Lehi, and family members came down and 
got me. 
Q You ultimately — Strike that — Did you 
ultimately make a written statement for the police? 
A Yes. I did. 
MR. BENGE: That's all I have of Ms. Evans. 
THE COURT: You may cross examine, Mr. Payton. 
_CROS_S_EXAMINATION 
By MR. PAYTON; 
Q Ms. Evans, what time do you allege that the 
assaults in question occurred? 
A When he hit me — When I allege he hit mo? 
Q Jfes, ma'am. 
A Approximately 6:30 or 7:00 o'clock. I'm not 
real sure. Between 6:30 and 7:30. 
^
 Well# y°u said at 6:00 o'clock you had been 
drinking; is that correct? 
A Uh huh. 
Q jgo we know that at 6:00 o'clock you were in 
the parking lot of the motel? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A Correct* 
Q And you had some Schnopp's at that time; is 
£ha£»rJLc£t? 
You said you had a half a beer? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you indicate — You say Mike had been 
drinking? 
A i£» 
Q And he had been drinking heavily? 
A He had been drinking. He had drank heavily 
while we were there. Yes. 
Q Let's confine our time period to April 10th 
just prior to this assault, okay. 
A Okay. 
Q Did you tell the police that he had been 
drinking heavily? 
• • • • • • • • > • • • • • • • » 
A I told the police that he had been drinking. 
Q Did you volunteer that? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you indicate that you were drinkincLyj^h 
him so you know that he was? 
A Yes. 
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Q 
drinking w 
said 
been 
A 
yes. 
Q 
drink 
A 
Q 
forty-five 
that he'd 
A 
again? 
1 that 
Q 
appro 
^U^™o£ii£ieiri i M a* * o n o n A P r * ! 10th discuss his 
ithyou? 
She asked me if Mike had been drinking and I 
And the reason you knew is because you had 
ing with him? 
I sat right there, shared the same bottle. 
Did you Indicate that as recently as 
minutes prior to Officer Mallon's arrival 
been drinking heavily? 
I'm sorry, would you state the question 
Have you at any time ever made a statement 
ximately forty-five minutes before all hell 
1 broke loose that he'd been sitting there drinking with 
you? 
A 
Q 
there was 
April 10th 
the 
A 
Yes. 
When did you first -- Were you aware that 
an intoxilyzer test given to Mr. Giolas on 
7 
I didn't realize that until we went on to 
sx-parte protective order hearing in Provo. 
Q 
A 
Q 
And that was April 22nd; was it not? 
Yes. 
About twelve days after this incident? 
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received it from Mr. Benge, Your Honor, so he has a 
copy. 
THE COURT: It makes no difference to me, Mr. 
Payton. Everyone seems to agree that it's the letter. 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) Did you make the statement 
that the only thing visible — this would have been 
April 10th — on your body were his suck marks all over 
his neck where he had sucked on your neck the day ^ 
before? 
A Yes. That was the only visible flesh 
showing. 
Q And you hated hickeys because they look 
trashy? 
A Right. 
Q And so by your own statement those were the 
only visible marks on you as evidence that you had been 
struck? 
A That you could see. 
Q That you could see. I take it then you take 
issue with Officer Mallon's report that those were 
attributable to an assault on April 10? 
A T n e
 suck marks? 
Q Yes. 
A They arose from April 9th. 
Q Betty McElroy you're familiar with? 
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Q And then you proceeded to make statements 
what you would do with regards to these proceedings; 
did you not? 
A No. I didn't talk to Mike at all, nothing, 
we left. 
Q After those proceedings, you proceeded to 
file affidavits in your custody case of witnesses that 
you never ever have offered --
MR. BENGE: Objection, Your Honor. 
Irrelevant. 
MR. PAYTON: I didn't — 
THE COURT: Now we're getting too far away, 
Mr. Payton. I'm going to cut you off. Sustained. 
Q CBy MR. PAYTON) The fact is in this case 
Mr. Giolas did not strike you; correct? 
A 
Q 
A 
Mr. Giolas did strike me. 
He had not been drinking had he? 
He was drinking. Yes. I drank wjtji_JTJLm. 
MR. PAYTON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Re-Direct, Mr. Benge? 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By MR. BENGE: 
Q Just one matter that came out on Cross 
Examination, Ms. Evans. You stated that Mike was also 
taking the Zoloft medicine? 
Ill 
nothing 
py MR. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
but the truth, so help you God? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BENGE: 
State your name for the Court, please. 
Jeckyiallon, 
How are you employed? 
-L^«-a P Q U s e Officer fpr Moa.fr city-
How long have you been in that capacity? 
Five years. 
And do you have any previous law enforcement 
experience? 
A 
Office 
Q 
County 
A 
Q 
Almost a year for the Grand County Sheriff's 
prior to that. 
And in what capacity were you with the Grand 
Sheriff's Office? 
A Deputy Sheriff. 
Officer Mallon, calling your attention to 
the 10th day of April of this year, I'd ask you if you 
were on 
A 
Q 
that da 
duty? 
Yes. I was. 
And in what capacity were you on duty on 
y? 
MR. PAYTON: Objection. I think he said April 
8th. The allegation is April 10th. 1 
MR. BENGE: I thought I said April 10th. 
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hallway. 
Q After she ran out of the room into the 
hallway, what happened? 
A I think as she was leaving the room another 
Officer arrived, Sergeant Lindquist, and — No. I'm 
sorry. I don't think he got there yet. Rebecca stood 
out in the hallway, I went out with her, asked Mike to 
remain in the room, pulled the door shut behind me, but 
kept my foot in the door so the door didn't lock and I 
could get back in and speak with Mr. Giolas, a n d ! 
talked to Rebecca out in the hall. 
Q And what was the nature of your conversation 
with Rebecca in the hall? 
A I asked her what had happened prior to my 
arrival there. 
Q And what did she tell you? 
A She described the same incident that she's 
described this morning on the stand, that he had hit 
her a couple of times in the jeep as they were going on 
the jeep trail or going up to a trail, she had jumped 
out of the jeep and some citizens who were on the 
street had offered her help and brought her back to the 
motel. 
Q After talking to Rebecca Evans, then Giolas, 
what did you then do or what did happen? 
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A Ns. Evans went down the hall with some 
friends to another room and I believe I went down there 
with her and spoke to her, left some witness statements 
with her, then I went back into the motel room and I 
told Mr. Giolas that he was under arrest for domestic 
violence assault. 
Q Did you make any observations about Mr. 
Giolas at that time or prior or subsequent? 
A He was angry. He made a great effort to be 
polite to me. He is -- He had an odor of alcohol on 
his breath, but he wasn't unsteady on his__feet. He — 
He — There were open bottles in the room, but I -- and 
^couLddetect^tha^^helia^ Mrs. Giolas 
also had a slight odor of alcohol on her breath. Mr. 
Giolas was obviously to me angry at his wife, but he --
he would visibly calm himself and try to be polite to 
me. 
Q Was he consistently polite to you throughout 
the process? 
A No. 
Q Did you ultimately place him -- place him in 
any form of restraint pursuant to your arrest? 
A I did. I placed handcuffs on him there in 
the motel room. 
Q And was he cooperative with that? 
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(WHEREAS, A DISCUSSION WAS HELD BETWEEN THE JUDGE 
AND BOTH COUNSEL). 
By MR. 
Q 
report 
A 
i Q 
A 
Q 
to inc] 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. BENGE: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: You may Cross Examine, Mr. Payton. 
CROS S^EXAMINATION 
PAYTON: 
Officer Mallon, have you reviewed your 
in this case? | 
Yes, sir. | 
All of your reports? 
I believe there's only one report. | 
When doing a report you -- your tlftention is | 
ude everything that may have a relevance or | 
bearing on the case; is that correct? | 
A 
Q 
do you 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, sir. | 
You have indicated today -- And, by the way, 
have your report with you? 
No. I don't. 
Is it present here in Court? 
It's on the bench. Yes. 
Could we -- Is it someplace where we could 
retrieve it so you could look at it? 
! A It's a file folder sitting right there on 
the front bench. 
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Q Yoji_h&yg_tgstified today that there was an 
odor of alcohol on Ms. Evans, then Mrs. Giolas. That 
particular bit of information appears nowhere in your 
.report does it? s
A No. It doesn't. 
Q And so for the first time today the Defense 
is discovering that there was alcohol on her breath as 
well; is that correct? 
A I don't know when you discovered that, sir. 
Q But in any case, you didn't put that 
information in your report? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q Mr. Giolas that night told you that he was 
not the one that was drinking, that she had been 
drinking; is that correct? 
A I believe he told me she had been drinking. 
Yes. 
Q So the issue of whether or not she had 
consumed alcohol was, in fact, an issue when you 
arrested him; was it not? 
A No. It wasn't an issue. 
Q But he told you she'd been drinking and now 
you concede there was an odor of alcohol on her breath 
and you didn't put that in your report? 
THE COURT: That's been asked and answered, 
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Counsel. Don't argue with the witness, just go ahead 
and ask the next question. 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) You felt that alcohol was 
important with regards to this incident; did you not? 
A No. I did not. 
Q Well, in your report you go to great lengths 
to indicate that there were numerous liquor bottles on 
tables and dressers that were full, open, partially 
consumed and some empty; is that what you put in your 
report? 
A There's one sentence there that says that. 
Yes, sir. 
Q You also go on to indicate not just that 
there was an odor, but there was a strong odor of 
alcohol on Mr. Giolas' breath and his person; do you 
not? 
Yes. I did say that. 
You were present when Ms. Evans testified 
Yes. 
A 
Q 
today? 
A 
Q And she indicated to you that Mr. Giolas was 
saying that — Correction. You heard her testify today 
that Mr. Giolas was telling you don't pay attention to 
her because she was irrational, she'd been drinking, 
and that she had emotional problems or mental problems 
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I think is what you said? 
A Yes. 
Q That, likewise, is not noted in your report; 
is it? 
A I believe it is. 
Q jaiiL_YOU_-fill out a probable cause statement 
for purposes of detaining Mr. Giolas in jail? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q Do you have that with you at the bench --
Correction, at your seat there? 
A Yes. Yes. I do. 
Q In your testimony you indicate that he was 
arrested solely for assault; is that what you said 
today? 
A That was what he was charged with. Yes, 
sir. 
Q But when Mr. Benge asked you, you said you 
arrested him solely for assault; is that correct? 
A I advised him at the motel room, I believe 
is what I said, that he was under arrest for assault. 
Q .In_y,our report, however, your probable cause 
statement for holding him in jail, you indicate he was 
placed under arrest for domestic assault and 
intoxication; do you not? 
A It says that. I believe the charges at the 
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top say only assault. 
Q JEut in your report you have stated that you 
arrested him also for intoxication; is that correct? 
A Ho, sir, that's not correct. That's not my 
report, that's the probable cause statement. 
Q I believe you have subscribed at the end of 
this your signature and that this statement is made 
under oath by you in its entirety; have you not? 
A Yes, sir. I signed that. 
Q And you don't make any qualification 
therein, you say that he was placed under arrest for 
domestic assault conjunction and intoxication? 
A It says that in a sentence below, yes, sir. 
The list of charges on top says only assault. 
Q Okay. So you had every intention of 
charging him with intoxication; did you not? 
A No. I did not. 
Q But you arrested him for that --
I — 
-- based upon your observations of him? 
I began an investigation based on the odor 
of breath on -- odor of alcohol on his breath. 
Q And you arrested him -- Excuse me -- And you 
arrested him for intoxication? 
No. I did not. 
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Q But that's not what this probable cause 
statement says; correct? 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Yes. Sustained. 
MR. PAYTON: I'll move on. 
Q You believed him to be intoxicated? did you 
not? I think a yes or no would help. 
A No, sir. 
Q You did not believe he was intoxicated? 
A I believed he had been drinking. 
Q Okay. How did it come about -- Well, let me 
strike that -- Did you ever discuss an intoxilyzer 
result with Ms. Evans on April 10? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q Have you at any time ever discussed the 
results of the intoxilyzer test? 
A No. I have not. With Ms. Evans? 
Q Yes. 
A No. I haven't. 
Q In your report that you have sworn to_you 
do, in fact, include therein that whe^_iJr^__Sj>oJfaa^.^_M 
submitted to an intoxilyzer test at the Sheriff's 
Office that the — 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I'm going to object 
before, anticipating what might be coming in, as 
13 
bringing in the evidence without asking a question 
something that would be hearsay. 
MR. PAYTON: gtjtf v§, B l E M f however, the 
Utah Supreme Court, one of Mr. Yengich's cases, 
indicated that a police report may not come into 
evidence unless the Defendant wants to introduce 
something from it, that he has that right, but the 
prosecution may not or the parties must --
THE COURT: We've discussed this in chambers, 
Mr. -- Mr. Payton. Do you want to give me the 
citations of the cases that you rely on? 
MR. PAYTON: State vs. Bertul is — that 
citation I would have to find, but the other case of 
Walker is 624 P2d 687, and State vs. Snorr. S45 P2d 
947. The Walker case is Utah Supreme Court 1981, the 
Snorr case is the Utah Court of Appeals 1993. The 
Walker case would be the more relevant. State vs. 
Bertul I do not have the cite here, but ^efensejia^ 
introduce police reports, Prosecution may not. 
THE COURT: All right. Members of the Jury, 
we're going to take a little recess for me to consider 
a legal question concerning the admissibility of 
evidence. Don't -- Don't you concern yourselves with 
that, except that I'm going to excuse you while I 
consider that question. In fact, we'll take a -- we'll 
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MR. PAYTON: What pertul says is that the 
prosecution can only introduce the information in the 
police report if it's done by stipulation of the 
parties, but the defense has the right to introduce the 
information from the police report on it/s own. 
However, that doesn't mean a report comes into 
evidence, but the defense only has that privilege, not 
the prosecution. 
THE COURT: Well, I think what that means, 
and, of course, I can't really comment -- I can't be 
sure without reading the case, but I'm aware that 
police reports could be introduced into evidence only 
at the request of the defense. The prosecution -- The 
most the prosecution will be able to do is if they are 
using them as past recollection recorded, get then read 
into the record and not introduced in full. 
MR. PAYTON: I think the Walker case is 
probably closer to this issue, because --
THE COURT: All right. Well, I've read the 
Walker case. 
MR. PAYTON: The matter of — 
THE COURT: I've read Walker and Snorr. and 
what those cases say is that the -- they cover two 
questions. The first is the prosecution's obligation 
to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense, 
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and if it doesn't do that, then — then I think in 
Walker there was a writ of corum novus that was 
granted. 
And in — And both of them talk about the 
prosecution not being permitted to knowingly introduce 
false testimony, but I don't think that, and I would --
I would — I would enforce that, but I don't think 
it — that — that an intoxilyzer result of 0.00 at 
some point after these events occurred necessarily 
makes the testimony of Ms. Evans false, because it may 
be that there's — that it would be — there would be a 
perfectly logical physical explanation or chemical 
explanation for why the Defendant may have consumed 
alcohol at some earlier point that day and still have 
at i '•'• " "" — — — ' 
had a negative breathalyzer or intoxilyzer, or that he 
may have had an odor of alcohol on his breath at the 
time that the Officer confronted him and still come up 
with a 0.00 intoxilyzer. 
MR. PAYTON: May I point something out to the 
Court in the Walker case? 
THE COURT: Sure. Sure. 
MR. PAYTON: One of the problems in Walker was 
that the police had made disclosures to Mr. Austin, who 
they name, and then when he argued the case he argued 
that there was no evidence to support the defendant's 
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contention, and that was the issue that the Supreme 
Court went off on, that that was a fraud on the Court 
and a fraud on the defendant, because the prosecution 
knew that what the defendant was asserting was 
consistent with the evidence that they knew about, and 
they said that the prosecution could not come in and 
argue that, that wasn't true or there was no evidence 
to support that, when they, in fact, knew that there 
was evidence. 
THE COURT; Well, but I don't think — M r . 
Payton, you can't use that rule to get around the Rules 
of Evidence. The Rules of Evidence apply to the 
prosecution and the defense. You must have known this 
issue was going to come up, you know what the rules are 
to get in a breathalyzer, at least in a DUI case, and 
you haven't even met that standard. You have — You 
have relied instead on the fact that the prosecution is 
supposed to let any evidence come in, admissible or 
not, if it's — if it's harmful to their case, and I 
don't think that can be the rule of law. 
MR. PAYTON: Well, I think at this juncture 
I'm only interested in questioning the Officer about 
what is and 
don't think 
may come in 
is not contained within her report, and I 
I've reached the issue of -- it very well 
in some other way, but I'm sinply saying 
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that the issue here is what, in fact, she has included 
within her report. 
^ — — — — •! || .1,1 
THE COURT: But even Officer's statements 
contained in a report, if they are hearsay or otherwise 
inadmissible, are not admissible simply because they 
are in an Officer's report. 
MR. PAYTON: Well, I think --
THE COURT: I can't believe that that's — 
that would be -- that would be the state of the law, so 
I'm going to rule that this is inadmissible. I'm going 
to — The defense must meet the same evidentiary 
standards as the prosecution. The testimony that 
you're seeking to introduce is hearsay, even assuming 
that what would be admissible in a DUI prosecution 
would be admissible here, which may not be true at all. 
In a DUI case you would have to have the 
testing officer testify and have the intoxilyzer 
affidavit, and that's the sufficient basis for refusing 
to admit this evidence, and that is the basis for r.y 
decision, but if I were to go beyond that, I would 
still have a question about the potential for 
confusion. 
How is the Jury to be expected to weigh a 
negative intoxilyzer reading at some point after the 
drinking allegedly occurred against the testimony of 
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the Officer and of Ms. Evans without someone to relate 
those to? How is alcohol burned off? How is it 
absorbed? What quantities do you have to take before 
you'll get some reading out of the breathalyzer? And 
this is a — this is a collateral issue. It bears on 
the credibility of a complaining witness in what I 
consider to be a marginal way considering the evidence 
today. The — The -- I think the potential for delay 
and confusion outweighs the probative value. 
Now, this is something -- I may still permit a 
restriction on what Mr. Benge is entitled to argue, but 
this is really something that you raised, Mr. Payton, 
in your opening statement, and -- and I don't think 
that it has ever been a part of Mr. Benge's case that 
the Defendant was intoxicated or not. I don't think 
that — 
mention 
think he 
anything 
He didn 
that in 
intend 
to do 
't argue 
his 
s to 
with 
that in his opening 
opening statement, 
argi 
the 
Lie to the Jury 
and 
that 
guilt or innocence 
, he 
I don 
that 
of th 
didn 
't 
has 
e 
't 
Defendant. 
If he does, if he tries to argue that the 
Defendant was intoxicated, then I'm going to cut him 
off. But -- But on this collateral issue I think the 
potential for confusion and delay outweighs the 
probative value, so I'm going to --
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, could I — Excuse me. 
THE COURT: You want to point out another 
basis? 
MR. PAYTON: I wanted to clear up one thing. 
State vs. Starns is a criminal case that the Utah 
Supreme Court has indicated that we have never really 
required defendants in criminal cases to take 
exception, and I think in one of your earlier rulings 
you cited to State vs. Barnes, which seems to be in 
conflict, but the Court has twice mentioned things that 
were raised in opening statement that I made. 
I just want to point out that this whole issue 
of drinking and alcohol was raised by Mr. Benge through 
his first witness, Ms. Giolas, and that was the first 
affirmative evidence, because the Court instructed the 
Jury that opening statement is not evidence, but he has 
injected -- I don't mean him personally, but I'm saying 
Jbhe prosecution has injected this whole issue of 
aAcghoi through Ms. Giolas. He was the first to raise 
it. 
THE COURT: Well, let's be clear about that, 
Mr. Payton. I think that -- I may be wrong. I may be 
wrong about this, but I think when you talk about it in 
your opening statement then Mr. Benge is entitled to 
ask about that on Direct, at least sufficiently to 
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defend himself against the argument that he's trying to 
hide something. 
You brought — I think — I think when we talk 
about who opened the door on this, it was you that 
opened the door. I may be wrong about that, and if I'm 
wrong, I'm happy to be reversed, but that's my ruling, 
you opened the door on this. All right. So the ruling 
is that the objection is sustained. Mr. Bailiff, you 
can bring the Jury back in. 
BAILIFF: The Jury can come back in now. 
THE COURT: The record will show that the Jury 
is -- has returned. Mr. — Mr. Payton, you may proceed 
with your questioning. 
Q {py MR. PAYTON) Officer Mallon, at some 
point you decided that the Defendant would not, in 
fact, be charged with the offense nf intoxication; is 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And why did you make a decision that the 
Defendant not be charged with intoxication after having 
initially arrested him for that? 
A I don't believe I said I initially arrested 
him for that. 
Q Well, I think we've established that your 
report says at least at one place --
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MR. BENGE: Your Honor, asked and answered. 
THECOURT: j^et's not go into that again, Mr. 
Payton. She did state her probable — there is --
she's admitted that there is a sentence in her probable 
cause statement that says that, and she says that the 
charges at the top were not — did not include 
intoxication, so let's — 
" ' ^ 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) I direct your attention 
then to the first page of your actual report, not your 
PC, probable cause statement, but your actual report. 
MR. PAYTON: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) Fourth paragraph. 
A Uh huh. 
Q I won't ask you to read it out loud, just to 
refresh your recollection. 
A Read it out loud? 
Q No. Do not read it out loud. 
A Okay. 
Q And you have your report in front of you 
now; do you not? 
A Yes. I do. 
Q Okay. After having initially made a 
decision that Mr. Giolas was intoxicated, you decided 
not to cite him for that. Why was that? 
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A I did not make an initial decision that he 
was intoxicated. 
Q Okay. You didn't charge him_witJL. 
Intoxication; correct? 
A Correct. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Why? 
I didn't believe he was intoxicated. 
But you maintain you smelled alcohol.? 
Yes. I did. 
And you've heard Ms. Evans say that he had 
been drinking heavily and she believed hiro to be 
intoxicated; correct? 
A I heard her say he'd been drinking heavily. 
Q Did she at any time indicate to you her 
opinion was he was intoxicated? 
A I don't recall. 
Q You don't recall or she didn't tell you — 
didn't say that? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Did she want him charged with intoxication? 
A I have no idea. 
Q So you do not believe in this case that his 
conduct was attributable to excessive use of alcohol? 
A Initially I wondered about that. 
Eventually, after speaking with him and speaking with 
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bject to that, Your Honor. 
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Same objection, Your Honor. | 
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MR. PAYTON: That it's hearsay? 
MR. BENGE: Yes. 
MR. PAYTON: I — 
THE COURT: With the same restriction, 
anything of your own personal observation, what you 
actually saw yourself? 
THE WITNESS: From my personal observation I 
believe he had been drinking. 
0tmmmmmmmmtmm^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) Well, your report is based 
on personal information; is it not? 
A Yes. It is, and also some information that 
was given to me that I can't testify to. 
Q I'm sorry, beg pardon? 
A Other information from other officers would 
be contained in their reports. 
Q Now, Officer, you filled out a probable 
cause statement under oath; correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And based on that information you wanted Mr. 
Giolas to be held without bail; correct? 
A _Correct. 
Q Did somebody initiate a test of him for 
intoxication? I'd ask --
MR. BENGE: Objection, Your Honor. 
MR. PAYTON: She can indicate yes or no if she 
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has a foundation and knowledge. 
THE COURT: Well, given my ruling, what 
possible purpose could there be for this, Mr. -- Mr. 
Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Just her basis for knowledge. 
Rule of Evidence says I concede that she must have some 
basis, but the question was does --
THE COURT: Well, if she were going to testify 
based on the test, then it would be hearsay anyway, so 
the objection is sustained. 
MR. PAYTON: I don't believe we're to that 
point, Your Honor, but I accept the ruling. 
THE COURT: Well, there's — -
MR. PAYTON: I think my question to her was 
does it -- does she have personal knowledge that at 
some point there was a test conducted on the Defendant 
for intoxication. 
THE COURT: All right. And my ruling is that 
it's going to be -- that it's irrelevant, because if 
you can't get the test result in, you can't get -- what 
point is there in knowing that the test was done? 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) Did you initiate a -- Did 
you request that a test be run on the Defendant? 
MR. BENGE: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Payton, move on. 
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Don't keep trying this. 
Q (By HR. PAYTON) Officer Mallon, what's the 
basis for the information in your provable cause 
statement that you signed under oath? Paragraph -- Do 
you have it in front of you? 
A Yes. I do. 
Q Go down to paragraph six, please. 
A And what was the question? 
Q What is the basis for the information that 
you have set out in paragraph six? Do you have 
personal information that caused you to make those 
statements in paragraph six of your probable cause 
statement? 
A No. I do not have personal information. 
Q So you don't know that of your personal 
information? 
A The first sentence, yes, sir, I do. I was 
the one that took that action, I placed him under 
arrest. 
Q You didn't take the action in the second 
sentence? 
A No, sir. I did not. 
Q Did you do something to initiate or cause 
.that action to be taken? 
A No, sir. I did not. 
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and I haven't moved to do that. That's what the 
problem is we continually run into. He's assuming I'm 
going to introduce something into evidence that I 
haven't moved to do. 
THE COURT: All right. You're right. I am a 
little bit premature on that. If you want to show 
something to her, fine, go ahead and show something to 
her. 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) I don't ask you to read 
this out loud, just read it to yourself, okay. 
A Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 
Q Before you have seen those things today, has 
that ever been brought to your attention with regards 
to your name and inclusion therein? 
A No. It hasn't. 
Q Did Ms. Evans ever indicate to you that Mr. 
Giolas is an adverse witness against her in her custody 
fight with her first husband? 
A No. She didn't. 
Q You have test -- You have set out in your 
report that there were red marks on her; is that 
correct? 
That's correct. 
^ • 
Q And you have heard her testimony today 
^hat -- Correction, yes — that the marks were 
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attributable to her husband sucking on her neck the 
night before. Have you heard that testimony? 
A I heard her say that that's where the marks 
on her neck came from. The ones on her face did not 
come from there I don't believe. 
Q Well, did you -- were you present when I 
asked her if there were any other marks and she said 
other than her face being red no, that there were no 
other marks on her? 
A Other than her face being red. 
Q That there were no other marks on her? 
A Yes. I remember her saying that. 
Q I'm sorry, if we talk together the tape will 
not take it down. Were you present in Court when she 
testified that other than the three marks she indicated 
from her husband sucking on her neck the night before, 
that there were no other marks other than her face 
being red? 
A Yes. I was present. 
Q And is your testimony in contradiction with 
her, that you're saying there were other marks? 
A No. I'm saying that there were marks on her 
neck and there were red marks on her face. 
Q Okay. But your testimony is at odds with 
«*————____^__ 
hers if you were present, wouldn't you say? 
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A .Ho. X don ' t b e l i e v e i t i s . 
MR. BENGET^-^Asked and answered, Your Honor. 
THE COURTS Asked — Strartoined. 
Q (By MR. PAYTON) Di^ fo i^make thef r e q u e s t 
that o t h e r o f f i c e r s p r e s e n t make a r e p o r t ? 
A No. I d i d n ' t . 
Q Did your Sergeant make a report? 
A I believe he did. Yes. 
Q Have you reviewed his report? 
A No. I haven't. 
Q Have you reviewed any other reports other 
than your own in this case? 
A No. I haven't. 
Q Are they contained in the file in front of 
you that was brought to you? 
A I -- All I have in front of me is my report, 
sir. 
Q And those are the only reports you've 
reviewed today in connection with this case? 
A Yes. They are. 
Q And you have not looked at any other 
officer's report? 
A No. I have not. 
Q Since this incident you have not looked at 
any other officer's report? 
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and that we would rely on the errors to this point. 
I would likewise ask, since this arose in the 
case of -- it was your case -- Monticello vs. --
THE COURT: City of Monticello vs. 
Christensen. 
MR. PAYTON: The City of Monticello vs. 
Christensen
 r there was some suggestion in that case 
that they didn't have the — a record or something to 
look at, not that they come into evidence, but I would 
like to have the -- Mr. Benge examine the discovery 
material supplied to me and have them placed in a 
separate sealed envelope so that the legal issue before 
you at least of the Appellate Court would have the 
benefit of those reports in terms of information 
supplied by the prosecution and whether or not it 
should or should not come in. I say with the 
disclaimer that they're not introduced in evidence, but 
they're there so that they will be before the Appellate 
Court in a separate --
THE COURT: Why don't we do it a little 
easier, Mr. Payton. You tell me what you think the 
reports would show and get Mr. Benge to concede that if 
the reports were admissible that's what tney would 
show. 
MR. PAYTON: -And that's what I was — 
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1 THE COURT: Rather than — Rather than clutter 
2 up the file with things that are not admitted but are 
3 proffered. I 
4 MR. PAYTON: I simply do that because that's a 
5 procedure I might indicate in Federal Court that they ' 
6 normally -- you put it in a separate envelope and mark 
7 it so that the Appellate Court may examine it. Inthis 
8 case, even if Mr. Benge were agree, the actual wording 
9 and the fact that these things are under oath would not 
10 be before the Appellate Court, and it's something that 
11 I think that they would really need to take a look at 
12 in terms of the documents. 
13 I don't want to be in the position of saying I 
14 didn't allow the trial court to do that and then get up 
15 to the Appellate Court and say we want to supplement 
16 the record here, and I'd be happy to -- I don't know if 
17 we need to do it now or do it later, but there are the 
— — — i i i»i 
18 materials submitted to me by Mr. Benge because they 
19 came from his file, and he is uniquely in control of 
20 the original documents. 
21 MR. BENGE: Your Honor, certainly if these are 
22 items that were offered and not received, I think that 
23 the putting them in the sealed envelope or whatever 
24 would be certainly appropriate, but here these are 
25 things that Mr. Payton has merely alluded to from the 
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podium, he's showed them to witnesses, but they've 
never been even offered, and — and sure they came from 
my file, in fact, I got the request for discovery of 
them last -- last night by fax, and I did make them 
available to Mr. Payton, but I — 
MR. PAYTON: I'm sorry, this is the other 
stuff. 
MR. BENGE: Well, I just don't see what — 
what would be the purpose of that. 
MR. PAYTON: We --
THE COURT: The only thing I know of that you 
have -- you've been cut off from offering, Mr. Payton, 
is the result of the intoxily_zer. 
MR. PAYTON: I think --
THE COURT: And I think Mr. Benge would 
stipulate 
MR. BENGE: I would. 
THE COURT: — that there was an intoxilyzer 
given and that the result was --
MR. BENGE: Zero, zero. 
THE COURT: Zero -- Zero, zero, zero. 
If -- And that it was given at — I don't know whether 
you can give us a time as to when that was given, Mr. 
Benge. 
MR. BENGE: I'd be willing to stipulate that 
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the time that it was 
MR. PAYTON: It started at 9:15. 
MR. BENGE: Twenty-one fifteen — Test started 
2130. 
MR. PAYTON: But the — No. 
MR. BENGE: First observed 2115, test — time 
test started 2130. 
MR. PAYTON: And the time of the arrest, 
according to Officer Mallon's report, is 1945, which 
would be 7:45, forty-five minutes. 
THE COURT: An hour and forty-five minutes. 
MR. PAYTON: No. That would be a half hour 
No, correction, you're right. 
MR. BENGE: And the first time she was 
dispatched to the scene was 1912. 
THE COURT: Okay. So — 
MR. PAYTON: I — I — 
THE COURT: So let's stipulate that the 
test -- if we had gone into the question of the 
intoxilyzer, 
inadmissible 
that Officer 
then — 
-- the 
Mallon 
7:12 p.m., and that 
breathalyzer 
• which I 
evidence 
was disp 
a breath 
have ruled 
would 
atched 
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show 
to be 
that the 
at 1912, that 
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zer was 
at 9:15 p.m. and that the test was conducted at 9:30 
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p.m. 
MR. PAYTON: Part of it — And I don't have 
any problem with stipulating to that. I, however, 
would not want it to be construed as a waiver, because 
part of the — the matter of the reports that Officer 
Mallon makes a disclaimer of whether or not he was 
arrested for a number of offenses, and I think, number 
one, the probable cause statement is significant, 
because it's controlled by a Supreme Court decision 
that says that he's got to be released within 
forty-eight hours of that time unless he's reviewed 
by a magistrate, but I think her probable cause 
statement as well as the report is significant because 
of the exchange, and as I indicate the things that the 
Court said I would not be able to go into. 
THE COURT: Well, you never offered either the 
probable cause statement or the police report, Mr. 
Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: When I was examining her about 
her report, the Court cut me off, and I said --
THE COURT: I just did not permit you to ask 
for hearsay, that's all. 
MR. PAYTON: I think that that's what I'm 
saying is the issue, that it's in her report, and 
therefore does -- is it -- does it come in under Bertul 
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if she's put it in her report if the defense wants it 
in. 
THE COURT: All right. So your contention is 
that under Bertul all police reports would come in 
regardless of the Rules of Evidence? 
MR. PAYTON: If the Defendant wants the report 
in, the report comes in. 
THE COURT: If offered by the — That's your 
position. 
MR. PAYTON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Well, all right then, and you — 
you — you proffer that you would have offered that if 
I hadn't cut you off; is that ri^ht? 
MR. PAYTON: And I'm asking to put it in a 
separate -- her probable cause — 
THE COURT: All right. T h e n — 
MR. PAYTON: And the report in a separate 
envelope so that it can be reviewed by an AppeJLl_a_te_ 
Court should it get that far. 
THE COURT: All right. They will be a part of 
the record as -- as Exhibits that may have been 
tendered but were not and were never received. 
MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to give those to me 
now, Mr. Payton? 
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BAILIFF: All rise please. The Seventh 
District Court is now in session. 
THE COURT: The record will show that the 
Court is in session outside of the presence of the 
Jury. I have given Counsel copies of the instructions 
I propose to give, as well as, in Mr. Benge's case, 
copies of the instructions that he requested with marks 
on them indicating where I've deviated. Mr. Benge, 
you've had an opportunity to review the proposed 
instructions? 
MR. BENGE: Yes. No exceptions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Yes, Your Honor. I don't know if 
you want to -- how you wish to do this. The -- The 
initial charge the language is not consistent with the 
information as originally charged, so the way the 
original information and the only one that we've ever 
been provided reads is that in violation of Moab City 
Ordinance, as the Court has it with the section, in 
that the said Defendant, Michael Giolas, on the 10th 
day 
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And I think that -- that the charge has to be 
consistent with the way it is in the information, 
because that's what we have relied upon. 
THE COURT; Well, the -- the specific hour and 
minute and the specific address within the City of the 
offense is not -- is not an element of the offense, 
it's information that helps you to know what it is 
they're talking about, and are you going to assert that 
in the element section I should -- I'd have to put in 
that they -- that the Jury would have to find that it 
occurred at that precise time and place? 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct, and I -- let ne 
indicate for the Court I have no reason to believe that 
it would be different from the charge as set out by the 
State, regardless of whether or not it is or is not, 
State vs. Eugene Myers was a 1953 case from the Utah 
Supreme Court in which it indicated that the State --
in that case it made the difference between a 
conviction for misdemeanor and a felony in terms of the 
value of property, but the Court said that the -- it 
was a State case. 
I keep getting confused here between State and 
Moab City, but the case I'm referring to, State vs. 
Eugene Myers, the value of the property asserted was 
over $250.00, but was proved to be less than that, and 
the Court said that the prosecution couldn't rely upon 
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something as they had plead it and then come in and 
amend it later where it meant the difference between 
conviction and not. 
State vs. Topham — T-0-P-H-A-M — is a case 
from the Supreme Court that said a defendant is only 
presumed to be -- know with what he's charged by virtue 
of the Information, and I'm simply saying that where 
they have alleged this specific time and a specific 
location --
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, what is the prejudice 
that you suffered by the Jury being instructed with 
regard to this being -- taking place on a day in the 
City? What prejudice do you suffer? 
MR. PAYTON: You mean a time and a place? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PAYTON: Because the day is in there. 
Because the Jury can reasonably find, based upon our 
argument, that there was no indication if the time was 
7:45 or based on the time when the Officer was ther° 
that there was no assault that took place at the tine 
that's alleged in the Information. 
THE COURT: Is that the only reason? 
MR. PAYTON: That the time and place? 
Correct. That's --
THE COURT: The only reason that you assert 
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MR. PAYTON: Go ahead. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Benge, do you — do you 
want me to put that back in? I wish that you'd leave 
it out of your informations entirely. 
MR. BENGE: Yeah. I agree, Your Honor, and 
that's — that's — 
THE COURT: It causes needless conf us.ign_8_ 
MR. BENGE: I agree that it shouldn't have 
been in there. 
THE COURT: If — 
MR. BENGE: I agree. 
THE COURT: But if you want me to put it back 
here in the charge thing, I'm certainly not going to 
put it in elements --
MR. BENGE: I certainly don't. 
MR. PAYTON: And my -- And let me be clear. 
We relied upon that up and to this point to then cone 
in and when tha jury instructions come out saying we're 
going to omit it, the Defendant certainly doesn't -- I 
mean if the Court rule I -- but, of course, a tria. 
strategy and there is at least one Supreme Court case 
that has specifically held that the courts do recognize 
that the defense may have a theory of the case, and 
that is a legitimate --
THE COURT: Well, that might — that might 
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help you a little bit, Mr. Payton, if you had submitted 
your own instructions that said — that included this 
as an element of the offense. Now, I -- the only thing 
I would consider doing is since we are quoting from the 
Information, putting it in Instruction No. 1, but I'm 
certainly not going to put it in the elements offense, 
because it isn't an element of the offense under our 
law. Certainly an approximate date is enough. 
MR. BENGE: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. PAYTON: Can I insert in the record the 
cases Olden vs. Kentucky.? It is 488 US 227 1988. The 
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged and held 
reversible error 
THE COURT: Mr. -- Mr. Payton, let's not waste 
anymore time on this. 
MR. PAYTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: You don't need to read cases to 
me. 
the 
you 
Mr. Benge, if you want me -- if you -- just for 
sake of eliminating a possible claim of error, if 
wanted me to put this back in on page one I'd do 
MR. BENGE: I'd rather you leave it the way it 
is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Your exception 
is noted and overruled, Mr. Payton. Next exception. 
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case, the charge was at the time and place specific 
that the Defendant did attempt with unlawful force or 
violence to do bodily injury to Rebecca M. Giolas, a 
Class B Misdemeanor. 
With regards to number five, I think the only 
thing appropriate there is number B, attempt with 
unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to 
Rebecca M. Giolas. The other matters there were not 
alleged in the Information and they have never been set 
out as something that the City intended to rely upon in 
terms of proving the offense. That's for starters, 
because --
THE COURT: Well, give me everything, Mr. 
Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: Okay. A we think is improper, B 
I've indicated, C is improper. The Defendant did on 
about April 
the time 
offense, 
of 
10/ 1993 — 
the offense 
since those 
I think 
at 7:12 
have 
tha 
and 
been set 
t included 
the 
out 
place 
should 
of the 
be 
and were alleged 
in the Information. 
THE COURT: That's overruled for the same 
reason stated earlier. 
MR. PAYTON: Okay. Then those are the 
exceptions to number five. 
THE COURT: You haven't alleged any prejudice 
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on the time and place aspect of this that qualifies as 
a kind of prejudice that the Court can recognize. Mr. 
Benge, what's your response with regard to the argument 
that we should not have an instruction with regard to 
acts or threats, only with regard to attempts? 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I -- it seems that the 
Court is compelled to instruct with the — with regard 
to the law as to all of the elements of the offense, 
and that's what — that's what I requested and that's 
what the Court is doing. 
MR. PAYTON: And I simply submit that as I 
attempted the Court said they didn't want the citation, 
so I won 
case is 
Informat 
threats, 
't 
we 
give the citation, but 
certainly have a 
ion where they have 
they've alleged an 
force, and 
right 
never 
our the 
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Dry of the 
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Information. 
THE COURT: Well, then two things, Mr. Payton, 
in ruling on that. The first is that assault is, 
because of the three different ways it can be 
committed, has always been a very difficult thing to 
plead in a short concise way, and -- and it in most 
cases I think it puts -- it's an adequate notice just 
to cite the section. 
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You have allowed evidence to come in showing 
acts, attempts and threats without any objection that 
it goes outside what was alleged in the -- in the 
Information, and you have not submitted jury 
instructions proposing to instruct only with regard to 
attempt. There has been evidence of acts, attempts and 
threats, and so I'm going to overrule your objection 
and -- and instruct on all three aspects of that. Mr. 
Benge might decide he wants to rework his wording of 
the assault charge, but I think you've had adequate 
notice. You haven't told me really of any prejudice 
that you've suffered by result of being instructed on 
all three. 
MR. PAYTON: I think that I did, Your Honor. 
I indicated that we relied upon the charge as set out 
in the Information and that under the QjLd.en vs. 
Kentucky case that the United States Supreme Court it 
"» ... — 
said that the defense is entitled to have a legitimate 
theory of defense. THE COURT; Then why did you not object to all 
this testimony about threats and acts? 
MR. PAYTON: Because as a matter of law when 
it goes to the charge whether I did or didn't all 
they've charged is attempt, and that's all that's 
charged in the Information. 
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THE COURT: All right. Would you have had 
other witnesses here to testify if act, attempt and 
threat had all been charged? 
MR. PAYTON: I'm not Well, it's — I'm not 
sure I would or wouldn't, but since they didn't charge 
it, I think it becomes an academic discussion, because 
we — 
THE COURT: Well,' I'm asking a question, Mr. 
Payton. Can you answer it? Can you tell me what other 
witnesses you would have had here if it had been? 
MR. PAYTON: Had they — Had they charged 
those things, other witnesses very possibly could have. 
Having not charged those things, I didn't believe in 
terms of the law. 
THE COURT: Would you tell me what witnesses 
those would be? 
MR. PAYTON: There were other parties that 
were traveling with -- Well, I guess what the Court 
wants us to say is that — 
THECOURT: Jfou need to tell me specifically 
what the prejudice is that you suffer. What would you 
have done if the information had been charged 
differently? 
MR. PAYTON: And I suppose what I'm saying is 
it wasn't, Your Honor, so we'll -- we'll live with the 
ruling as the Court has set it out. 
THE COURT: Well, okay, so you're not going --
you're not going to state anything that you would have 
done differently if it had been charged more 
completely; right? 
MR. PAYTON: If the Information had been 
charged differently, I would have tried the case 
differently, yes, but i t — 
THE COURT: Tell me how you would have tried 
it. 
MR. PAYTON: But it was not. That's what I'm 
saying. It has not been. 
t — — ^ — — • » 
THE COURT: You tell me that you would have 
tried it differently. Tell me how you would have tried 
it differently. 
MR. PAYTON: Because if they're going to 
allege -- They have only alleged attempt. State vs. 
Topham says that all we know is what they allege in the 
Information. If — And if, for example, possession of 
controlled substance says you must knowingly and 
intentionally. If the State does not allege both of 
those and it turns out later when they go through the 
whole case you say so what they didn't allege in the 
conjunctive that a person knowingly and intentionally, 
and therefore there is no violation. If you look at 
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this, I don't have — 
THE COURT: In that case, I would rule the 
same way I'm ruling today, that the Defendant was 
placed on adequate notice. 
MR. PAYTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: But you haven't told me how you 
would — how you would have tried the case differently. 
You haven't told me specifically what you would have 
done differently if the charge had been charged 
differently. 
MR. PAYTON: And I think at this juncture the 
Court is asking me on instantaneous momentary question 
to go back and rethink a theory of a case that has been 
pending here for the better part of six months, and I'm 
saying I can't do it. 
THE COURT: Well, I think you had -- An 
additional ground is that you had adequate notice by 
the service of the State's proposed instructions before 
trial began that they were going to assert all three 
theories and you made no objection at that tine about 
that, so I'm going to overrule your objection. Let's 
have your next exception. 
MR. PAYTON: Number six. As far as any 
allegation, the second paragraph there, there's no self 
defense claim in this case, and that appears to be a 
180 
your Foreperson, and must be returned by you into 
Court. Your verdict in this case must be guilty of 
Assault as charged in the Information, or not guilty as 
your deliberations may result. This being a criminal 
case, it requires a unanimous concurrence of all the 
Jurors to find a verdict. Dated this 29th day of 
October, 1993, Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge. 
I will give you these instructions when you 
retire to deliberate together with two verdict forms. 
One of them says we find the -- we the Jurors in the 
above case find the Defendant guilty of Assault. The 
other says we the Jurors in the above case find the 
Defendant not guilty of Assault. And you will return 
only one of these at the conclusion of your 
deliberations with the instructions that I will give to 
you. All right. Mr. Benge, you may make _your__ 
argument. 
MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor, Counsel. 
Gentlemen, I appreciate your attentiveness and your 
patience while you got up and down and in and out and 
back and forth, and you got to see firsthand the way 
the judicial process operates, and that's kind of a 
rare privilege for most citizens. 
The Judge has told you what your duty is here 
today. You're to weigh what was told to you from that 
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Also, Counsel would have you believe that the 
victim said that when she quits her medication the roof 
caves in. Again, it's your recollection that's 
important, but I believe she said that's the reason she 
was taking the medication, because she felt like the 
roof was caving in from this relationship. 
Everybody has a job to do to make this Country 
run, and in the case of the judicial branch or the law 
enforcement branch, the Legislature makes laws, and in 
this case it makes laws that make assault a crime, and 
we see everyday in the paper articles about domestic 
violence, assaults involving husbands assaulting wives. 
— — — — — — — — • in • 11 eg—•samm, -u — • J M I K^^miMummmmmmmammmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
MR. PAYTON: Objection. That's improper. He 
can not make emotional appeals with regards to an issue 
of public interest and it's contrary to the law. 
THE COURT: Well, that's kind of a close 
question. I'll sustain that, Mr. Benge, scale back 
your argument there a little bit so that — Members of 
the Jury, you're here to decide this case. You don't 
need to make a grand statement about -- about domestic 
violence as a problem in our society. You decide thLS 
case based on its facts. You don't have to make any 
grand statements with your verdict, and you shouldn't. 
Mr. Benge, go ahead. 
MR. BENGE: You don't have to make any grand 
208 
MR. PAYTON: No. 
THE COURT: I guess we'll be in recess then 
pending the return of the Jury. 
COURT CLERK: All rise. 
(WHEREAS, THIS HEARING WENT OFF THE RECORD). 
BAILIFF: The Seventh District C&irt is back 
in session. Be seated. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bailiff, you've 
indicated that the Jury has informed you that they have 
reached a verdict? 
BAILIFF: Yes. 
THE COURT: The record will show that Counsel 
for the City is present, Counsel for the Defendant and 
the Defendant are present. Please escort the Jury into 
the courtroom. It looks like, Mr. Peirson, you were 
the — you were the Foreman of the Jury? 
MR. PEIRSON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Have the Clerk read 
the verdict. You've reached a verdict then, Mr. 
Peirson? 
MR. PEIRSON: Yes. We were unanimous. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll have the Clerk 
read the verdict. 
COURT CLERK: In the case of City of Moab vs. 
Michael Bruce Giolas, we the Jurors in the above case 
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find the Defendant guilty of Assault, signed by Mr. 
Peirson, Foreman, dated this date. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Payton, do you 
desire that I poll the Jury? 
MR. PAYTON: We so desire, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Members of the Jury, 
the Defendant 
unanimous 
member of 
to --- one 
ver 
the 
at 
is en 
diet a 
Jury. 
a time 
titled 
nd 
I 
to 
so 
am 
to know that this was 
that it is the verdict 
going to ask 
tell me whether 
each 
this 
of 
is 
a 
of 
you 
your 
each 
verdict. Mr. Hamblin, is this your verdict? 
MR. HAMBLIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. -- Let's see, the next one --
Mr. Buchanan, is this your verdict? 
MR. BUCHANAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Peirson, is this your verdict? 
MR. PEIRSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bybee, is this your verdict? 
MR. BYBEE: Yes, but I felt we didn't 
deliberate as long as I would have liked, but I suppose 
it is. 
THE COURT: Well, would — 
MR. PAYTON: If there's any question, our 
position is that they be sent back to confer further 
even though they've announced the verdict. 
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THE COURT: I think with that — with that 
statement, Mr. Bybee, I'll — I will excuse the Jury to 
deliberate further, and don't get mad at him, folks, 
it's his right to say that, and — and deliberate with 
open minds about it. JMr. Bailiff, will you take the 
Jury into your charge under the same oath that you 
earlier took? 
BAILIFF: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, go with the 
Bailiff Mr. -- members of the Jury. Court will be in 
recess pending the second return of the Jury. 
(WHEREAS, THIS HEARING WENT OFF THE RECORD). 
BAILIFF: Seventh District Court is now in 
session. Please be seated. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bailiff, you indicate that the 
Jury has once again reached a verdict? 
BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you escort them 
• * _ . . . . . . 
into the courtroom, please? 
BAILIFF: Yes. 
Foreman? 
THE COURT: Mr. Peirson, are you still the 
MR. PEIRSON: I guess. 
THE COURT: All right. The Jury has reached a 
verdict? 
21 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
PEIRSON: We have reached a verdict. 
COURT: All right. We'll have the — 
PEIRSON: And it is unanimous this time. 
COURT: All right, good. We'll have the 
Clerk read the verdict. 
COURT CLERK: City of Moab vs. Michael Bruce 
Giolas, we the Jurors in the above case find the 
Defendant guilty of Assault, signed by the Foreman, 
Lloyd Peirson, dated this date. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Payton, do you 
want them polled again? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
verdict? 
MR. 
1 THE 
PAYTON: Definitely. 
COURT: Mr. Hamblin, is this your verdict? 
HAMBLIN: Yes. 
COURT: Mr. Bybee, is this your verdict? 
BYBEE: Yes. 
COURT: Mr. Peirson, is this your verdict? 
PEIRSON: Yes. 
COURT: And, Mr. Buchanan, is this your 
BUCHANAN: Yes. 
COURT: It appears that the verdict is 
unanimous. The Court will authorize its entry by the 
Clerk. Mr. Benge, what do you say with regard to 
sentencing? 
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and, of course, I'll listen to Mr. Benge, the 
Prosecutor, and certainly to the Defendant and his 
Counsel as to what they think I should do, but your 
work is done and you're welcome to stay or you can be 
excused. 
MR. PEIRSON; Can we make a statement? 
THE COURT: You may, Mr. Peirson. 
MR. PEIRSON: I think the Jury feels that any 
^ H M M B a a ^ a w i l B a H M I M i a a a a M a M ^ H H M a H l l H M a B H a H M B M a M 
punishment of this gentleman ought to be minimal. We 
have sympathy for him, but the letter of the law being 
such, we felt we had to come out with a guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well — 
MR. PAYTON: Put your hand down. 
MR. GIOLAS: Your Honor — 
MR. PAYTON: Put your hand down. 
MR. GIOLAS: I just don't -- I don't have 
anything against these gentlemen. I realize that you 
had to do what you had to do and that was part of your 
job as being called to what you had to do and there is 
absolutely no -- no hard feelings or anything like that 
at all, and I just wanted you guys to know that. 
You're put in a heck of a spot and that's what you have 
to do, that's what you have to do. I just wanted you 
guys to know that. 
THE COURT: One of the things that jurors 
220 
often wonder is what about the evidence that they got a 
hint of but they didn't hear, and in this case you got 
a hint that there was evidence that the Defendant had 
been tested and came out negative on a breathalyzer, 
and one of the reasons why I excluded that evidence and 
didn't — and instructed you not to consider it is that 
it was a period of three hours, perhaps as much as 
three hours, and certainly two hours from the time that 
he supposedly had something to drink and when the 
breathalyzer test was given, and I didn't know how you 
would be able to weigh -- how you would be able to 
relate a breathalyzer result at 9:30 in the evening 
back to things that happened at 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in 
the afternoon. I don't know whether that mattered to 
you. 
I always worry when I exclude evidence that 
jurors get worried that I'm trying to hide something 
from them. I just try to limit to what is admissible 
under the Rules, and that generally is reliable 
evidence. Anyway, you're excused and thank you for 
your service. 
MR. BENGE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I did want to give the victijtua 
chance to speak if she wanted to be^ CeiT? sentence was 
imposed. 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH * 
* SS. 
County of Salt Lake * 
I, MINDY L. NELSON, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 225, contain a 
true and accurate transcript of the electronically 
recorded proceedings held in connection with The City 
of Moab vs. Michael B. Giolas held on October 29, 1993 
at 9:30 a.m., and was transcribed by me to the best of 
my ability from the cassette tapes furbished to me. 
Dated this 13th day of January, 1994. 
Mindy L. Nelson*; Transcriber 
I, RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary 
Public for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing transcript prepared by Mindy L. Nelson 
was transcribed under my supervision and direction. 
My commission expires: 
ZLiriT 
Renee L. Stacy, CSR, RPR 
Notary P-.t1-: 
BfNEELCT.CY J 
My Cor-nss on Eap-rjs • 
Slate of iftah • 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF MOAB, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs 
MICHAEL BRUCE GIOLAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
District Court Case No. 9317-97 
Court of Appeals Nos. 930741-CA 
I, BARBARA PROCARIONE, Clerk of the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and 
for Grand County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the hereunto attached papers are all 
of the original documents on file in my office as such Clerk of the Court. Said papers 
constitute all of the documents to be transmitted to the Court of Appeals in the above-entitled 
criminal action. 
I further certify that the papers contained in said file are by me this day transmitted to 
the Court of Appeals together with the Exhibits and original Transcripts of those certain 
proceedings as were requested by the attorney for the Appellant. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL of the Seventh District Court at my office in 
Moab, Grand County, State of Utah, this 11th day of MARCH, 1994. 
BY: 
BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK 
<U /CAfi7FA<s(/i< A ^ 
Sue Batchelder 
Assistant Clerk of Court 
SEVENTH D<ST*»CT COURT 
Grand Coun'v. Uteh 
nu» APR 1 5 1993 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
In and For Grand County. State of Utah 
THE CITY OF MOAB, 
VS 
MICHAEL BRUCE GIOLAS, 
13148 S. 3600 West 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
DOB: 4/22/66 
Plaintiff, 
DciVndan( 
INFORMATION 
NO. <5£n~ 97 
COMES NOW William L. Benge, Moab City Attorney, and states 
on information and belief that the Defendant committed in the 
above named city and countv, the crime(s) of: 
ASSAULT - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE in violation of Moab City 
Ordinance #92-06 (Section 76-5-102, LGA), in that the said 
Defendant, MICHAEL BRUCE GIOLAS, on the 10th dav of April, A.D., 
1993, at approximately 7:12 p.m., at 549 North Main, Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah, did attempt with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily iniury to Rebecca M. Giolas, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. 
DATED this i^  dav of 1993. 
Moab C 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED MAY 1 0 1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOAB CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL B. GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
•k 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Case No. 9317-97 
Citation No. 013383 (MCPD) 
"Assault11 
* (Judge, Lyle R. Anderson) 
DOCUMENTS MAILED 
(1) Appearance of Counsel; 
(2) Request For Discovery; 
(3) Demand For Names of Witnesses; 
V (4) Demand For Place. Date, & Time of Commission of 
Alleged Offense; 
y (5) Demand For Copy of Information; 
• (6) Demand For Copy of City Ordinance; 
(7) *Notice To Court 
[U.R.Cr.P. Rule 16 "Discovery"] 
/cfj 
Certificate of Mailing Case No. 9317-97 Page 2 
Moab City v Giolas 7th D/C Grand County 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing documents as stated herein were mailed via United States 
Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the [ C s day 
of \T\f\.\» , 19 P 1 ^ , to the following: 
Moab City Prosecutor Seventh District Court 
P.O. Box 699 115 West 200 South 
Moab, UT 84532 Moab, UT 84532 
Certified Mail #P879-458-826 Certified Mail #P879-458-827 
Michael B. Giolas 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) 
Authority 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration 
CJA Rule 4-504 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees" 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
Papers" 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED MAY 1 0 1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOAB CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL B. GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
Authority 
U.C.A. 77-14-1 "Time & Pla 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
ce c 
DEMAND FOR PLACE, DATE, 
& TIME OF COMMISSION 
OF ALLEGED OFFENSE 
Case No. 9317-97 
Citation No. 013383 (MCPD) 
f,AssaultM 
(Judge, Lyle R. Anderson) 
f Alleged Offense11 
Defendant hereby makes written demand that within ten (10) 
days hereof prosecution specify in writing and mail to defendants 
counsel the following: 
^f (a) Place of alleged offense; 
(b) Date alleged offense occurred; 
(c) Specific time it is alleged the offense was committed. 
DATED this I t^day of 
Steven Lee rayton 
Attorney for Defendant 
//?> 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) Grand County. Utah 
Attorney for Defendant _llf_ M M / « A 4ft„ 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 F,UED "AY 1 0 1993 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOAB CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL B. GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
* 
-k 
* 
* 
DEMAND FOR COPY 
OF INFORMATION 
* Case No, 9317-97 
* Citation No. 013383 (MCPD) 
* "Assault" 
* (Judge, Lyle R. Anderson) 
Authority 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 4 "Prosecution of Public Offenses" 
U.R.Cr.P. 5 "Information and Indictment" 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 
7(4)(a),(5) "Proceedings Before Magistrate" 
9 "Joinder of Offenses and Defendants" 
10 "Arraignment" [Information Before Plea] 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 10(b) "Arraignment" [Additional Time In Which 
To Plead] 
Defendant by and through his Attorney of Record, hereby 
demands that he be provided, by the prosecution, with copy of 
formal Information in the above-referenced case. 
DATED this ! \ \ day of 
Attorney Defe^Bant 
vjt 
William L. Benge 
Moab City Attorney 
Bar Number 282 
94 East Grand Avenue 
P. 0. Box 699 
Moab, Utah 84532 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
» MAY 24 1993 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF MOAB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MICHAEL B. GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No. 9317-97 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
TO DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW William L. Benge, Moab City Attorney, and 
certifies to the Court that on this 20th day of May, A.D., 1993, 
he has complied with Defendant's Request Fop Discovery dated the 
6th day of May, A.D., 1993. 
1 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
William L. Benge 
Moab City Attorney 
Bar Number 282 
94 East Grand Avenue 
P. 0. Box 699 
Moab, Utah 84532 
FILED MAY 2 4 1993 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF MOAB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MICHAEL B. GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No. 9317-97 
CERTIFICATE OF 
COMPLIANCE 
In response to Defendant's demand for place, date and time 
of commission of alleged offense, the undersigned hereby 
certifies that a true and correct copy of the Information filed 
in this matter against said Defendant which sets forth said 
information, has been provided to Defendant, 
DATED th is cPd 
WrTliain(jG. Benge, 
Moab C i t y A t t o r n e y 
fc6 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
William L. Benge 
Moab City Attorney 
Bar Number 282 
94 East Grand Avenue 
P. 0. Box 699 
Moab, Utah 84532 
FILED HAY 2 4 1993 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF MOAB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MICHAEL B. GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No. 9317-97 
CERTIFICATE OF 
COMPLIANCE 
In response to Defendant's demand for copy of Information, 
the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of 
the Information charging said Defendant has been provided to 
Defendant. 
DATED th i 8 ^ day of May, 
Wi^yLiam L*/Benge , 
Moab C i t y A t t o r n e y 
1 
£VENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
FILED OCT 2 r 1533 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY _ _ 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF MOAB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MICHAEL BRUCE GIOLAS, 
Defendant. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 9317-97 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
The defendant, Michael Bruce Giolas is accused by an 
Information filed in this court by the Moab City Attorney of 
having committed the following crime: 
ASSAULT, in violation of Moab City Ordinance #92-06 
(Section 76-5-102, Utah Code Annotated) in that the 
said defendant, Michael Bruce Giolas, on the 10th day 
of April, 1993, in Moab, Grand County, State of Utah, 
did attempt with unlawful force or violence to do 
bodily injury to Rebecca M. Giolas. 
-I 
DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF NOT GUILTY PUTS BURDEN ON STATE/CITY 
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the charge 
of assault. 
This casts upon the fiSSfce/City the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense. 
cji 
No. fT 
DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE 
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of 
assault, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following numbered elements of that offense. 
1) That defendant either 
, a) acted, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another, or 
b) attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another, or 
c) . threatened, with a show of immediate unlawful 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
and 
2) That defendant did so on or about April 10, 1993. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said 
elements then you should find the defendant not guilty. 
HO. 1 
JURY TO DETERMINE WEIGHT OF 
EVIDENCE, CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AMD FACTS 
y Q U a r e t|ie s o l e jU(^ges 0f the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of the witnesses and the facts. ~ ,. id rIna ; ' e 
testimony of a witness w-'- - > (T.sidPi hi** app^-r ^ i-p and 
d e m e a n o r I: :i :i s a p p a i: e i 11 - t, 
c a p a c . * v : r r e m e m b e r . \ea un: i-i< t:- interes' , .: " s 
showr ' : X \ \ ^ G ' m.n h ^  •- *~ i~\- r : ' * M^* r--,.-, and 
a l s o ,< -I i I i i o b a M - in I i vi \ h i eh 
a n y \ ,. . .; aga i n s t e i t h e r p a r t y . 
If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely as 
to any material fact ii i tl le case, you are at liberty to disregard 
the whole of the testimony of such witness, except as he may have 
been corroborated by other credible witnesses or credible 
evidence. You arc not bound to believe all that the witnesses 
may have testified to nor are you bound to believe any witness; 
" 1 111 e. :•; s a ,*. a q a i n s t m a n \' , 111 in i 111 , «i ' a < f a i n •, t 
I lit1' ,;i I if.)vo o b s e r v a 11 on,;, 11 j a y o u r 
.) .v.i^i ; . i w e i g h t to be g i v e n to the t e s t i m o n y of the 
witnesses a i determine what the facts are. 
s. 
JURY TO APPOINT FOREPERSON CONCURRENCE 0 , JURORS 
FOREPERSON STfiNS VFpnTrT 
When - et: rt i , l i b e r a t e , you should appoint one of 
your numbe e T T ! i d " mi i • • I 1 111 w i i I i i n |, 
**\.uii. . . : ~ be returned \>) you into court. 
Your v^r-jL •'. ^ I : </.*so must be: 
Guilty ci d~~uuit db cnaiyca In the Inform^:.j.on or not 
giliIty as your deliberations may result. 
This being a criminal case it requires a unani mous 
c o n c u r r e n c e o f a 1 ] t h e j u r o r s t o f i n d a v e r d i c t. 
D A T E D I In i , 1 li i l . i s i Ml I i i - l n l x M i . Il " J I , 
#>i '^ k/. Ly3r^ R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
( & 
*l STATE v, Citeas664P.2dl 
303, 199 P.2d 542 (1948) (advertisement for 
sale of property was sufficient to put other 
cotenants on notice of adverse possession). 
[8] In this case, the district court's find-
ings show that it was not until 1976 that 
Lewis "brought home" to Mary his adverse 
possession. For several years after pur-
chasing the Paragonah property, Lewis only 
farmed the land and paid taxes on it. In 
May of 1974 Mary requested that they fix 
up the family home together. Lewis' re-
sponse was essentially, "Not right at this 
time." This was, at best, an equivocal act 
of exclusion. Then, in May of 1976 Lewis 
told Mary that he had purchased the prop-
erty at a tax sale and that it was his alone. 
In August of 1977, this suit was brought. 
On these facts Lewis did not adversely pos-
sess the property under either the general 
seven-year or the special four-year require-
ment of § 78-12-7.1. 
In affirming the first four district court 
rulings, we also necessarily affirm the fifth: 
that Lewis and Alene Prothero own, as 
joint tenants, an undivided one-fourth in-
terest in the Paragonah property as tenants 
in common with the other heirs. At best 
Alene has a joint interest in Lewis' pro rata 
share as a cotenant. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Chris Alfred BERTUL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 17153. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 3, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine 
BERTUL Utah U g l 
181 (Utah IMS) 
M. Durham, J., of burglary and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that the trial court's exclusion of a police 
"booking sheet" from evidence, proffered 
by defendant to support his defense of in-
toxication, was not prejudicial error where 
intoxication would not have served as a 
defense to the charge, and (2) the evidence 
did not entitle defendant to a charge on the 
lesser included offense of criminal trespass. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=»429(l) 
Booking sheet, on which booking offi-
cer wrote a number indicating arrestee's 
degree of intoxication based on conclusion 
of "searching officer," who verbally com-
municated his conclusion to booking officer, 
was admissible as business record when of-
fered by defendant. Rules of Evid., Rule 
63(13). 
2. Criminal Law e=»436 
Business record may be admitted irre-
spective of type of organization from which 
it emanates. Rules of Evid., Rule 63(13). 
3. Criminal Law <s=»444 
For evidence to be admissible as busi-
ness record, foundation must be laid, gener-
ally including: the record must be made in 
regular course of business or of entity 
which keeps record; record must have been 
made at time of, or in close proximity to, 
occurrence of act, condition or event record-
ed; evidence must support conclusion that 
after recordation document was kept under 
circumstances that would preserve its integ-
rity; sources of information from which 
entry was made and circumstances in prep-
aration of document were such as to indi-
cate its truthworthiness; and generally req-
uisite foundation can be made by custodian 
of records. Rules of Evid., Rule 63(13). 
4. Criminal Law c=>429(l) 
Whether police records are admissible 
depends on nature of records and purpose 
1 1 8 2 Utah 664 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
'or which they are offered and police rec 
ords of routine matters are admissible 
Rules of Evid , Rule 63(13) 
5 Criminal Law ®=>429(1) 
Even fingerprint records of defendant 
are admissible as business records if proper 
foundation is laid Rules of Evid, Rule 
63(13) 
6 Criminal Law <§=»429(1) 
Police records containing nonroutine in-
formation as to which memory, perception, 
3r motivation of reporter ma> raise serious 
questions of reliability are inadmissible 
Rules of Evid , Rule 63(13) 
7 Criminal Law <s=»429(l) 
Witnesses' statements recorded by offi 
cers are not made in regular course of wit 
ness' business and do not have indicia of 
reliability associated with routine and regu-
larly recorded entries upon which reliance is 
placed by organization and are thus not 
admissible under business records exception 
to hearsay rule Rules of Evid , Rule 63(13) 
8 Criminal Law <^ =>429(1) 
Police reports of crime should ordinan 
1> be admitted when offered by defendant 
in criminal case to support his defense 
however, when offered by prosecution they 
should ordinarily be excluded, except when 
offered to prove several routine matters 
which are based on first-hand knowledge of 
maker of report and do not involve conclu-
sions, and when circumstances of their 
preparation indicate their trustworthiness 
Rules of Evid , Rule 63(13) 
9 Criminal Law c=429(l) 
As with business records, investigative 
spo r t s of governmental officials containing 
opinions not based on first-hand knowledge 
are not admissible Rules of Evid Rule 
63(15) 
10 Criminal Law <s=»53 
Defense of intoxication was not intend 
ed to justify criminal act by someone whose 
behavior controls were lessened or some 
vhat diminished by voluntary intoxication 
and it is not defense to crime that one does 
things one might not otherwise hive done 
because of influence of alcohol 
11 Criminal Law <s=»55 
Voluntary intoxication of sufficient de-
gree may destroy person's ability to form 
necessary specific intent to commit particu-
ar crime requiring specific intent 
12. Criminal Law <s=> 1170(1) 
In prosecution for burglary, erroneous 
xclusion of police booking sheet indicating 
that defendant was intoxicated was not 
prejudicial, since such intoxication would 
not have served as defense to burglary 
charge 
13 Criminal Law <s=» 795(2) 
In prosecution for burglary, evidence 
did not entitle defendant to instruction on 
lesser included offense of criminal trespass 
G Fred Metos, Ronald J Yengich, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Craig L Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent 
STEWART Justice 
Defendant appeals from a burglary con-
viction He raises two points (1) whether 
the trial court erred m excluding from evi-
dence a document called a police "booking 
sheet" w hich was proffered by the defend-
ant to support his asserted defense of intox-
ication, and (2) whether the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct on the enme of 
criminal trespass as a lesser-included of-
fense of the crime of burglary 
The defendant was convicted of burglar-
izing the Westminster Pharmacy m Salt 
Lake County in the early morning hours of 
October 14, 1979 He was seen leaving the 
pharmacy bj a witness who identified him 
at trial When arrested, the defendant was 
in possession of drugs taken from the phar-
macy 
At trial the defendant relied on a defense 
)( voluntary intoxication He did not dis-
pute his participation in the crime Rather, 
he contended that he had.consumed an inor-
dinate amount of alcoholic beverages the 
night o r the crime, was subject to blackouts 
STATE v. 
Cite as 664 P 2d 1 
when drinking, and had blacked out the 
night of the burglary and remembered 
nothing of it The testimony of the officer 
who made the arrest, Officer English, was 
that the defendant had obviously been 
drinking but did not appear intoxicated 
During cross examination of Officer Eng-
lish, the defendant proffered what appeared 
to be a copy of the "booking sheet," which 
apparently was filled out at the Salt Lake 
County jail when the defendant was booked 
at 6 30 a m the day of the burglary The 
burglary was committed approximately 
three hours prior to the arrest Defend-
ant's apparent purpose in offering the book 
mg sheet was to substantiate his claim of 
intoxication The trial court ruled that the 
document was inadmissible hearsay 
In making out a booking sheet, the book-
ing officer writes in a number indicating 
the arrestee's degree of intoxication The 
number is based on the conclusion of the 
"searching officer" who verbally communi-
cates his conclusion to the booking officer 
A " 1 " indicates that the searching officer 
concluded that he believed that the arres-
tee, at the time of booking, was so intoxi-
cated that he could not be booked A ' 2 ' 
indicates obvious intoxication, and a " 3 ' 
indicates that the arrested person had been 
drinking The booking sheet offered by 
defendant was marked with the number 
2 " 
[1] The booking sheet and the code 
rumber on it were clearly hearsay, they 
were out-of-court statements offered to 
prove the truth of the information con-
tained on the sheet Thus, they were inad-
missible unless the) fell within one of the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule Defendant 
contends that the booking sheet falls within 
the business record exception and within 
the exception for past recollection recorded 
Because we conclude that the booking sheet 
1 Rule 63(13) provides in full text 
Business Entries md the Like Writings of 
fered as memoranda or records of icts con 
ditions or events to prove the facts stated 
therein if the judge finds that thev were 
made in the regular course of a business at or 
ibout the time of the act condition or event 
recorded and that the sources of information 
from which imde and the method ind cir 
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should have been admitted as a business 
record," we do not address the exception to 
the hearsay rule for past recollection re-
corded 
[2] Rule 63(13) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides for the admissibility of 
business entries "and the like " ' We have 
construed that rule and predecessor rules 
governing the business record exception 
broadly In Joseph v WH Groves Latter 
Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P 2d 
330 (1957), we laid down the rule that an 
opinion in a hospital record, in that case a 
doctor's diagnosis, was admissible as a busi-
ness record exception2 See also In re Rich-
ards' Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P 2d 542 
(1956) We have also held that the essential 
test in establishing the applicability of the 
exception is the reliability of the document, 
not the nature of the enterprise from which 
the records are taken A business record 
may be admitted irrespective of the type of 
organization from which it emanates "It 
is the type of evidence which will be exclud-
ed by the hearsay rule, not the type of 
organization (i e , private or public) that is 
important " Barney v Cox, Utah, 588 P 2d 
696, 698 (1978) In Barney we expressly 
held that the business records exception ap-
plies to governmental entities 
In the instant case, the custodian of the 
police records in question did not testify 
Initially, the trial court excluded the evi-
dence because there was no evidence either 
of its authenticity or its reliability The 
trial court ruled that the absence of any 
evidence showing that the proffered book-
ing sheet was a genuine police department 
record precluded admission of the evidence 
The trial court also excluded the document 
because the conclusion as to defendant's 
intoxication upon which the code number 
was based was supplied by the officer who 
cumstances of their preparation were such as 
to indicate their trustworthiness 
ft is also significant that m Joseph the doctor 
making the entry was not an employee of the 
hospital The requisite trustworthiness arose 
from the doctor s dutv to render proper service 
to the pitient 
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searched the defendant at the police station 
and not by the booking officer who filled 
out the form. 
Since the searching officer who supplied 
the information acted in the regular course 
of his duties in reporting to the booking 
officer, we are not convinced that that was 
sufficient to require exclusion of the docu-
ment. See Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter 
Day Saints Hospital, supra; United States 
v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir.1975). Af-
ter a recess, defendant's counsel proffered 
the testimony of the custodian of the police 
department's booking documents to over-
come the objection based on foundation. 
The proffer was refused, however, because 
the trial court ruled that even with an 
adequate foundation, the evidence was not 
sufficiently trustworthy. 
On its face, Rule 63(13) appears to pro-
vide for the admission of all hearsay entries 
contained in a business record as long as the 
source of the information and the method 
and circumstances of the preparation of the 
record are such as to indicate its trustwor-
thiness. 
[3-5] For evidence to be admissible as a 
business record, a proper foundation must 
be laid to establish the necessary indicia of 
reliability. That foundation should gener-
ally include the following: (1) the record 
must be made in the regular course of the 
business or entity which keeps the records; 
(2) the record must have been made at the 
time of, or in close proximity to, the occur-
rence of the act, condition or event record-
ed; (3) the evidence must support a conclu-
sion that after recordation the document 
was kept under circumstances that would 
preserve its integrity, and (4) the sources 
of the information from which the entry 
was made and the circumstances of the 
preparation of the document were such as 
to indicate its trustworthiness. Generally, 
the requisite foundation can be made by the 
custodian of the records. See generally 
Carpenter Paper Co. v. Brannock, 14 Utah 
2d 34, 376 P.2d 939 (1962). Thus, whether 
3. They ma\, ho\ve\er, be admissible if the wit 
ness' statement to the police officer meets the 
requirements of some other exception to the 
police records are admissible depends on the 
nature of the records and the purpose for 
which they are offered. Police records of 
routine matters are admissible under Rule 
63(13), such as the day a crime was report-
ed. United States v. Smith, supra. Even 
fingerprint records of a defendant are ad-
missible under this rule if a proper founda-
tion is laid. State In re Marquez, Utah, 560 
P.2d 342 (1977). 
[6, 7] On the other hand, police reports 
containing non-routine information as to 
which the memory, perception, or motiva-
tion of the reporter may raise a serious 
question of reliability, are inadmissible. 
Furthermore, statements by witnesses to a 
crime and recorded by officers are not made 
in the regular course of the witness' busi-
ness and do not have the indicia of reliabili-
ty associated with routine and regularly 
recorded entries upon which reliance is 
placed by an organization.3 See Gencarella 
v. Fyfe, 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir.1948); John-
son v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 
(1930). See also United States v. Shiver, 
414 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.1959); Standard Oil 
Co. of California v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th 
Cir.1957); Gordon v. Robinson, 210 F.2d 192 
(3rd Cir.1954); McCormick, The Law of Ev-
idence § 308 (2d ed. 1972). Thus, the "cir-
cumstances of their preparation" are not 
such "as to indicate their trustworthiness," 
as required by Rule 63(13). 
Furthermore, since police reports of the 
factual events and details of a criminal case 
are generally made for the purpose of suc-
cessfully prosecuting a crime, the reasons 
which might otherwise provide a basis to 
assume reliability of such reports as busi-
ness records do not exist where police re-
ports are offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal proceeding. United States v. 
Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir.1975). It does 
not necessarily follow, however, that such 
•records may not be admissible when prof-
fered by a defendant 
hearsay rule See An not . 69 A L R 2d 1148, 
* 5 H960) 
STATE v. 
Citeas664P.2dI 
The present state of the pertinent law 
began with Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 
109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), in 
which the Supreme Court held that an acci-
dent report prepared by a since-deceased 
railroad engineer and offered by the rail-
road in its defense in a grade-crossing colli-
sion case did not qualify as a business rec-
ord since the report was prepared in con-
templation of litigation. As the court of 
appeals had stated in that case, the report 
was "dripping with motivations to misre-
present." Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 
976, 991 (2d Cir.1942). The Palmer doctrine 
has generally been extended to exclude 
"business records" which were made with 
an eye toward litigation when offered by 
the party responsible for making the record. 
See, e.g., Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702 
(7th Cir.1972) (in suit by prisoner against 
prison guards for alleged beating, guards' 
reports as to prisoner's behavior were inad-
missible because they were possibly "self-
serving.") 
A number of cases have excluded police 
reports under the Palmer doctrine when 
offered by the prosecution even though the 
police reports met the literal, specific re-
quirements of the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Thus, in the lead-
ing case of United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 
698 (7th Cir.1957), the court held: 
[E]ven if memoranda such as the ones in 
question are regularly prepared by law 
enforcement officers, they lack the neces-
sary earmarks of reliability and trustwor-
thiness. Their source and the nature and 
manner of their compilation unavoidably 
dictate that they were inadmissible under 
section 1732. They are also subject to the 
objection that such utility as they possess 
relates primarily to prosecution of sus-
pected law breakers, and only incidentally 
to the systematic conduct of the police 
business. Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, supra. 
See also United States v. Frattinni, 501 
F.2d 1234 (2nd Cir.1974); United States v. 
Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir 1971); Unit-
ed States v. Adams, 385 F 2d 548 (2nd Cir. 
1967); Sanchez v. United States, 293 F 2d 
260 (8th Cir 1961), Annot, 31 A L R Fed 
457 (1977); Annot, 77 A L R3d 115 (1977) 
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In most cases dealing with police reports 
of a criminal investigation, it is apparent 
that the reports are made in part in con-
templation of litigation. Although the re-
ports may not be readily describable as 
"dripping with motivation to misrepresent," 
their exclusion is more fundamentally ex-
plainable on the ground that substantial 
rights under the confrontation clause of the 
United States Constitution, and especially 
the right of cross-examination, may be se-
verely prejudiced when the information in 
the report calls into question the motivation 
and the accuracy of perception, recall, the 
manner of language usage, or the sound-
ness of conclusions by the author of the 
report. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1973) (the right to cross-examine is essen-
tial to a fair trial). It would be "error and 
ordinarily reversible error to receive an ex-
hibit containing 'a neat condensation of the 
government's whole case against the de-
fendant' " in the form of a police report for 
which there can be no effective cross-exam-
ination. United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 
529 (8th Cir.1974) (denial of rehearing; 
main opinion at 491 F.2d 517) (quoting San-
chez v. United States, supra, 293 F.2d at 
269; United States v. Ware, supra, 247 F.2d 
at 700). We have long ago forsaken the 
practice of allowing a person to be convict-
ed on the basis of out-of-court statements, 
whether written or oral, of persons not sub-
ject to cross-examination 
[8,9] After a careful and scholarly anal-
ysis of many cases under the business rec-
ords exception involving the admissibility of 
police records, United States v. Smith, 521 
F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir.1975), synthesized the 
rule, to which we adhere, that police reports 
of crimes should ordinarily be admitted 
when offered by the defendant in a crimi-
nal case to support his defense. When of-
fered by the prosecution, however, they 
should ordinarily be excluded, except when 
offered to prove simple routine matters 
which are based on first-hand knowledge of 
the maker of the report and do not involve 
conclusions, and when the "circumstances of 
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their preparation indicate their trustworthi-
n e s s / Rule 63(13). Cf. KoninkUjke 
Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. KIM v. ful-
ler, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C.Cir.1961) (business 
reports admissible where adverse to em-
ployer's interest); Pekelis v. Transcontinen-
tal & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2nd 
Cir.1951) (same); Korte v. New York, N.H. 
& H.R. Co., 191 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir.1951) (busi-
ness reports prepared by doctors admissi-
ble). This rule finds support in the similar 
application given to a similar exception to 
the hearsay rule, i.e., official governmental 
reports. Rule 63(15) provides an exception 
for official reports and findings of public 
officers. This exception may, of course, 
overlap with the business record exception. 
As with business records, investigatory re-
ports of government officials containing 
opinions not based on first-hand knowledge 
are not admissible under that exception. 
E.g., Emmet v. American Insurance Co., 265 
A.2d 602 (D.C.Ct.App.1970) (fire official's 
report); Dale v. Trent, 146 Ind.App. 412, 
256 N.E2d 402 (1970) (policeman's report); 
Middlesex Supply, Inc. v. Martin & Sons, 
Inc., 354 Mass. 373, 237 N.E.2d 692 (1968) 
(fire chief's report); Hall v. Boykin, 207 
So.2d 645 (Miss.1968) (highway patrolman's 
accident report). 
Since the booking sheet was offered by 
the defendant, we conclude that the trial 
court erred in excluding the booking sheet 
in the instant case even though it contained 
what might be considered a conclusion. 
Our next inquiry must then be whether 
that error was prejudicial or harmless in 
nature. The defense raised by the defend-
ant was that he was so intoxicated that he 
was not criminally liable for the act of 
burglary. To maintain a successful defense 
of that sort, the defendant had to meet the 
requirements established by U C.A.. 1953, 
§ 76-2-306, which provides: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a de-
fense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of the 
offense; however, if recklessness or crim-
inal negligence establishes an element of 
an offense and the actor i« unaware of 
the risk because of voluntary intoxica-
tion, his unawareness is immaterial in a 
prosecution for that offense. 
[10] The defense of intoxication was not 
intended to justify a criminal act by some-
one whose behavior controls were lessened 
or somewhat diminished by voluntary intox-
ication. It is not a defense to a crime that 
"one does things one might not otherwise 
have done" because of the influence of alco-
hol. State v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856, 
859 (1981). 
[11,12] Voluntary intoxication of a suf-
ficient degree may destroy a person's ability 
to form the necessary specific intent to 
commit a particular crime requiring a spe-
cific intent. State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 
71 (1982). But there is nothing on the facts 
of this case which would justify a conclu-
sion that because the defendant may have 
been intoxicated at the time of booking, as 
the code number "2" indicates, such evi-
dence is probative that defendant was so 
overcome by the influence of alcohol at the 
time of the crime that he was not able to 
form the required criminal intent to steal. 
Indeed, the evidence in the instant case 
strongly indicates that the defendant was 
not so mentally beclouded at the time of the 
commission of the crime that he simply did 
not know what he was doing, as he would 
now have this Court believe. The evidence 
indicated that he intentionally and deliber-
ately broke into the pharmacy, entered, and 
removed the stolen drugs, including a con-
trolled substance. There is nothing whatso-
ever that appears on the booking sheet that 
would have supported the inference that 
the defendant, at the time of the crime, was 
unaware of breaking and entering the phar-
macy and of leaving with the drugs in hand. 
Furthermore, since the officer who made 
the conclusion reflected on the booking 
sheet was not the same officer who testified 
at trial that defendant had been drinking 
but was not intoxicated, the out-of-court 
statement of the "searching" officer could 
not have been used for impeachment as a 
prior inconsistent statement. In sum, we 
find no prejudicial error in the trial court's 
exclusion of the booking sheet 
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[13] Defendant also contends that the 
trial court erred in not giving an instruction 
on the lesser-included offense of criminal 
trespass. The facts are all but incontro-
vertible that defendant entered the phar-
macy and in fact committed a burglary. 
He was caught with the goods. We do not 
have a case where the defendant made an 
unlawful entry but his intention after the 
entry was unclear and a matter of infer-
ence. The facts, therefore, unequivocally 
demonstrate a burglary, not a criminal tres-
pass. On these facts, State v. Hendricks, 
Utah, 596 P.2d 633 (1979), controls, and an 
instruction on criminal trespass was not re-
quired. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ., 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate. 
TAYLOR, District Judge, sat but died 
before the opinion was filed. 
unemployment benefits to be effective dur-
ing claimant's first week without work, 
during which time he failed to satisfy work-
search requirement, contrary to claimant's 
contention on appeal that application was 
for subsequent weeks, during which he al-
legedly did satisfy work-search require-
ment. 
Affirmed. 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=»593.5 
Substantial evidence supported finding 
by the Industrial Commission that the 
claimant intended application for extended 
unemployment benefits to be effective dur-
ing claimant's first week without work, 
during which time he failed to satisfy work-
search requirement, contrary to claimant's 
contention on appeal that application was 
for subsequent weeks, during which he al-
legedly did satisfy work-search require-
ment. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-10(i). 
George L. JEFFRIES, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18742. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 11, 1983 
Claimant appealed from decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying extended 
unemployment benefits because of claim-
ant's failure to actively engage in seeking 
work. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that substantial evidence supported 
finding by the Industrial Commission that 
claimant intended application for extended 
Utah Rep G60 667 P 2d— W 
George L. Jeffries pro se. 
David L. Wilkinson, Floyd G. Astin, K. 
Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a decision by the 
Industrial Commission board of review, de-
nying extended unemployment benefits to 
appellant because of his failure "to actively 
engage in seeking work." We affirm. 
Appellant, having exhausted his regular 
unemployment benefits, filed his initial 
claim for extended benefits on April 8, 
1982, to be effective beginning the week 
before. He received extended benefits for 
the weeks ending April 3 through May 1, 
1982. He was then employed from May 5th 
to June 11th. On Friday of the following 
week, June 18th, he returned to the Job 
Service office and completed a form to re-
sume the extended benefit payments, effec-
tive that week, June 13th-19th. However, 
appellant's work search record submitted 
for that week showed that he had made no 
WALKER 
Cite w, Utah 
of damage, an adjustment of the judgment 
in this case was appropriate. However, the 
judgment may only be reduced to the ex-
tent it specifically and identifiably included 
special damages of the same types as those 
for which no-fault benefits had previously 
been received. This is consonant with the 
basic procedure outlined in Allstate v. Ivie, 
supra. Under Allstate a judgment for 
damages may only reflect damages suffered 
over and above those particular types of 
damages reimbursed by the no-fault insur-
er. Defendant is not entitled to a reduction 
of plaintiffs award of general damages to 
offset no-fault insurance payments for dif-
ferent types or categories of damages. See 
Transamerica Insurance Company v. 
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); 
see also Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
supra, wherein a similar factual situation 
arose and the same result was reached. 
Also see Brophy v. Ogden Rapid Transit 
Company, 46 Utah 426, 151 P. 49 (1915). 
The judgment of the lower court is af-
firmed. No costs. 
HALL and CROCKETT,* JJ., and MAU-
RICE HARDING, Retired District Judge, 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; HARDING, Retired District Judge, 
sat. 
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
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Willie Mae WALKER, aka Dell Walker, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 16705. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 23, 1981. 
Defendant was convicted of unlawful 
possession of controlled substance with in-
tent to distribute for value, and following 
her later discovery that prosecution was 
made aware of and failed to disclose during 
trial certain evidence favorable to her de-
fense, she petitioned for writ of coram nobis 
or in the alternative writ of habeas corpus. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Peter F. Leary, J., denied her petition, and 
she appealed. The Supreme Court, Mau-
ghan, C. J., held that: (1) prosecutor's ac-
tion in failing to disclose contradicting tes-
timony to plaintiff or court and his reliance 
on false impression created by original tes-
timony in both closing argument and sum-
mation to jury constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct analogous to knowing use of 
false testimony; (2) there existed reasona-
ble likelihood that false impression fostered 
by prosecutor could have affected judgment 
of jury; and (3) prosecutor's actions de-
prived defendant of fair trial and constitut-
ed denial of due process. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law «=»706(2) 
Any conviction obtained by knowing 
use of false testimony is fundamentally un-
fair and totally incompatible with rudimen-
tary demands of justice. 
2. Constitutional Law «=»268(9) 
Conviction obtained through use of 
false evidence known to be such by repre-
sentatives of state must fall under due 
process clause of Federal and State Consti-
tutions if there is any reasonable likelihood 
that such false testimony could have affect-
* CROCKETT, Justice, concurred in this case be-
fore his retirement. 
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ed judgment of jury. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
3. Criminal Law *=»706(2) 
Conviction obtained through use of 
false evidence must fall when State, al-
though not soliciting false evidence, allows 
it to go uncorrected when it appears. U.S. 
CA.Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art 1, § 7. 
4. Criminal Law *»700 
In role as state's representative in 
criminal matters, prosecutor must not only 
attempt to win cases, but must see that 
justice is done, and while he should prose-
cute with earnestness and vigor, it is as 
much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
5. Criminal Law «=»706(2) 
Where prosecutor discovered during 
course of trial that testimony of two police 
officers in direct conflict with position ad-
vocated by plaintiff was incorrect, failed to 
disclose contradicting testimony to plaintiff 
or court, and deliberately relied on false 
impression created by original testimony in 
both his closing argument and summation 
to jury, his conduct constituted prosecutori-
al misconduct analogous to knowing use of 
false testimony and therefore was subject 
to same standard of materiality used in 
such cases. 
6. Constitutional Law «=>268(9) 
Where prosecutor discovered during 
trial that testimony of two police officers 
was incorrect, failed to disclose contradict-
ing testimony to plaintiff or to the court, 
and instead relied on false impression creat-
ed by original testimony in both closing 
argument and summation to jury, there ex-
isted reasonable likelihood that false im-
pression fostered by prosecutor could have 
affected judgment of jury and prosecution's 
actions therefore deprived defendant of fair 
trial and constituted denial of due process. 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art 1, 
§7. 
7. Criminal Law *»700 
In criminal trial it is essential that evi-
dence which tends to exonerate defendant 
be aired as fully as that which tends to 
implicate him. 
Richard J. Leedy, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Craig L. 
Barlow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice: 
The plaintiff appeals the District Court's 
judgment denying her petition for a Writ of 
Coram Nobis or in the alternative a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. We reverse the judgment 
and remand the matter to the District 
. Court for further proceedings in conformity 
with this opinion. All statutory references 
are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
The plaintiff Willie Mae Walker, herein-
after "Walker," was originally tried and 
convicted ,by a jury of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value. On September 26, 
1977, the Court entered judgment against 
the plaintiff, sentenced her to an indefinite 
term as provided by law, and ordered her 
commitment to commence forthwith. The 
plaintiff appealed her conviction to the 
Utah Supreme Court, which in an unpub-
lished per curiam opinion upheld the convic-
tion.1 
Following her conviction and our decision 
on appeal, the plaintiff discovered the fact 
that during the trial the prosecution was 
made aware of and failed to disclose certain 
evidence which Walker contends was favor-
able to her defense. In order to understand 
the import of these allegations a brief re-
view of the factual basis for the conviction 
is necessary. 
The plaintiff was initially arrested after 
the search of a building, owned by her, 
uncovering a brown prescription bottle 
I. State v Walker, Utah. No. 15568, September 
5. 1978 
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filled with 56 balloons of heroin. The up- the heroin was found, 
stairs portion of this building contains three 
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bedrooms which share a common living 
room area. None of the bedrooms have 
separate bathroom or kitchen facilities and 
a common bathroom and washroom are 
used jointly by the occupants. The upstairs 
also contains an office-bedroom in which 
the plaintiff kept the various records of her 
restaurant business. Only this latter room 
had functioning locks on its door. 
At the time of the search, which was 
made pursuant to a warrant, Walker was 
detained by the police in the adjacent res-
taurant where she was working. After se-
curing the plaintiff the police went upstairs 
and searched the three bedrooms, one of 
which was used by the plaintiff as her 
residence. While upstairs they found Rob-
ert Westley, hereinafter "Westley," who 
was also named in the warrant. A search 
of Westley uncovered 4 balloons of heroin. 
Westley was then placed in custody and the 
search moved to the office-bedroom. 
Finding this room locked, the police en-
tered the room by breaking down the door. 
Once inside they found the prescription bot-
tle containing heroin in a nightstand next 
to the only bed in the room. They also 
found in the nightstand two letters ad-
dressed to the plaintiff. Other areas of the 
room contained furs, jewelry, women's 
clothing, a cash box and business receipts, 
all of which were identified as belonging to 
the plaintiff. 
After what one of the police officers 
characterized as a thorough search of the 
room the plaintiff was read her Miranda 
rights and questioned about the room where 
2. On direct examination Officer Michael 
George explained: 
A. Yes, I completed the search of this 
Q. What if any did you observe in men's 
clothing or men's articles in that room? 
A. There were no men's articles in that 
room. 
During cross-examination by the plaintiffs 
attorney Officer George further explained-
A I searched practically the whole room, 
yes, Sir. 
Q. Did you find in any closet by the win-
dow clothing of Robert Westley? 
She was subsequent-
ly tried and convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distrib-
ute for value in violation of 5&-37-
8(lXaP). 
Walker's defense at trial was grounded 
upon the premise that Westley had use and 
control of the room in question. The plain-
tiff argued Westley was using the room as 
his residence prior to and at the time of the 
search. In support of this contention the 
plaintiff testified Westley had clothing and 
toiletry articles in the room at the time of 
the search. 
During the trial the plaintiff also denied 
making a post-arrest statement testified to 
by the police in which she allegedly indi-
cated she had exclusive control over the 
locked room and possessed the only key to 
that room. 
In contravention to the plaintiffs de-
fense, the prosecuting attorney, Spencer 
Austin, elicited testimony from two of the 
officers present at the time of the search 
and arrest to the effect that no men's cloth-
ing or toiletries were found in the locked 
room.2 The prosecuting attorney later re-
ferred to this testimony and the lack of any 
evidence corroborating the plaintiff's de-
fense in his closing argument and final 
summation to the jury.3 
However, after the trial and appeal, the 
plaintiff became aware of evidence known 
by the prosecution which supported her con-
tention that Westley had access to and ac-
tually occupied the room in question. 
A There was no male clothing found in 
that bedroom. 
Officer Randall Anderson's testimony was of 
similar import. 
3. In his closing argument the prosecutor stated: 
"He (Sheriffs Deputy Michael George) made a 
further search of that room after Deputy An-
derson had, and what did he testify that he 
found? Women's clothing He testified 
that he found perfume, jewelry and different 
types of women's clothing. I would submit to 
you that that's possession of that particular 
heroin. Who else was using that room?" 
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In an affidavit accompanying the plain-
tiffs Petition for Relief, Ophelia Buford, 
who worked at the plaintiffs restaurant at 
the time of the search, explained the police 
had asked her to come upstairs and take 
possession of jewelry and money found in 
the locked room. Once upstairs she asked if 
they were going to take Westley to jail in 
his pajamas. When questioned about the 
location of his clothes, she, according to her 
affidavit, explained they were in the locked 
room where he had been sleeping. She 
further explained in the affidavit that 
Sheriffs Deputy Duncan then entered the 
room with Westley where certain articles of 
clothing belonging to the latter were found 
in diverse areas of the room. 
During the Habeas Corpus-Coram Nobis 
proceeding, Sheriffs Deputy Duncan con-
firmed the fact that after arresting Westley 
he accompanied him into the office-bedroom 
where Westley's clothes were located. Fur-
thermore, at the petition hearing the prose-
cuting attorney, Spencer Austin, testified 
that Sheriffs Deputy Duncan informed him 
during the second day of the trial of the 
existence of the clothes in the room. 
The District Court's findings of fact re-
lating to the Petition for Relief acknowl-
edged the existence of this undisclosed evi-
dence concerning the presence of Westley's 
clothing in the room containing the heroin. 
The findings also credited the prosecution 
with knowledge of this evidence on the 
second day of the trial and, thus, at the 
time of his closing argument. The findings 
also stated the prosecuting attorney did not, 
at the time of his initial discovery, nor at 
any later time, disclose this evidence to the 
plaintiff or her counsel. 
4. See Gigho v. United States, 405 U.S 150, 153, 
92 SCt. 763, 765, 31 L Ed.2d 104 (1972), quot-
ing from Mooney v Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 
S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed 791 (1935). 
5. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 
1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); see also 
Donneilv v DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 
S.Ct. 1868, 40 LEd.2d 431 (1974); Miller v. 
Pate, 386 U S 1, 87 S Ct. 785, 17 L Ed.2d 690 
(1967), Alcorta v Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 
Thus, in the present case, the prosecuting 
attorney solicited testimony from two of 
the officers present during the search of the 
building. This testimony indicated the 
room in which the heroin was found did not 
contain men's clothing. Furthermore, the 
testimony was in direct conflict with the 
position advocated by the plaintiff. Wheth-
er or not the prosecution was aware of the 
fact this testimony was incorrect at the 
time it was given, he was later made ex-
pressly aware of that fact during the course 
of the trial. Yet, the prosecuting attorney 
failed to disclose the contradicting testimo-
ny to the plaintiff or the court, and instead 
deliberately relied on the false impression 
created by the original testimony in both 
his closing argument and summation to the 
jury. 
[1-3] It is an accepted premise in Amer-
ican jurisprudence that any conviction 
obtained by the knowing use of false testi-
mony is fundamentally unfair and totally 
incompatible with "rudimentary demands 
of justice."4 The proposition is firmly es-
tablished that a conviction obtained 
through the use of false evidence known to 
be such by representatives of the State, 
must fall under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment5 and Article I, 
Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution, if 
there is any reasonable likelihood that the 
false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury.* The same result 
obtains when the State, although not solic-
iting false evidence, allows it to go uncor-
rected when it appears.7 This standard de-
rives from both the prosecutorial miscon-
duct and more importantly the fact that the 
use of false evidence involves a corruption 
103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942) 
6. See Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U S. 
note 4, at 153, 92 S.Ct. at 765, quoting from 
Napue, supra, note 5, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. 
at 1178, see also United States v. Agurs, 427 
• U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L Ed.2d 342 (1976) 
7. See State v. Jarrell,. Utah, 608 P.2d 218 
(1980) 
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of the truth seeking function of the trial 
process.8 
In a similar manner the prosecution's re-
liance on the false impression created by 
the testimony of the two police officers also 
represents a corruption of the truth seeking 
function of our criminal trial process. 
[4] We have previously stated that the 
State while charged with vigorously enforc- -ilfiS—tne raise impression that no men's 
ing the laws "has a duty to not only secure clothes were found in the room at the time 
appropriate convictions, but an even higher °f *n e search. Although the prosecution 
duty to see that justice is done." • In his was aware of the false character "of'that 
role as the State's representative in crimi- testimony, he did nothing to correct the 
nal matters, the prosecutor, therefore, must false impression creaied in the mind3 of the 
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The police_testimony concerning the ab-
sence of any men's clothing in the room was 
presented in direct suppori of this testimo-
ny and the prosecution s case and in direct 
contravention of the p l a i n ^ a j a t a f c 
tions." 
This latter testimony which was allowed 
to stand uncorrected by the prosecution cre-
ated th  f l  i i  t t  '  
 i    
not only attempt to win cases, but must see 
that justice is done.1* Thus, while he 
should prosecute with earnestness and vig-
or, it is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just 
one.11 
In the present instance the State's case 
against the plaintiff is based on circumstan-
tial evidence. The heroin was not found on 
the person of the plaintiff or in her living 
quarters. Instead, the heroin was found in 
a separate room which the plaintiff used as 
an office. The position advocated by the 
State imputed possession of the heroin to 
the plaintiff because of her control over the 
room in which it was found. In support of 
that position the State introduced police 
testimony crediting the plaintiff with a post 
arrest statement in which she allegedly 
stated she had exclusive control of that 
room and the only key to its locked door. 
8. Id , at 225. 
9. See Codianna v Morris, Utah, 594 P 2d 874, 
877 (1979). 
10. Cf. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 
55 SCt. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). 
11. State v. Adams, Utah, 583 P.2d 89, 91 
(1978). 
12. For example, in her defense, the plaintiff 
challenged the police testimony relating to her 
post arrest statement and the search of the 
room. The testimony of Deputy Duncan which 
was not disclosed by the prosecution would 
have added direct support to the plaintiffs po-
sition that Westley had use and control of the 
Rather, he expressly relied on this 
impression in his closing arguments. 
It is possible that the prosecution's mislead-
ing statements relating to this issue and his 
manipulation of the evidence had an effect 
on the jury's determination." 
[5] The false impression which the pros-
ecution knowingly fostered in the present 
case constitutes prosecutorial misconduct 
which seriously interferred with the trial 
court's truth seeking function. We believe 
this to be analogous to the prosecution's 
knowing use of false testimony and there-
fore subject to the same standard of mate-
riality used in those cases. 
[6,7] Applying this standard to the 
present case, we believe there exists a rea-
sonable likelihood the false impression fos-
tered by the prosecutor could have affected 
the judgment of the jury. 
Therefore, the prosecution's actions have 
deprived the defendant of a fair triall4 and 
room. Equally important, revelation of the 
false character of the police testimony relating 
to the occupancy of the room inferentially sup-
ports the plaintiffs position regarding her post 
arrest statement by impugning the credibility 
of those witnesses. See Napue v. Illinois, su-
pra, note 5, 360 U.S. at 269. 79 S.Ct. at 1177. 
13. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, supra note 5, 
416 U S. at 647. 94 S Ct. at 1873 
14. As we explained in State v. Jarrell, supra 
note 7, at 225, "The overriding concern in 
cases involving the prosecutorial nondisclosure 
(and more importantly prosecutonal mis-
conduct) is the defendant's right to a fair trial." 
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constitute a denial of due process. As we 
explained in State v. Jarrell, "In a criminal 
trial it is essential that evidence which 
tends to exonerate the defendant be aired 
as fully as that which tends to implicate 
him."1* In the present case this has not 
occurred and the defendant is entitled to 
have that error rectified.1* 
The judgment of the District Court is 
therefore reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
STEWART and CROCKETT,* JJ., con-
cur. 
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
The statutory provision1 which bears 
upon the propriety of granting a new trial 
on the basis of newly-discovered evidence 
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When a verdict or decision has been 
rendered against the defendant the court 
may, upon his application, grant a new 
trial in the following cases only: 
* * * * * * 
(7) When new evidence has been discov-
ered, material to the defendant and 
which he could not with reasonable dili-
gence have discovered and produced at 
the trial. 
The matter of granting or refusing to grant 
a new trial is within the sound discretion of 
the trial judge and this Court will reverse 
his decision thereon only where he has 
abused that discretion.2 I do not agree that 
the trial judge in the instant case has 
abused his discretion. 
The "new evidence" relied upon relates to 
the officer's knowledge of the existence of 
men's clothing in the office-bedroom in 
which the heroin was found. Although the 
prosecution did not disclose such evidence, 
the record is clear that it was equally acces-
15. State v. Jarrell, supra note 7, at 225. 
sible to Walker at the time of trial. It is 
undisputed that Walker was present with 
Officer Duncan when Westley obtained 
clothing from the room on the night of his 
arrest At the hearing on the writ (herein 
appealed), Officer Duncan testified that to 
the best of his recollection he entered the 
room with Walker and Westley and that 
Walker opened the closet and procured the 
clothes for Westley. Ophelia Buford, ap-
pearing as a witness on behalf of Walker, 
disputes some of that testimony, but not the 
presence of Walker. Buford testified as 
follows: 
Q. Do you recall when Robert Westley 
was getting dressed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When [they] took him into Room 6 
[the upstairs room in which the her-
oin was found] and had him change 
from his pajamas into—. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was Mrs. Walker at that 
time? 
A. She was upstairs. 
Q. Was she in the room? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she get a key to open the closet? 
A. No. 
Q. How did she get into the closet? 
A. They broke it open. 
At trial, Officer Duncan took the witness 
stand, but was never asked by the defense 
on cross-examination whether he saw any 
men's clothing in Room 6. Walker herself 
testified and denied having exclusive con-
trol over the room but apparently never 
informed her attorney of the incident now 
relied upon in this proceeding. In light of 
the foregoing, the officer's knowledge of 
the existence of men's clothing in the room 
cannot be construed to be newly-discovered 
evidence. 
I. U C.A.. 1953, 77-38-3. 
16. Cf. Codianna v. Morris, supra note 9. at 877. 2. State v. Bundy, Utah, 589 P 2d 760 (1978) 
* Crockett, Justice, concurred in this case before 
his retirement. 
WALKER 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that such evi-
dence was "newly discovered," it still must 
be shown that Walker could not with rea-
sonable diligence have discovered and pro-
duced it at trial. In his closing argument 
at the hearing, Walker's attorney concedes 
that "perhaps there could have beeti more 
diligence in obtaining that type of evi-
dence," but that he did not anticipate the 
need for that defense. It is his contention 
that "it came as a complete surprise to me 
when these officers testified that Mrs. 
Walker stated that she had 'sole and exclu-
sive control' over Room 6." However sur-
prised counsel may have been, certainly it 
cannot be said that Walker was similarly 
surprised if the testimony of Buford is to be 
believed that Walker was present in Room 6 
when the clothing was taken therefrom for 
Westley. Had Walker apprised her counsel 
of that fact, he would have had an opportu-
nity to meet the issue at trial, either by 
more appropriate cross-examination of the 
State's witnesses, or by producing further 
defense witnesses, notably, Buford. Rea-
sonable diligence simply has not been dem-
onstrated. 
In any event, the trial court concluded 
that, although corroborative of Walker's po-
sition at trial, the prosecutor's undisclosed 
evidence would not have changed the deci-
sion of the jury. 
The main opinion makes reference to the 
case of United States v. Agurs? In that 
case, the Court declared that the rule of 
Brady v. Maryland* arguably applies in 
three quite different situations: (1) where 
the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that 
the prosecution's case includes perjured tes-
timony and that the prosecution knew or 
should have known of the perjury; (2) 
where there is a pretrial request for specific 
evidence and the prosecution suppresses the 
information; and (3) where the defense ei-
ther makes no request or merely makes a 
general request for exculpatory material, 
and certain favorable material is not volun-
3. 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 
(1976). 
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tarily supplied by the prosecutor. The in-
stant case involves no perjury and clearly 
falls within the third situation. Agurs held 
that under the third situation, the appropri-
ate standard to be applied is as follows: 
. . . [I]f the omitted evidence creates a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist, constitutional error has been com-
mitted. This means that the omission 
must be evaluated in the context of the 
entire record. If there is no reasonable 
doubt about guilt whether or not the 
additional evidence is considered, there is 
no justification for a new trial. On the 
other hand, if the verdict is already of 
questionable validity, additional evidence 
of relatively minor importance might be 
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
The role of the trial court in making a 
determination- as to the effect of non-dis-
closed evidence was articulated in Cannon 
v. State of Alabama} In the instant case, 
the trial court properly relied upon that 
case in its ruling: 
The Court has reviewed the transcript 
of the evidence. The Court has read the 
cases submitted. 
And there is no question that, in the 
Court's mind, that the County Attorney's 
Office failed to disclose the fact that the 
men's clothing was contained in the room 
wherein the heroin was found. 
However, in reviewing the cases and in 
reviewing the transcript of the trial, the 
Court endeavored to approach it the same 
as was done in the case of Cannon v. 
State of Alabama, and approached the 
reading of the testimony and the evi-
dence from the point of view of a fact-
finder in connection with the matter. 
* * * * * * 
Now, with the background, and with 
what the evidence would appear to a 
finder of fact, the Court has concluded 
that the evidence would have been some-
what corroborative of the defendant's po-
prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused. 
4. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 5. 558 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977). 
(1963), dealing with the suppression by the 
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sition in the matter, but that the fact 
that the clothing in the room, and the 
fact that the defendants put on evidence 
both the heroin found in the possession of 
Mr. Westley in the room and that in the 
room appeared to be the same, would not 
have been matters that would have 
changed the fact-finders [sic] decision in 
connection with the matter and would 
not have weighed heavily in connection 
with the fact finder as far as the court 
can determine. 
Therefore, the Petition for Coram No-
bis and/or In the Alternative Habeas 
Corpus will be denied. 
The narrow question the trial court was 
called upon to answer was this: Did the 
omitted evidence that Duncan saw Westley 
get a pair of pants from a closet in the 
room where the heroin was found create a 
reasonable doubt as to Walker's guilt? At 
trial, there was ample evidence that West-
ley had access to the room. Walker testi-
fied that Westley would go into the room 
for periods of time when he had headaches. 
Westley was also found to have the same 
type of heroin on his person at the time of 
arrest as was found in the room. On the 
other hand, it is undisputed that numerous 
items of personal property which belonged 
to Walker were also discovered in the room. 
At trial, the court specifically instructed the 
jury that ownership of the controlled sub-
stance need not be exclusive—it may have 
been jointly owned. Although the men's 
clothing found in the room may have cor-
roborated Walker's theory of the case, it is 
not, as phrased by the trial court, "materi-
al" to Walker's conviction in a constitution-
al sense. 
I would affirm. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
"*Walter Darwin BARKER, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 16676. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 28, 1981. 
State appealed from an order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Pe-
ter F. Leary, J., quashing an information 
charging defendant with third-degree felo-
ny criminal mischief. The Supreme Court, 
Maughan, C. J.f held that the state could 
not, for purposes of charging defendant 
with a felony, aggregate the damages suf-
fered by individual property owners from 
separate acts of vandalism occurring at the 
same general location over a short period of 
time. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Crockett, J., joined. 
1. Malicious Mischief <£=»1 
State could not, for purpose of charg-
ing defendant with felony criminal mis-
chief, aggregate damages suffered by indi-
vidual property owners from separate acts 
of vandalism occurring at same general lo-
cation over short period of time. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-6-106, 76-6-106(2Xc). 
2. Larceny «=>88 
Purpose of single larceny doctrine is to 
prevent aggregation of criminal penalties 
for single act. 
3. Criminal Law <©=» 1208(1) 
Doubts in enforcement of penal code 
must be resolved against imposition of 
harsher punishment. 
Theodore L. Cannon, County Atty., Susan 
Creager, Deputy County Atty., Robert B. 
Hansen, Atty. Gen., Craig L. Barlow, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
STATE v. BARKER 
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Robert M. McRae and Loni F. DeLand of third-degree felony charge. 
McRae & DeLand, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
Utah 695 
Following a 
hearing on the matter, the District Court 
granted the defendant's motion and dis-
missed the charge. 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice: 
The State appeals the District Court's 
order granting the defendant's motion to 
quash the information filed against him. 
We affirm. All statutory references are to 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The defendant, Walter Darwin Barker, 
was initially charged with criminal mischief 
in violation of 76-6-106.1 In support of 
this charge the State alleged that on the 
evening of March 8, 1979, the defendant 
broke or damaged the windshields of 16 
separately owned vehicles. The State fur-
ther contends the several acts of vandalism 
occurred within a short period of time and 
at one location, to-wit: the parking lot of P. 
J.'s Lounge in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Although the damage to any single vehi-
cle did not exceed $250, the total damage to 
all the vehicles was approximately $1800.00. 
Relying on this latter amount the State 
charged the defendant with a third-degree 
felony as provided for in 76-6-106(2Xc).2 
Pursuant to 77-23-3(e) and (g) the de-
fendant moved to quash the information on 
the grounds the facts presented in the 
State's bill of particulars did not constitute 
the offense charged, but rather represented 
16 separate misdemeanor offenses involving 
16 separate victims. The defendant further 
argued this series of misdemeanor offenses 
could not be aggregated to support the 
1. 76-6-106 reads, in pertinent part: "(1) A per-
son commits criminal mischief if: . (c) He 
intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the 
property of another 
2. 7 6 ^ J 0 6 ( 2 ) ( c ) states. "Any other violation 
of this section is a felony of the third degree if 
the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000 value; 
a class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss in 
excess of $500; a class B misdemeanor if the 
actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause 
pecuniary loss in excess of $250; and a class C 
misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause loss of less than $250." 
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[1] The sole issue before this Court is 
whether the State may, for the purpose of 
charging a defendant with a felony under 
76-6-106 aggregate the damages suffered 
by individual property owners from sepa-
rate acts of vandalism occurring at the 
same general location over a short period of 
time. 
In support of its aggregation of the dam-
age amount, the State relies on an analogy 
to the single larceny doctrine. This com-
mon law doctrine which is rooted in antiqui-
ty rests upon a specific analytical founda-
tion. That foundation provides a single lar-
cenous taking of property, whether owned 
by one or several individuals, will be treated 
as a single criminal offense.8 This conclu-
sion is based on the premise that if the 
taking (in the older cases referred to as the 
caption) constitutes but a single act, then 
there is but one offense and the multiple 
ownership of the property taken is immate-
rial.4 
Implicit in this analytical foundation is 
the opposite coTifckkskm, \. e., that sevwal 
distinct acts of larceny constitute separate 
criminal offenses.5 This concept is ex-
plained in Wharton's Criminal Law and 
Procedure,* which states: 
"If different articles are taken from dif-
ferent owners at different times, the de-
3. See People v. Sichofsky, 58 CalApp. 257, 208 
P. 340 (1922) See generally 37 AL.R.3d 1407-
1416. 
4. This rationale is followed in the first Utah 
case which expressly employs the single larce-
ny doctrine, i. e., State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 
65 P. 484 (1901). In that case, this court ex-
plained: "Where many articles are stolen at 
one time, there is only one theft, whether the 
ownership is in one or many." Id. at 485. 
5. See State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 26 A. 500 
(1893). 
6. 2 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and 
Procedure. § 451 (1957). 
STATE v. SCHNOOR Utah 9 4 7 
Chew MS PJd 947 (UtahApp. 1993) 
(Okl.1984). See generally 18 Charles A. 
Wright et a!., Federal Practice and Proce- STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
dure, § 4443 (1981). 
The policies advanced by the doctrine of 
res judicata have particular importance in 
this case because the child's right not to be 
bastardized far outweighs defendant's in-
terest in asserting nonpaternity more than 
six years after having acknowledged pater-
nity.5 See A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 
1227 (Wyo.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 
103 S.Ct 388, 74 L.Ed.2d 518 (1982). Be-
cause of the potentially damaging effects 
that relitigation of a paternity determina-
tion might have on a child, we rigorously 
observe the doctrine of res judicata. See, 
e.g., In re Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 
1256, 1263-65 (Wyo.1991); see also 27 
C.J.S. Divorce § 702 at 331 (1986) ("A de-
termination of paternity in a child support 
order, particularly where the issue has 
been contested or could have been contest-
ed, generally, precludes subsequent denials 
of paternity."). 
We conclude that res judicata precludes 
defendant from asserting nonpaternity as a 
defense to the petition for modification. 
The trial court therefore erred in admitting 
any evidence going to defendant's claim of 
nonpaternity. It also erred in denying the 
petition. Accordingly, we reverse and re-
mand for a determination as to whether, 
consistent with this court's opinion, the 
child support order should be modified as 
originally requested by ORS. 
RUSSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, J., cone >rs in result only. 
(O f KlYNUMBfRVWlM 
5. "If there ever is a situation where the rules of 
law, the interests of justice, and sound consider 
ations of policy combine to require the applica-
tion of the rules of res judicata, it should be 
Thomas W. SCHNOOR, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 900330-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 7, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Michael 
R. Murphy, J., of forgery and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: 
(1) record did not establish that state used 
false testimony, and (2) defendant did not 
establish ineffectiveness of counsel. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>706(2) 
State may not knowingly use false evi-
dence to obtain conviction, even where 
false evidence goes only to credibility of a 
witness. 
2. Criminal Law ©=*706(2), 1171.8(1) 
If court determines that evidence used 
by state to obtain conviction was false, 
reviewing court must determine whether 
remarks called to the attention of jurors 
matters which they could not properly con-
sider in determining their verdict and 
whether error is so substantial and prejudi-
cial that there would be reasonable likeli-
hood that, without error, result would have 
been more favorable. 
3. Criminal Law ©=»706(2) 
State did not use false evidence by 
allowing main witness against defendant to 
testify that he was not granted immunity 
and was not testifying because he had re-
ceived immunity, even though court had 
held at preliminary hearing that it would 
hold state to its assertion that it would not 
file charges against witness, where wit-
ness' testimony was already available to 
especially so as to the adjudication on the pai 
enthood of a child " Roche v Roche, S96 P 2d 
647, 649 (1979) (Crockett. J., concurring) 
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state in the form of earlier confession and 
fair interpretation could be that witness, 
who had learning disorder, was confused 
rather than dishonest. 
4. Criminal Law <£=>1134(3) 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
cannot ordinarily be raised on appeal be-
cause the trial record is insufficient to al-
low claim to be determined, but appellant 
may raise such claim if trial record is ade-
quate to permit determination of issue and 
there is new counsel on appeal. 
5. Criminal Law <3=>641.13(2.1) 
Counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to insist that bench conference concerning 
testimony by witness be recorded, failing 
to impeach witness through his preliminary 
hearing transcript, or failing to proffer evi-
dence regarding his immunity status where 
he vigorously cross-examined witness re-
garding his immunity status and his testi-
mony on cross-examination did not conflict 
with events that transpired at preliminary 
hearing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Jan Graham, State Atty. Gen., Kris C. 
Leonard (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., R. Paul 
Van Dam, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
Joan C. Watt, Robert L. Steele, Ronald S. 
Fujino (argued), Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Ass'n, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant, Thomas W. Schnoor, appeals 
from a conviction of forgery in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990). We 
affirm. 
On February 21, 1990. Schnoor was 
charged with forgery. During the prelimi-
nary hearing, held March 29, 1990, sixteen 
year old B.L. testified for the State. 
Schnoor's counsel pointed out that B.L. 
was also a suspect in the forgery. Thus he 
should not be required to testify and possi-
bly incriminate himself. The prosecutor, 
who did not later represent the State at the 
evidentiary hearing, then committed not to 
file charges against B.L. The court noted 
that the proper way to grant immunity was 
via a formal written document signed by 
the county attorney. Despite the court's 
statement that it would "hold the County 
Attorney to it," the prosecutor never exe-
cuted a written statement of immunity. 
Trial was held May 1 and 2, 1990. B.L. 
testified as follows: He knew Schnoor be-
cause Schnoor was romantically involved 
with his mother. Schnoor offered B.L. fif-
ty dollars for cashing a paycheck from 
Huish Detergents made out to Robert B. 
Saupe. Schnoor told B.L. he could not tell 
anybody what he was going to do. 
Schnoor first drove B.L. and his twin sister 
to Mike's Pawn Shop, owned by Jack 
Lords. Schnoor instructed B.L. to memor-
ize the name on the check and to cash it. 
While at the pawn shop, Schnoor repur-
chased his television set and took it to his 
car while B.L. attempted to cash the check 
at a different counter. When Lords re-
quired an endorsement on the check, B.L., 
who has a learning disorder, misspelled 
Saupe's name. Lords refused to cash the 
check. 
Schnoor drove B.L. and his sister to their 
apartment. While there, Schnoor made 
two telephone calls, each time asking 
whether the establishment on the other end 
cashed checks. Schnoor ordered B.L.'s 
twin sister to get him some scissors so he 
could cut off the end of the check that bore 
the misspelled name. 
Schnoor drove B.L. and his sister to 
Cash-A-Check, stopping across the street 
to let B.L. out. Schnoor gave B.L. the 
check, told him what to do, and admonished 
him not to mention Schnoor's name, hi'-
description, or where he was parked, in the 
event there were a problem. Because B.L. 
did not have the payee's identification, the 
manager required him to fill out an infor-
mation sheet. B.L. neglected to fill in most 
of the form and again misspelled the pay-
'ee's name. Becoming suspicious, the man-
ager went to the back room, telephoned 
Huish Detergents for* verification, spoke 
STATE v. SCHNOOR 
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with Robert Saupe, discovered Saupe had er day, that 
reported the check missing, and then the 
manager called the police. The police ar-
rived minutes later. Schnoor drove away 
when the police arrived. The police arrest-
ed B.L. 
B.L.'s twin sister corroborated her broth-
er's testimony concerning Schnoor's in-
structions to B.L. prior to each attempt. 
She also corroborated B.L.'s story about 
the scissors. 
She admitted on cross-examination that 
she had originally told defense counsel that 
B.L. found the check at Huish Detergents, 
while Schnoor was there to pick up his 
check. 
During cross-examination, B.L. reported 
he was not granted immunity, he was not 
testifying because he had received immuni-
ty, and he had not been promised that the 
State would not press charges against him 
if he testified against Schnoor. He further 
testified he did not know why charges had 
not been pursued against him, and that he 
was not told that if he testified against 
Schnoor, he would not go to detention or to 
jail. 
Also during cross-examination, an unre-
corded bench conference was held. 
Schnoor's testimony contradicted that of 
B.L. Schnoor testified that it was B.L. who 
obtained the check and who asked Schnoor 
to drive him to a place where he could cash 
it. On cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked Schnoor whether he felt Lords, the 
owner of Mike's Pawn Shop, was telling 
the truth, confused, or mistaken. 
The court instructed the jurors that they 
were not to concern themselves with the 
status of any other person or defendant 
named in the case. Defense counsel object-
ed to this instruction. After another unre-
corded bench conference concerning the in-
struction, the court pointed out to the jury 
that they could properly consider the credi-
bility of both B.L. and his sister. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor 
told the jurors they should protect B.L., 
that the prosecutor believed this case was 
important, that he believed Schnoor was 
guilty, that B.L.'s trial would be for anoth-
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B.L. had much to lose by 
testifying, that B.L. incriminated himself, 
and that the jury should not let B.L. down. 
Schnoor's counsel did not object to any 
part of the prosecutor's closing argument. 
The jury found Schnoor guilty as charged. 
He was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of one to fifteen years. 
Schnoor appeals claiming the court com-
mitted reversible error in admitting the tes-
timony regarding B.L.'s immunity status. 
He also claims the court denied his right to 
a fair trial because of the prosecutor's com-
ments during closing arguments regarding 
immunity, the need to protect B.L., and his 
personal opinion as to the importance of 
the case. Schnoor claims he was also de-
nied his right to a fair trial because the 
prosecution asked Schnoor to speculate as 
to whether the owner of Mike's Pawn Shop 
was telling the truth, confused, or mistak-
en. 
FALSE TESTIMONY 
Schnoor claims the court erred in convict-
ing him because of B.L.'s testimony regard-
ing his immunity status. 
[1] A state may not knowingly use 
false evidence to obtain a conviction, even 
where the false evidence goes only to the 
credibility of the witness. Napue v. Illi-
nois. 360 ti.S. i k , t & , W S.(!t 1175, 1177, 
3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); Giglio v. Umte"d 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 
31 Lt ! J 2J 104 ( lWa. "The j u r T T S g 
mate of the truthfulness and reliability of a 
given witness may well be determinative of 
guilt or innocence, and it is upon such 
subtle factors as the possible interest of 
ying falsely 
fendant'i 
pue, 360 U.S 
ife or liberty may depend. 
kkl
 79 B.&.~ at W at 
7Vq-
1177. 
[2] If we determine that the evidence 
was false, we then apply the two-part test 
articulated in State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 
918 (Utah App.1990). This test asks (1) 
whether "the remarks call to the attention 
of the jurors matters which they could not 
properly consider in determining their ver-
dict," and (2) whether the error was so 
"substantial and prejudicial such that there 
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is a reasonable likelihood that without the 
error the result would have been more fa-
vorable for the defendant." Id. at 925. 
[3] Here, B.L.'s immunity status was 
based on the prosecutor's commitment that 
he would not file future charges against 
B.L., and the court's statement that it 
would hold the prosecutor to his commit-
ment. The record reveals no exchange of 
testimony for immunity. In fact, B.L.'s 
testimony was already available to the 
State in the form of his earlier confession 
to the police. Moreover, a fair interpreta-
tion of the trial transcript could be that 
B.L., who has a learning disorder, was con-
fused rather than dishonest. 
Moreover, B.L.'s statements on cross-ex-
amination did not conflict with what took 
place at the preliminary hearing: He re-
ported he was not testifying because he 
had received immunity. He testified he 
was not promised that the State would not 
press charges against him if he testified 
against Schnoor. He testified he did not 
know why charges had not been pursued 
against him. He testified he was not told 
that if he testified against Schnoor, he 
would not go to detention or to jail. 
In short, the fact the prosecutor had 
committed not to file charges against B.L. 
would not affect the "jury's estimate of the 
truthfulness and reliability" of B.L. Na-
pue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177. 
Likewise, it would in no way "be determi-
native of guilt or innocence" of Schnoor. 
Id. Because we determine that B.L.'s testi-
mony was not false, we need not apply the 
two-part Humphrey test. 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Schnoor also claims his state constitu-
tional rights were violated. However, be-
cause Schnoor (1) did not preserve this 
issue at trial; (2) offers no separate analy-
sis; and (3) claims no broader protection, 
we decline to consider this claim. State v. 
Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n. 2 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 
1986). 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
Schnoor claims for the first time on ap-
peal that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel. 
[4] Schnoor did not raise this issue at 
trial. Ordinarily, an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim cannot be raised on appeal 
because the trial record is insufficient to 
allow the claim to be determined. State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 
1991). However, an appellant may raise 
such a claim if the trial record is adequate 
to permit determination of the issue and 
there is new counsel on appeal. Id.; State 
v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 
1991). Because the trial record is adequate 
and Schnoor is represented by new counsel, 
we reach the merits of the claim. 
We have no order to review. Thus, we 
roust determine whether counsel's perfor-
mance was deficient and, if so, whether the 
deficient performance prejudiced Schnoor 
under the test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Accord State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, Schnoor must show that 
(I) "counsel's representation falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,"; 
and (2) counsel's representation had a prej-
udicial effect on the outcome. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
[51 Schnoor claims the following acts 
and omissions of his counsel fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and 
prejudiced the outcome of his trial: (1) fail-
ure to insist that the bench conference be 
on the record; (2) failure to impeach B.L. 
via the preliminary hearing transcript; (3) 
failure to proffer evidence regarding B.L.'s 
immunity status; (4) failure to object to the 
prosecutor's closing argument; and (5) fail-
ure to record counsel's objections and argu-
ments regarding instruction number seven. 
In sum, all of the alleged acts and omis-
sions relate to a presumption that B.L. 
LAKE PHILGAS SERVICE v. VALLEY BANK 
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received immunity in exchange for his testi-
mony. 
Here, defense counsel vigorously cross-
examined B.L. regarding his immunity sta-
tus. Moreover, because we have already 
determined that B.L. did not receive immu-
nity in exchange for his testimony and 
thus, B.L.'s testimony on cross-examination 
did not conflict with the events that tran-
spired at the preliminary hearing, we find 
no fault in defense counsel's strategy re-
garding this issue. We thus find no merit 
in Schnoor's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
We decline to consider Schnoor's other 
claims, including those of prosecutorial 
misconduct and cumulative effect of errors, 
because they were not preserved for ap-
peal, and/or because they are without mer-
it. See Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 
(Utah 1990). Affirmed. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
O fniY NUMBER SYSTEM) 
LAKE PHILGAS SERVICE, a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v. 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; and Carl D. Bennett, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 910128-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 1993. 
Trailer owner filed conversion action 
against creditor of trailer occupant based 
on its execution sale of trailer. The Fourth 
District Court, Millard County, J. Robert 
Bullock, J., awarded vehicle owner $16,300 
in compensatory damages and $25,000 in 
punitive damages. Defendant creditor ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, 
J., held that: (1) sales agreement between 
trailer occupant and trailer owner, Motor 
Vehicle Division records and county tax 
records showing occupant as trailer's own-
er, insurance obtained by occupant, and 
occupant's possession of trailer, merely cre-
ated presumption of ownership by occu-
pant, which was rebutted by evidence that 
proposed sale of vehicle had fallen through 
due to lack of financing; (2) plaintiff was 
not estopped from recovering damages 
from occupant's creditor; and (3) punitive 
damages were not assessed out of passion 
or prejudice. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>1008.1(5) 
A reviewing court will not set aside the 
trial court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <£=>842(2) 
An appellate court reviews a trial 
court's conclusions of law under a correc-
tion-of-error standard, granting no defer-
ence to the trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 52(a). 
3. Trover and Conversion ^ l 
To sustain an action for conversion, a 
party must prove that the act in question 
constituted an act of willful interference 
with a chattel, done without lawful justifi-
cation, by which the person entitled thereto 
is deprived of its use and possession. 
4. Trover and Conversion <3=>35 
Trailer purchase agreement between 
trailer occupant and seller, records of the 
Motor Vehicle Division of State Tax Com-
mission and county tax records showing 
occupant as owner of trailer, insurance ob-
tained by occupant through his application 
identifying him as owner, and occupant's 
possession of trailer, established only a re-
buttable presumption of occupant's owner-
ship of trailer. 
5. Contracts <S^187(1) 
Provision in vehicle purchase agree-
ment, requiring any modifications of agree-
[488 US 227] 
JAMES OLDEN, Petitioner 
v 
KENTUCKY 
488 US 227, 102 L Ed 2d 513,109 S a 480 
[No. 88-5223] 
Decided December 12, 1988. 
Decision: Kentucky limitation on cross-examination, in sexual assault case, 
as to cohabitation of complaining witness with third party at time of trial, 
held (1) to violate accused's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, and 
(2) not to be harmless error. 
SUMMARY 
A black accused and his black codefendant were indicted, in Kentucky, for 
the kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy of a white woman. The woman 
was allegedly cohabiting with a black male third party, and the accused 
asserted that (1) the accused and the woman had engaged in consensual 
acts; and (2) the woman, out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with the 
third party, had lied when she told the third party that she had been raped, 
and had continued to lie since. The Kentucky trial court, however, (1) 
granted the prosecutor's motion to keep all evidence of current cohabitation 
between the woman and the third party from the jury, and (2) sustained the 
prosecutor's objection to an attempted cross-examination of the woman 
about her living arrangements, after the woman had claimed during direct 
examination that she was living with her mother. The jury, which acquitted 
the codefendant of all three charges and acquitted the accused of kidnap-
ping and rape, convicted the accused only of forcible sodomy. On appeal, the 
accused's claims included an argument that the trial court's refusal to allow 
the accused to impeach the woman's testimony by introducing evidence 
supporting a motive to lie deprived the accused of his right, under the 
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, to confront the witnesses against 
him, but the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in upholding the accused's 
conviction, expressed the view that (1) the evidence that the woman and the 
third party were living together at the time of trial (a) was not barred by 
the state's "rape shield" law, and (b) was relevant to the accused's theory of 
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the case; but (2) the evidence was properly excluded on the grounds that its 
probative value was outweighed by its possibility for prejudice, for the trial 
court's admission of such evidence might have created extreme prejudice 
against the woman, because the woman was white and the third party was 
black. 
Granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and granting certiorari, the 
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. In a per curiam 
opinion expressing the view of REHNQUIST, Ch. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, 
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., it was held that 
(1) it was beyond a reasonable limit on cross-examination, and violated the 
accused's right of confrontation, under the Sixth Amendment, as incorpo-
rated in the Fourteenth Amendment, to prohibit the accused from cross-
examining the woman as to the woman's alleged cohabitation with the third 
party at the time of trial, where (a) the accused had consistently made the 
assertions described, (b) a reasonable jury might have received a signifi-
cantly different impression of the witness' credibility had the accused's 
counsel been permitted to pursue the proposed line of cross-examination, 
and (c) speculation as to the effect of the jurors' racial biases could not 
justify exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential to demon-
strate the falsity of the woman's testimony; and (2) the violation was not 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, where (a) the woman's testimony 
was essential, indeed crucial, to the prosecution's case, (b) the woman's 
story, which was directly contradicted by the accused and the codefendant, 
was corroborated only by the largely derivative testimony of the third party, 
whose impartiality would also have been somewhat impugned by revelation 
of the relationship, and (c) as demonstrated by the jury's verdicts and by the 
dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals below, the state's case against 
the accused was far from overwhelming. 
MARSHALL, J., dissented, expressing the view that summary dispositions 
(1) deprive litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits; and (2) 
create a significant risk that the Supreme Court is rendering an erroneous 
or ill-advised decision that may confuse the lower courts. 
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forcible sodomy of a white woman, 
which prosecution results in the co-
defendant's acquittal of all three 
charges, the accused's acquittal of 
kidnapping and rape, and the ac-
cused's conviction only for forcible 
sodomy, it is beyond a reasonable 
limit on cross-examination and vio-
lates the accused's right of confron-
tation, under the Federal Constitu-
tion's Sixth Amendment, as incorpo-
rated in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to prohibit the accused from 
cross-examining the woman as to the 
woman's alleged cohabitation with a 
black male third party at the time of 
trial, where (1) the accused has con-
sistently asserted that (a) the ac-
cused and the woman engaged in 
consensual acts, and (b) the woman, 
out of fear of jeopardizing her rela-
tionship with the third party, lied 
when she told the third party that 
she had been raped, and has contin-
ued to lie since, (2) a reasonable jury 
might receive a significantly differ-
ent impression of the witness' credi-
bility if the accused's counsel were 
permitted to pursue the proposed 
line of cross-examination, and (3) 
despite the argument that testimony 
as to such interracial cohabitation 
might create extreme prejudice 
against the woman, speculation as to 
the effect of the jurors' racial biases 
cannot justify exclusion of cross-ex-
amination with such strong poten-
tial to demonstrate the falsity of the 
woman's testimony; such a violation 
is not harmless error beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, where (1) the wom-
an's testimony was essential, indeed 
:rucial, to the prosecution's case, (2) 
the woman's story, which was di-
rectly contradicted by the accused 
ind the codefendant, was corrobo-
rated only by the largely derivative 
testimony of the third party, whose 
mpartiality would also have been 
)16 
somewhat impugned by revelation of 
the relationship, and (3) as demon-
strated by the jury's verdicts and by 
the dissenting opinion in a state 
court of appeals below, the state's 
case against the accused was far 
from overwhelming; under such cir-
cumstances, the United States Su-
preme Court will grant leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis and grant a 
petition for certiorari, reverse the 
judgment of the state court of ap-
peals, and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings. (Marshall, J., dis-
sented in part from this holding.) 
Constitutional Law §37 — Sixth 
Amendment — states 
2. An accused's right, under the 
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amend-
ment, to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against the accused, is incor-
porated in the Constitution's Four-
teenth Amendment and is therefore 
available in state proceedings. 
Criminal Law §50 — right to 
cross-examine witnesses 
3. An accused's right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against 
the accused, under the Federal Con-
stitution's Sixth Amendment, as in-
corporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, includes the right to 
conduct reasonable cross-examina-
tion. 
Criminal Law § 50 — right to con-
frontation — limits on cross-
examination 
4. With respect to an accused's 
right of confrontation, under the 
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amend-
ment, as incorporated in the Four-
teenth Amendment, a trial court 
may impose reasonable limits on de-
fense counsel's inquiry into the po-
tential bias of a prosecution witness, 
in order to take account of such 
factors as harassment, prejudice, 
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confusion of the issues, the witness' 
safety, or interrogation that would 
be repetitive or only marginally rele-
vant. 
Appeal § 1552 — harmless error — 
denial of right to cross-exam-
ine witnesses 
5. With respect to harmless-error 
analysis of a violation of an ac-
cused's right to conduct reasonable 
cross-examination, pursuant to an 
accused's right of confrontation, un-
der the Federal Constitution's Sixth 
Amendment, as incorporated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the correct 
inquiry is whether, assuming that 
the damaging potential of the cross-
examination were fully realized, a 
reviewing court might nonetheless 
say that the error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt; whether 
such an error is harmless in a par-
ticular case depends upon a host of 
factors, including (1) the importance 
of the witness' testimony in the pros-
ecution's case, (2) whether the testi-
mony was cumulative, (3) the pres-
ence or absence of evidence corrobo-
rating or contradicting the testi-
mony of the witness on material 
points, (4) the extent of cross-exami-
nation otherwise permitted, and (5) 
the overall strength of the prosecu-
tion's case. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
[488 US 228] 
Per Curiam. 
Petitioner James Olden and his 
friend Charlie Ray Harris, both of 
whom are black, were indicted for 
kidnaping, rape, and forcible sod-
omy. The victim of the alleged 
crimes, Starla Matthews, a young 
white woman, gave the following 
account at trial: She and a friend, 
Regina Patton, had driven to Prince-
ton, Kentucky, to exchange Christ-
mas gifts with Bill Russell, petition-
er's half brother. After meeting Rus-
sell at a local car wash and exchang-
ing presents with him, Matthews 
and Patton stopped in J.R.'s, a "boot-
legging joint" serving a predomi-
nantly black clientele, to use the 
restroom. Matthews consumed sev-
eral glasses of beer. As the bar be-
came more crowded, she became in-
creasingly nervous because she and 
Patton were the only white people 
there. When Patton refused to leave, 
Matthews sat at a separate table, 
hoping to demonstrate to her friend 
that she was upset. As time passed, 
however, Matthews lost track of Pat-
ton and became somewhat intoxi-
cated. When petitioner told her that 
Patton had departed and had been 
in a car accident, she left the bar 
with petitioner and Harris to find 
out what had happened. She was 
driven in Harris' car to another loca-
tion, where, threatening her with a 
knife, petitioner raped and sodom-
ized her. Harris assisted by holding 
her arms. Later, she was driven to a 
dump, where two other men joined 
the group. There, petitioner raped 
her once again. At her request, the 
men then dropped her off in the 
vicinity of Bill Russell's house. 
On cross-examination, petitioner's 
counsel focused on a number of in-
consistencies in Matthews' various 
accounts of the alleged crime. Mat-
thews originally told the police that 
she had been raped by four men. 
Later, she claimed that she had been 
raped by only petitioner and Harris. 
At trial, she contended that peti-
tioner was the sole rapist. Further, 
while Matthews testified at trial 
that petitioner had threatened her 
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with a knife, she had not previously 
alleged that petitioner had been 
armed. 
[488 US 229] 
Russell, who also appeared as a 
State's witness, testified that on the 
evening in question he heard a noise 
outside his home and, when he went 
out to investigate, saw Matthews get 
out of Harris' car. Matthews imme-
diately told Russell that she had just 
been raped by petitioner and Harris. 
Petitioner and Harris asserted a 
defense of consent. According to 
their testimony, Matthews proposi-
tioned petitioner as he was about to 
leave the bar, and the two engaged 
in sexual acts behind the tavern. 
Afterwards, on Matthews' sugges-
tion, Matthews, petitioner, and Har-
ris left in Harris' car in search of 
cocaine. When they discovered that 
the seller was not at home, Mat-
thews asked Harris to drive to a 
local dump so that she and peti-
tioner could have sex once again. 
Harris complied. Later that evening, 
they picked up two other men, Rich-
ard Hickey and Chris Taylor, and 
drove to an establishment called The 
Alley. Harris, Taylor, and Hickey 
went in, leaving petitioner and Mat-
thews in the car. When Hickey and 
Harris returned, the men gave 
Hickey a ride to a store and then 
dropped Matthews off, at her re-
quest, in the vicinity of Bill Russell's 
home. 
Taylor and Hickey testified for the 
defense and corroborated the defen-
dants' account of the evening. While 
both acknowledged that they joined 
the group later than the time when 
the alleged rape occurred, both testi-
fied that Matthews did not appear 
upset. Hickey further testified that 
Matthews had approached him ear-
lier in the evening at J.R.'s and told 
him that she was looking for a black 
man with whom to have sex. An 
independent witness also appeared 
for the defense and testified that he 
had seen Matthews, Harris, and pe-
titioner at a store called Big O's on 
the evening in question, that a po-
liceman was in the store at the time, 
and that Matthews, who appeared 
alert, made no attempt to signal for 
assistance. 
Although Matthews and Russell 
were both married to and living 
with other people at the time of the 
incident, they were apparently in-
volved in an extramarital relation-
ship. By the 
[488 US 230] 
time of trial the two 
were living together, having sepa-
rated from their respective spouses. 
Petitioner's theory of the case was 
that Matthews concocted the rape 
story to protect her relationship 
with Russell, who would have grown 
suspicious upon seeing her disem-
bark from Harris' car. In order to 
demonstrate Matthews' motive to 
lie, it was crucial, petitioner con-
tended, that he be allowed to intro-
duce evidence of Matthews' and Rus-
sell's current cohabitation. Over pe-
titioner's vehement objections, the 
trial court nonetheless granted the 
prosecutor's motion in limine to 
keep all evidence of Matthews' and 
Russell's living arrangement from 
the jury. Moreover, when the de-
fense attempted to cross-examine 
Matthews about her living arrange-
ments, after she had claimed during 
direct examination that she was liv-
ing with her mother, the trial court 
sustained the prosecutor's objection. 
Based on the evidence admitted at 
trial, the jury acquitted Harris of 
being either a principal or an accom-
plice to any of the charged offenses. 
Petitioner was likewise acquitted of 
kidnaping and rape. However, in a 
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somewhat puzzling turn of events, 
the jury convicted petitioner alone of 
forcible sodomy. He was sentenced 
to 10 years' imprisonment. 
Petitioner appealed, asserting, in-
ter alia, that the trial court's refusal 
to allow him to impeach Matthews' 
testimony by introducing evidence 
supporting a motive to lie deprived 
him of his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront witnesses against him. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals up-
held the conviction. No. 86-CR-006 
(May 11, 1988). The court specifically 
held that evidence that Matthews 
and Russell were living together at 
the time of trial was not barred by 
the State's rape shield law. Ky Rev 
Stat Ann §510.145 (Michie 1985). 
Moreover, it acknowledged that the 
evidence in question was relevant to 
petitioner's theory of the case. But it 
held, nonetheless, that the evidence 
was properly excluded as "its proba-
tive value [was] outweighed by its 
possibility for prejudice." App to Pet 
for Cert A6. By way 
[488 US 231] 
of explanation, 
the court stated: "[T]here were the 
undisputed facts of race; Matthews 
was white and Russell was black. 
For the trial court to have admitted 
into evidence testimony that Mat-
thews and Russell were living to-
gether at the time of the trial may 
have created extreme prejudice 
against Matthews." Judge Clayton, 
who dissented but did not address 
the evidentiary issue, would have 
reversed petitioner's conviction both 
because he believed the jury's ver-
dicts were "manifestly inconsistent," 
and because he found Matthews' tes-
timony too incredible to provide evi-
dence sufficient to uphold the ver-
dict. Id., at A7. 
[1a, 2, 3] The Kentucky Court of 
Appeals failed to accord proper 
Ed 2d 513, 109 S a 480 
weight to petitioner's Sixth Amend-
ment right "to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him." That 
right, incorporated in the Four-
teenth Amendment and therefore 
available in state proceedings, 
Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 13 L 
Ed 2d 923, 85 S a 1065 (1965), 
includes the right to conduct reason-
able cross-examination. Davis v 
Alaska, 415 US 308, 315-316, 39 L 
Ed 2d 347, 94 S a 1105 (1974). 
In Davis v Alaska, we observed 
that, subject to "the broad discretion 
of a trial judge to preclude repetitive 
and unduly harassing interrogation 
. . . , the cross-examiner has tradi-
tionally been allowed to impeach, i. 
e., discredit, the witness." Id., at 316, 
39 L Ed 2d 347, 94 S Ct 1105. We 
emphasized that "the exposure of a 
I witness' motivation in testifying is a 
I proper and important function of the 
! constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination." Id., at 316-317, 
39 L Ed 2d 347, 94 S Ct 1105 citing 
Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474, 496, 
I 3 L Ed 2d 1377, 79 S a 1400 (1959). 
Recently, in Delaware v Van Ars-
dall, 475 US 673, 89 L Ed 2d 674, 
106 S Ct 1431 (1986), we reaffirmed 
Davis, and held that "a criminal 
defendant states a violation of the 
! Confrontation Clause by showing 
| that he was prohibited from engag-
ing in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a pro-
totypical form of bias on the part of 
the witness, and thereby 'to expose 
to the jury the facts from which 
jurors . . . could appropriately draw 
inferences relating to the reliability 
of the witness.'" 475 US, at 680, 89 
L Ed 2d 674, 106 S Ct 1431, quoting 
I Davis, supra, at 318, 39 L Ed 2d 347, 
94 S Ct 1105. 
[488 US 232] 
[1b] In the instant case, petitioner 
has consistently asserted that he 
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and Matthews engaged in consen-
sual sexual acts and that Matthews 
—out of fear of jeopardizing her re-
lationship with Russell—lied when 
she told Russell she had been raped 
and has continued to lie since. It is 
f plain to us that "[a] reasonable jury 
I might have received a significantly 
I different impression of [the witness'] 
I credibility had [defense counsel] 
I been permitted to pursue his pro-
I posed line of cross-examination." 
I Delaware v Van Arsdall, supra, at 
I 680, 89 L Ed 2d 674, 106 S Ct 1431. 
[1c, 4] The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals did not dispute, and indeed 
acknowledged, the relevance of the 
impeachment evidence. Nonetheless, 
without acknowledging the signifi-
cance of, or even adverting to, peti-
tioner's constitutional right to con-
frontation, the court held that peti-
tioner's right to effective cross-exam-
ination was outweighed by the dan-
ger that revealing Matthews' inter-
racial relationship would prejudice 
the jury against her. While a trial 
| court may, of course, impose reason-
I able limits on defense counsel's in-
I quiry into the potential bias of a 
I prosecution witness, to take account 
I of such factors as "harassment, prej-
I udice, confusion of the issues, the 
I witness' safety, or interrogation that 
I [would be] repetitive or only margin-
I ally relevant," Delaware v Van Ars-
I dall, supra, at 679, 89 L Ed 2d 674, 
I 106 S Ct 1431, the limitation here 
• was beyond reason. Speculation as to 
the effect of jurors' racial biases can-
not justify exclusion of cross-exami-
nation with such strong potential to 
demonstrate the falsity of Matthews' 
testimony. 
|
[1d, 5] In Delaware v Van Arsdall, 
supra, we held that "the constitu-
tionally improper denial of a defen-
dant's opportunity to impeach a wit-
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iness for bias, like other Confronta-
tion Clause errors, is subject to 
Chapman [v California, 386 US 18 
[17 L Ed 2d 705, 87 S a 824, 24 
ALR3d 1065 (1967)] harmless-error 
analysis." Id., at 684, 89 L Ed 2d 
674, 106 S a 1431. Thus we stated: 
"The correct inquiry is whether, 
assuming that the damaging po-
tential of the cross-examination 
were fully realized, a reviewing 
court might nonetheless say that 
the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
[488 US 233] 
Whether such 
an error is harmless in a particu-
lar case depends upon a host of 
I factors, all readily accessible to 
I reviewing courts. These factors in-
I elude the importance of the wit-
I ness' testimony in the prosecu-
I tion's case, whether the testimony 
I was cumulative, the presence or 
I absence of evidence corroborating 
I or contradicting the testimony of 
I the witness on material points, the 
I extent of cross-examination other-
I wise permitted, and, of course, the 
I overall strength of the prosecu-
• tion's case." Ibid. 
Here, Matthews' testimony was cen-
tral, indeed crucial, to the prosecu-
tion's case. Her story, which was 
directly contradicted by that of peti-
tioner and Harris, was corroborated 
only by the largely derivative testi-
mony of Russell, whose impartiality 
would also have been somewhat im-
pugned by revelation of his relation-
ship with Matthews. Finally, as dem-
onstrated graphically by the jury's 
verdicts, which cannot be squared 
with the State's theory of the alleged 
crime, and by Judge Clayton's dis-
senting opinion below, the State's 
case against petitioner was far from 
overwhelming. In sum, considering 
OLDEN v KENTUCKY 
(1988) 488 US 227,102 L Ed 2d 513, 109 S a 480 
the relevant Van Arsdall factors ceed in forma pauperis and the peti-
within the context of this case, we tion for certiorari are granted, the 
find it impossible to conclude "be- judgment of the Kentucky Court of 
yond a reasonable doubt" that the Appeals is reversed and the case is 
restriction on petitioner's right to remanded for further proceedings 
confrontation was harmless. not inconsistent with this opinion. 
[1el The motion for leave to pro- It is so ordered. 
SEPARATE OPINION 
Justice Marshall, dissenting. 
I continue to believe that sum-
mary dispositions deprive litigants of 
a fair opportunity to be heard on the 
merits and create a significant risk 
that the Court is rendering an erro-
neous or ill-advised decision that 
may confuse the lower courts. See 
Pennsylvania v Bruder, ante, p 11, 
102 L Ed 2d 172, 109 S a 205 (1988) 
(Marshall, 
[488 US 234] 
J., dissenting); Rho-
des v Stewart, ante, p 4, 102 L Ed 2d 
1, 109 S Ct 202 (1988) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Buchanan v Stanships, 
Inc., 485 US 265, 269, 99 L Ed 2d 
289, 108 S Ct 1130 (1988) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Commissioner v 
McCoy, 484 US 3, 7, 98 L Ed 2d 2, 
108 S Ct 217 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). I therefore dissent from 
the Court's decision today to reverse 
summarily the decision below. 
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into the traffic lane due to a parked car and 
an encroaching fence, a material question 
of fact then arises whether the City has 
discharged its obligation to provide reason-
ably safe conditions for pedestrian travel. 
Governmental immunity has been waived 
by statute in such case. Whether a street 
is reasonably safe is a factual question to 
be resolved by the fact finder. Ingram v. 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). 
The Supreme Court of Colorado was 
faced with a similar situation in Wheeler v. 
County of Eagle, 666 P.2d 559 (Colo.1983). 
The trial court and the court of appeals 
held that the county had no duty to con-
struct a pedestrian walkway along a rural 
road. In reversing, the supreme court stat-
ed that the issue was not whether the 
county was required to construct side-
walks, but whether it breached its duty to 
maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe 
manner for members of the public who use 
it: 
The factual predicate was that a large 
trailer court, where a number of high 
school students resided, was located near 
County Road 13. Trees and bushes 
which extended to the edge of the road 
forced pedestrians to walk on the pave-
ment. A genuine issue exists as to 
whether, under the circumstances, the 
County failed in its duty to exercise rea-
sonable care to ensure the safety of mo-
torists and pedestrians who travel upon 
County Road 13. Therefore, a summary 
judgment should not have been entered 
for the County. 
Id. at 561. 
The summary judgment is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Michael 
R. Murphy, J., of aggravated sexual abuse 
of a child. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that: 
(1) prosecutor's questions which implied in-
culpatory facts unsupported by evidence 
were improper; (2) prosecutor's question-
ing of defendant regarding veracity of wit-
nesses was improper; (3) evidence did not 
support prosecutor's comments in closing 
argument; (4) stipulated testimony impli-
cating defendant's prearrest silence was 
inadmissible; and (5) errors were cumula-
tively harmful. 
Reversed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=*728(2), 1037.1(1) 
Failure to object to prosecutor's im-
proper remarks waives claim unless re-
marks reach level of plain error. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1030(1) 
Normally, Court of Appeals finds plain 
error only if error exists, it should have 
been obvious to trial court, and it was 
harmful. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified 
herself, does not participate herein; Regnal 
W. Garff, Jr., Court of Appeals Judge, sat 
but retired before acting on the case. 
Bf « SYSTEM> 
3. Criminal Law <&=> 1030(1) 
Error is harmful, and may reach level 
of plain error, if it undermines confidence 
in verdict or, there is reasonable likelihood 
of more favorable outcome without error. 
4. Criminal Law e»706(4) 
Prosecutor's questions, asking defen-
dant charged with aggravated sexual 
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abuse about incriminating statements al-
legedly made to child's stepfather, were 
improper where state did not introduce sup-
porting evidence to show that defendant 
actually made such statements. 
5. Criminal Law e=>1037.1(3) 
Although prosecutor's questions imply-
ing inculpatory facts not supported by evi-
dence were not obvious error, Court of 
Appeals would dispense with requirement 
of obviousness of error to allow review of 
prosecutor's error; egregious nature of 
prosecutor's question and strong inculpato-
ry inferences contained therein allowed re-
view so that justice cold be done. 
6. Criminal Law «=»706(4) 
Prosecutor's question of defendant 
charged with aggravated sexual abuse re-
garding veracity of other witnesses was 
improper. 
7. Criminal Law <s=»719(l) 
Comment by prosecutor during closing 
argument that jury consider matters out-
side evidence is prosecutorial misconduct. 
8. Criminal Law «=1037.1(2) 
Even if error in prosecutor's comments 
during closing argument that jury consider 
matters outside evidence was not obvious, 
Court of Appeals would dispense with re-
quirement of obviousness of error to allow 
review of prosecutor's error. 
9. Criminal Law <S=>719(1) 
Evidence did not support prosecutor's 
comment in closing argument that defen-
dant touched child on penis while child was 
naked and sitting in defendant's lap. 
10. Criminal Law <£=»719(1) 
In prosecution for sexual abuse, evi-
dence did not support prosecutor's state-
ment in closing argument that court could 
take judicial notice of hot tub business loca-
tion and that particular business was 
where defendant had taken child; neither 
child nor defendant had identified location 
of hot tub business mentioned by prosecu-
tor and defendant denied taking child to 
any hot tub business. 
11. Criminal Law «=»719(lf 
In prosecution for aggravated sexual 
abuse, evidence did not support prosecu-
tor's comment in closing argument that 
defendant was worried about seven counts 
when speaking to alleged victim's mother; 
defendant actually spoke to victim's mother 
before finding out about seven counts from 
detective and victim's mother never testi-
fied about defendant's statement as to sev-
en counts. 
12. Witnesses «=»347 
Prosecution may use defendant's pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence for impeach-
ment purposes. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
13. Witnesses <3=»347 
Postarrest silence may be used for im-
peachment purposes where Miranda warn-
ings have not been given. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 5. 
14. Witnesses <®=>29372 
Fifth Amendment protections exist in 
civil investigations. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 5. 
15. Criminal Law ®=>407(1) 
Evidence of defendant's pre-Miranda, 
prearrest silence was not admissible to 
demonstrate defendant had consciousness 
of guilt. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
16. Criminal Law &*l 186.1 
Determination of whether errors can 
be classified as cumulatively harmful turns 
on whether errors undermine confidence in 
verdict. 
17. Criminal Law «=>1186.1 
Where case turned primarily on jury's 
assessment of credibility of victim of al-
leged sexual abuse versus credibility of 
defendant, cumulative effect of numerous 
errors, including prosecutor's questions 
containing unsupported innuendo, prosecu-
tor's misstatement of evidence, and admis-
sion of statements in stipulated testimony 
regarding defendant's pre-Miranda, prear-
rest silence was not harmless. 
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Jan Graham and Kris Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant, Curtis Palmer, appeals his 
conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, a first degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1990). We 
reverse. 
FACTS 
Defendant lived with his mother at 520 
East Commonwealth Avenue in Salt Lake 
County.1 He met Chuck Bartholomew 
while both men were incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison. After their release, the 
men maintained a friendship. Sometime in 
early 1990, Bartholomew introduced defen-
dant to his stepson, nine year old E.N. 
Between the end of school in 1990 and 
December of 1990, E.N. visited defendant 
numerous times to return borrowed items, 
to work at defendant's home, or to stay 
while his parents were gone. Additionally, 
E.N. once spent the night at defendant's 
house when E.N.'s sister and some friends 
were staying at E.N.'s house. 
At age five, E.N. had been sexually 
abused by his natural father. E.N. was 
removed from his mother's home for a time 
when he was eight years old for molesting 
his little sister. E.N. had participated in 
counseling as a result of these experiences. 
On January 7, 1991, E.N.'s mother was 
walking him and his sisters to school. Be-
cause children had teased E.N. previously, 
he did not want to go to school and threw a 
tantrum. E.N.'s mother told him she was 
going to call defendant. The record is un-
clear as to her motivation for calling defen-
dant. It was either to help calm E.N. down 
1. On appeal we recite the facts from the record 
in the manner most consistent with the jury's 
verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
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or to have defendant take E.N. to Bartholo-
mew to be punished, or both. E.N. then 
accused defendant of sexually abusing him. 
E.N.'s mother took him home and after 
further questioning called the police. 
The case was assigned to Salt Lake City 
Police Detective Dennis Sweat. On Janu-* 
ary 11, 1992, the detective left a message 
on defendant's answering machine. After 
receiving the message, defendant attempt-
ed to phone Bartholomew but reached 
E.N.'s mother and talked to her instead. 
On January 14, 1992, and again two days 
later, defendant contacted Detective Sweat 
by phone and discussed the situation. Ac-
cording to Detective Sweat, defendant sug-
gested making a deal for community ser-
vice stating "he never once claimed it didn't 
happen" and "he wanted to get some ad-
vice" before talking. The Salt Lake Coun-
ty Attorney filed an information. The in-
formation alleged defendant had committed 
the crime of "[aggravated sexual abuse of 
a child, a first degree felony, at 520 East 
Commonwealth, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah." Defendant surrendered and was 
arrested. The preliminary hearing was 
held March 28, 1992, at which time defen-
dant was bound over for trial. 
At trial, E.N. testified defendant had 
touched his penis and buttocks "about sev-
en" different times at defendant's house 
between the end of school in 1990 and 
December of 1990, forced him to touch 
defendant's penis once, and tried to force 
him to kiss defendant's lips. E.N. further 
testified the last time defendant touched 
him was at a hot tub rental business. Ad-
ditionally, E.N. alleged defendant had 
asked him to touch defendant several 
times. E.N. also testified defendant had 
warned E.N. his mother and stepfather 
would get in trouble if E.N. told anyone 
about the incidents. 
The trial court allowed a "Stipulation of 
Expected Testimony" of Detective Sweat 
regarding defendant's prearrest conversa-
tions with him to be read into evidence. 
1989); State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 172 n. 1 
(Utah App.1992). 
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The jury convicted defendant of sexual 
abuse of a child. Because he had previous-
ly been convicted for attempted sexual 
abuse of a child, this conviction was en-
hanced to a first degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404. l(3Xe) (1990). 
Defendant raises numerous claims on ap-
peal. We do not discuss all the issues,2 but 
rather focus on the numerous issues which 
require our reversal of defendant's convic-
tion. 
I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
[1-3] Defendant points to a number of 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. He 
argues the prosecutor, both in his cross 
examination of defendant and his closing 
arguments, made improper statements. 
The State responds that defendant failed to 
preserve all but one issue for appeal and 
the preserved issue did not amount to pros-
ecutorial misconduct. 
Generally, the test used for determining 
whether a prosecutor's statements are 
improper and constitute error is whether 
the remarks " 'called to the jurors' atten-
tion matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in reaching a ver-
dict.' " Improper statements will require 
reversal if they are determined to be 
harmful. 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 
1992) (quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 
48, 51 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Crevi-
ston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982))) (foot-
note omitted). Failure to object to the im-
proper remarks, however, waives the claim 
unless the remarks reach the level of plain 
error. Id. Normally, we find plain error 
only if we conclude: an error exists, it 
should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and it was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n. 10; State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 
2. Defendant's claims that we have examined but 
do not address are- (1) The trial court erred 
when it referred to the charge as one of aggra-
vated assault; (2) Evidence of the hot tub inci-
dent is inadmissible "other bad act" evidence; 
(3) The elements jury instruction contained a 
fatal variance from the information, (4) The 
prosecutor improperly violated the trial court's 
1992). But see State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 n. 8 (Utah) (noting "obviousness 
requirement poses no rigid and insur-
mountable barrier to review"), cert denied, 
Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 
62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). An error is 
harmful if it undermines our confidence in 
the verdict or, put another way, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome without the error. Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1208-09; Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174. 
A. Unsupported Innuendo 
First, defendant claims the prosecutor 
failed to support prejudicial, inculpatory in-
ferences arising from his questions with 
appropriate evidence. During cross-exami-
nation of defendant the following exchange 
occurred: 
Q. [Prosecutor] You really liked [E.N.], 
didn't you? 
A. [Defendant] Yes. 
Q. You admitted as much to his stepfa-
ther, didn't you? 
A. Yes. I mean, I had a friendship with 
the stepfather and with [E.N.]. 
Q. And didn't you, at one time, say to 
the stepfather, "Yes, I'm having feelings 
for [E.N.] that I really shouldn't be hav-
ing?" 
A. I don't know whether I made [a] 
statement to that effect. 
Q. That certainly would have been an 
accurate statement wouldn't it? 
A. I mean, I was close to [E.N.]. But if 
you're talking about sexual feelings, no. 
Q. You deny you ever had sexual feel-
ings toward this young boy? 
A. Yes. 
After further questions on different top-
ics, the prosecutor asked: 
Isn't it true that you in fact, on previous 
occasions, had told [E.N.'s stepfather] 
bifurcation order; (5) The prosecutor's refer-
ence to E.N.'s molestation of his sisters rather 
than just one sister and to the magistrate's deter-
mination at the preliminary hearing were prose-
cutorial misconduct, and (6) Utah Rule of Evi-
dence 408 or 410 made admission of portions of 
the stipulation of Detective Sweat's testimony 
impropei. 
STATE v. PALMER 
Cite •» 860 VIA 339 (Utah App. 1993) 
Utah 343 
that you were concerned about feelings 
that you were having for E.N. that were 
inappropriate? 
To which defendant answered "no." 
[4] The prosecution did not put on evi-
dence that defendant made such an incrimi-
nating statement to E.N.'s stepfather. De-
fendant claims the failure to introduce sup-
porting evidence means the question 
brought improper information to the ju-
rors' attention. The State responds that 
under the plain error test any error embod-
ied in the exchange was neither obvious 
nor harmful. 
[5] The Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, 
recently noted this type of questioning is 
generally error. See State v. Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). In Emmett, after 
ruling the defendant was entitled to a new 
trial, the court addressed some issues 
which it felt might be presented on retrial. 
One of those issues was the propriety of 
the prosecutor's questioning. Referring to 
the defendant's pretrial witness prepara-
tion, "the prosecutor asked, 'He didn't tell 
you to face the jury and tell you exactly 
what to say?'" Id. at 786 (emphasis in 
original). The defendant denied the allega-
tion and no evidence was entered which 
supported it. The court noted: "Generally, 
it is error to ask an accused a question that 
implies the existence of a prejudicial fact 
unless the prosecution can prove the exis-
tence of the fact. Otherwise, the only limit 
on such a line of questioning would be the 
prosecutor's imagination." Id. at 786-87. 
See also United States v. Silverstein, 737 
F.2d 864, 868 (10th Cir.1984) (requiring 
prosecutor who asks accused question im-
plying existence of prejudicial fact to prove 
the fact); State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 
769-70 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (holding 
questioning about prior convictions after 
witness's denial improper without extrinsic 
proof of convictions). Hence, we conclude 
the prosecutor's questions which implied 
inculpatory facts that were unsupported by 
evidence were error. 
The next question is whether the error is 
obvious. The trial judge could not know 
whether later evidence would support the 
inculpatory inferences of the prosecutor's 
questions. Thus, we cannot say the error 
was obvious. However, this is a circum-
stance "when an error not readily apparent 
to the court" does not raise an "insur-
mountable barrier to review." State v. El-
dredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n. 8 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, the egregious nature of the 
prosecutor's question and the strong incul-
patory inferences contained therein lead us 
"to dispense with the requirement of obvi-
ousness so that justice can be done." Id. 
Unless we apply this exception, this type of 
error would always escape review under 
the obviousness requirement. 
We reserve an analysis of the harmful-
ness of this error in order to consider it in 
conjunction with all other errors in the 
case. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786 (as-
sessing harmfulness after considering all 
errors). 
B. Examination on the Veracity 
of Other Witnesses 
[6] While cross-examining defendant, 
the prosecutor asked him to comment on 
the conflict between his testimony and that 
of two other witnesses, E.N. and his moth-
er. The prosecutor asked defendant if 
E.N. was "mistaken or lying" regarding 
the visit to the hot tub establishment. De-
fendant answered "yes." Later, while dis-
cussing defendant's phone conversations 
with Detective Sweat, the prosecutor again 
had defendant comment on E.N.'s veracity. 
Q. [Prosecutor] You knew that whatev-
er [E.N.] had to say regarding sexual 
abuse, it was not true, as applied to you? 
A. [Defendant] That's correct. 
Q. Had you by that time formulated 
any reason that you could think of that 
[E.N.] would say these things about you 
if they weren't true? 
A. Oh, I— 
Q. Just yes or no. 
A. Not really. 
Q. Did you think about it? 
A. I was kind of in shock. 
The prosecutor later asked 
mother was "mistaken or lying" 
if E.N.'s 
regarding 
a conversation she testified about. Defen-
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dant again answered in the affirmative 
Defendant argues these questions regard 
mg the veracity of the other witnesses 
amount to prosecutorial misconduct The 
State responds they must be analyzed for 
plain error 
In the dicta portion of Emmett, the su 
preme court addressed the propnety of ex 
animation on another witness's veracity 
The court noted this type of 
question is improper because it is argu-
mentative and seeks information beyond 
the witness's competence The prejudi 
cial effect of such a question lies in the 
fact that it suggests to the jury that a 
witness is committing perjury even 
though there are other explanations for 
the inconsistency In addition, it puts 
the defendant m the untenable position 
of commenting on the character and mo-
tivations of another witness who may 
appear sympathetic to the jury 
Emmett, 839 P2d at 787 (footnote omit-
ted) 
Thus, we conclude these questions, 
amounted to obvious error We again re 
serve an analysis of the harmfulness of 
this error so we can consider it in conjunc 
tion with all other errors in the case 
C Argument on Matters 
Not in Evidence 
[7,8] Defendant identifies three com 
ments by the prosecutor in closing argu 
ment on matters not in evidence A com 
ment by a prosecutor during closing argu 
ment that the jury consider matters outside 
the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct 
See State v Troy, 688 P 2d 483, 486 (Utah 
1984) Again, defendant's counsel failed to 
object to these comments and we can only 
reach them under a plain error analysis 
In two of the instances we address, the 
Statp argues only that any error was harm 
less, thus conceding both error and obvi 
ousness Regarding the other remark, the 
State argues the failure to object was an 
affirmative trial strategy of defense coun 
sel and thus plain error analysis is preclud 
ed We need not decide whether these 
misstatements of the evidence should have 
been obvious to the trial judge We are 
hesitant to set a rule which would require a 
tnal judge to intervene m closing argument 
whenever the judge believes a misstate-
ment of the evidence by counsel has oc-
curred Whether or not objections to such 
misstatements are to be made is trial coun-
sel's decision In the vast majority of in-
stances, failure to object to such a mis-
statement will be deemed a waiver of the 
error However, the three misstatements 
we address went to the heart of the State's 
case and, especially in light of the pattern 
of errors in this case, we are compelled to 
assess their impact Thus, even if the mis-
statements were not "obvious," we would 
"dispense with the obviousness require 
ment so that justice can be done " State v 
Eldredge, 773 P 2d 29, 35 n 8 (Utah 1989) 
[9] First, in closing argument the prose-
cutor stated 
It [a minor inconsistency in E N 's testi-
mony] shows only that he's capable of 
having the same failure of memory that 
we all are, but the central core of his 
memory is unaffected This man 
touched him touched him on the penis 
He did it while he was naked, while he 
was sitting in his lap 
There was no evidence of any abusive 
touching while E N was sitting on defen 
dant's lap The harmfulness of this single 
comment on the alleged tepsittmg incident 
is considered in conjunction with the other 
errors in the case 
[10] Second, in the final portion of his 
closing remarks the prosecutor referred to 
the hot tub incident Defendant s counsel 
attempted to attack E N ' s credibility dur 
mg the defense's closing argument Try 
ing to reduce the impact of that attack, the 
prosecutor discussed the hot tub incident 
I don t care about the hot tub It was 
kind of interesting, as discombobulated 
as it was, that [defendant] wasn t pre 
pared vvith his slicko testimony to talk 
about the hot tub But he did admit that 
he had been to the hot tub before, on 
more than one occasion He did admit 
that, yes, you can t get kids in there 
unless you have got an adult with them 
And if memory ser\es correctly, he told 
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us where the hot tub was, even though 
he couldn't agree or couldn't confirm, or 
whatever you want to use, with my sug-
gestion about what the possible name of 
it was 
I think the Court can take judicial notice 
of the fact there's such a place as Rub-
A-Dub Hot Tub If memory serves cor-
rectly, it's on about 21st South and Ninth 
East It's not where [E N] said it was 
That he wasn't to the hot tub But it's 
where [defendant] says he went to the 
hot tub It's the same place that [ E N ] 
said he went 
E N testified that defendant had taken him 
to a hot tub business on South State Street 
He could not remember the name of it 
Defendant testified he had been to a hot 
tub business but denied ever taking E N 
there He admitted "going by" Rub-A-
Dub Hot Tub 
Defendant contends there is no evidence 
connecting E N with Rub-A-Dub Hot Tub 
Further, there is no testimony regarding 
the busmess's address Thus, the prosecu 
tor's statement the court could take judicial 
notice of the hot tub business and his argu 
ment this business was where defendant 
took E N could well ha/e convinced the 
jury the hot tub evidence was stronger 
than it actually was Defendant notes 
these comments came in the prosecutor's 
final closing remarks to which defendant 
had no opportunity to respond 
The State concedes the prosecutor's 
statement is "not entirely accurate" but 
contends defendant was not harmed by the 
error Whether the prosecutor's improper 
statements regarding Rub-A-Dub Hot Tub 
are harmful will be considered in conjunc 
tion with the other errors in this case 
[11] Third, the prosecutor told the jury 
"We know that when he talked to [E N 's 
mother], he somehow figured out that he 
was worried about seven different counts " 
The prosecutor then focused on this fact as 
supporting both E N ' s testimony and the 
State's theory that defendant was unusual 
ly sophisticated regarding these charges 
The prosecutor argued defendant's knowl 
edge evidenced a consciousness of guilt 
However, there was no testimony from 
E N 's mother that defendant ever men-
tioned seven charges In fact, defendant 
testified he learned of the potential for 
seven charges from Detective Sweat, to 
whom he talked after he talked to E N ' s 
mother Further, defendant expressly de-
nied ever mentioning the potential for sev-
en charges to E N ' s mother Thus, the 
prosecutor not only argued facts not m 
evidence but argued facts directly contra 
dictory to the evidence 
The State argues that because defen 
dant's counsel used this contradiction as an 
example of problems with the State's case, 
he made an affirmative decision not to ob-
ject to the prosecutor's comments Thus 
according to the State, we should rot un 
dertake a plain error analysis of these com 
ments See State v Bullock, 791 P 2d 155 
(Utah 1989) (holding strategic decision by 
counsel to allow evidence precludes plain 
error analysis) We disagree We find the 
prosecutor's comments error and consider 
any harm from this error in comunction 
with the other errors 
II PRE-MIRANDA CONVERSATION 
WITH DETECTIVE SWEAT 
Detective Sweat had a conflict at the 
time of trial and was not called to testify 
In place of his live testimony there was a 
document read into the record captioned 
' Stipulation of Expected Testimony " Pn 
or to the stipulation being read, an mfor 
mal conference was held where the judge 
deleted some portions of the stipulation 
objected to by defendant The judge how 
ever refused to delete other portions of the 
stipulation objected to by defendant 
The portion of the stipulation relevant to 
our analysis that the trial judge allowed 
over defendant's objection provides 
Mr Palmer told me he would call back 
after he decided whether he wanted to 
talk to me in person or not 
Mr Palmer then said he had never 
once claimed that it didn t happen he 
just wanted to get some advice before 
talking to me 
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Prior to admission of this stipulated testi-
mony, defendant's counsel indicated he had 
objected to it in the informal conference 
held by the trial judge in part because the 
statements included evidence of defendant 
"trying to decide whether or not [he] ought 
to have counsel in this case " * The prose-
cutor indicated he thought the contested 
portions were admissible because 
[tjhat's the theory of the State's case 
that this shows a consciousness of 
guilt The detective [told defendant] 
he wanted to discuss some allegations of 
[ E N ] that [defendant] had sexually 
abused him 
[G]iven the specificity of that and 
the fact that [defendant] is the one who 
initiated the telephone call, I think it 
ought to be allowed for the purpose of 
showing consciousness of guilt 
Following the introduction of Detective 
Sweat's testimony in the case in chief, de 
fendant took the stand He testified that 
in the first phone conversation he had in 
formed Detective Sweat he wanted to 
check with legal counsel According to 
defendant, Detective Sweat responded to 
the effect "if you're not guilty, why do you 
need a lawyer?" Defendant testified he 
told Detective Sweat that he was neither 
admitting nor denying anything He fur 
ther testified his reason for not denying 
everything was that he wanted a chance to 
talk to a lawyer first 
3 The fact that these evidentiary rulings and 
arguments were made in an informal confer 
ence makes assessment of this issue much more 
difficult than it would be if the conference was 
part of the record We have however a sum 
mary made by counsel for both sides on the 
record and we make our determination based 
on that oral summary As we have recognized 
before a record should be made of all proceed 
mgs of courts of record including those in 
chambers Birch v Birch 771 P 2d 1114 1116 
(Utah App 1989) (citing Bnggs v Holcomb 740 
P2d 281 283 (Utah App 1987)) (emphasis in 
original) 
4 In a footnote defendant refers to Article I 
sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and 
invites us to apply a state constitutional analysis 
to this question This argument however is 
not developed to any meaningful extent We 
therefore refuse to consider it See State v 
Arroyo 770 P 2d 153 154 n 1 (Utah App 1989) 
The prosecutor argued that defendant's 
choice to remain silent and neither admit 
nor deny guilt to Detective Sweat showed a 
consciousness of guilt Discussing defen-
dant's refusal to admit or deny the charges 
m his closing argument, the prosecutor 
stated 
What kind of a person would do that7 I 
mean, he's not working for the CIA 
He's not one of these public officials who 
have been instructed to tell the news-
man, "I can neither confirm nor deny 
such and such a rumor " He's a person 
who has been accused of a crime 
Now, what is so incredibly difficult 
about saying, "No, I didn't do i t ?" Why 
didn't he do that7 Because he knew he 
was guilty, that's why 
Defendant claims admission of the con-
tested paragraphs of the stipulation to sup-
port an inference of guilt was unconstitu-
tional Defendant asserts he has a nght, 
under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, to not have his decision 
to seek advice and neither admit nor deny 
the charges against him placed in evidence 
in the prosecution's case in chief to prove 
culpability4 The State responds that the 
contested paragraphs do not implicate the 
Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment provides "No 
person shall be compelled in any cnmi 
nal case to be a witness against himself " 
U S Const amend V 5 Utah courts have 
revd on other grounds 796 P 2d 684 (Utah 
1990) 
5 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination is based on numerous social poll 
cies 
It reflects many of our fundamental \alues 
and most nobel aspirations our unwilling 
ness to subject thoce suspected of crime to the 
cruel tnlemma of self accusation perjury or 
contempt our preference for an accusatorial 
rather than an inquisitorial system of cnmi 
nal justice our fear that self incriminating 
statements will be elicited by inhumane treat 
ments and abuses our sense of fair play 
which dictates a fair state individual balance 
by requiring the government to leave the mdi 
vidual alone until good cause is shown for 
disturbing him and by requiring the govern 
ment in its contest with the individual to 
shoulder the entire load our respect for the 
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never explicitly addressed whether evi- 96 S C t 2240, 
dence of a person exercising the constitu-
tional nght to remain silent or to consult 
with an attorney prior to custodial interro-
gation can be used as inferential evidence 
of guilt dunng the State's case in ch i e f 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme 
Court has not directly considered the issue 
raised by defendant The Supreme Court 
has noted the semmal Fifth Amendment 
silence case, Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 
436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), 
and its predecessor Escobedo v Illinois, 
378 U S 478, 84 S Ct 1758, 12 L Ed 2d 977 
(1964), are not innovations but are merely 
"explication[s] of basic rights that are en 
shrmed in our Constitution" Miranda, 
384 U S at 442, 86 S Ct at 1611 The Fifth 
Amendment nght to silence is a compre-
hensive privilege that 
"can be claimed m any proceeding, be it 
criminal or civil, administrative or judi 
cial, investigatory or adjudicatory 
[I]t protects any disclosures which the 
witness may reasonably apprehend could 
be used in a criminal prosecution or 
which could lead to other evidence that 
might be so used " 
In re Gault, 387 U S 1, 47-48, 87 SCt 
1428, 1454, 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967) (quoting 
Murphy v Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U S 
52, 94, 84 S Ct 1594, 1611, 12 LEd2d 678 
(1964) (White, J , concurring)) (emphasis 
modified) 
The Supreme Court has held that com 
ment by a prosecutor on a defendant's fail 
ure to testify at tnal is an unconstitutional 
violation of the defendant's Fifth Amend 
ment rights Griffin v California, 380 
U S 609, 615, 85 SCt 1229, 1233, 14 
L Ed 2d 106 (1965) Further, the Court has 
ruled a defendant's silence cannot be used 
to impeach his testimony at trial if his 
silence follows the delivery of Miranda 
warnings In Doyle v Ohio, 426 U S 610, 
inviolability of the human personality and of 
the right of each individual to a private en 
clave where he may lead a private life our 
distrust of self-deprecatory statements and 
our realization that the privilege while some 
times a shelter to the guilty is often a 
protection to the innocent 
Utah 347 
49 L E d 2 d 91 (1976), the 
Supreme Court held a prosecutor's attempt 
to impeach a defendant's testimony by 
questioning him about his silence following 
arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings 
violated due process Id 426 U S at 619, 
96 S Ct at 2245 The Court reasoned that 
this silence follows the delivery of Mi-
randa warnings and could simply be an 
exercise of these rights "Thus, every 
post-arrest silence is msolubly ambiguous 
because of what the State is required to 
advise the person arrested " Id 426 U S 
at 617, 96 S Ct at 2244 
Even the three dissenters in Doyle found 
"ment in a portion" of petitioner's argu-
ment Id at 620, 96 S Ct at 2246 (Stevens, 
J , dissenting) In discussing the aspect 
they found meritorious, they indicate using 
silence as a direct inference of guilt is 
improper "Comment on the lack of credi 
bility of the defendant is plainly proper, it 
is not proper, however, for the prosecutor 
to ask the jury to draw a direct inference 
of guilt from silence—to argue, in effect, 
that silence is inconsistent with innocence " 
Id at 634-35, 96 S Ct at 2252-53 (Stevens, 
J , dissenting) Because the permissible 
credibility reference and the impermissible 
inference of guilt reference by the prosecu 
tor were "inextricably intertwined,' the 
dissenters rejected reversing the conviction 
due to the inference of guilt argument Id 
at 636, 96 S Ct at 2253 (Stevens, J , dissent 
mg) Thus, while rejecting the Court's 
holding that post Miranda silence was in 
admissible for impeachment purposes, the 
dissent implies evidence of silence is mad 
missible in the case in chief 
Later, in Jenkins v Anderson, 447 U S 
231, 100 S Ct 2124, 65 L Ed 2d 86 (1980), 
the Court held a defendant's prearrest pre 
Miranda warnings silence could be used to 
impeach his exculpatory testimony at trial7 
Murphy v Waterfront Comm n 378 U S 52 55 
84 SCt 1594 1596-97 12 L Ed 2d 678 (1964) 
(citations omitted) 
6 See State v Gray 851 P 2d 1217 1223-24 
(Utah App 1993) (assessing passing reference to 
silence under custodial interrogation standard) 
7 The Jenkins Court expressly reserved the issue 
of whether prearrest silence was ever projected 
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Id. 447 U.S. at 240, 100 S.Ct. at 2130. It is 
clear the ambiguity issue on which Doyle 
turned does not arise in this setting. Im-
peachment questioning is acceptable here 
because it "follows the defendant's own 
decision to cast aside his cloak of silence 
and advances the truth-finding function of 
the criminal trial." Id. 447 U.S. at 238, 100 
S.Ct. at 2129. 
"Every criminal defendant is privileged 
to testify in his own defense, or to refuse 
to do so. But that privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit 
perjury Having voluntarily taken 
the stand, petitioner was under an obli-
gation to speak truthfully and accurate-
ly, and the prosecution here did no more 
than utilize the traditional truth-testing 
devices of the adversary process." 
Id. at 237-38, 100 S.Ct. at 2129 (quoting 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 
SCt. 643, 645-46, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)). 
"Once a defendant decides to testify, '[tjhe 
interests of the other party and regard for 
the function of courts of justice to ascer-
tain the truth become relevant, and prevail 
in the balance of considerations determin-
ing the scope and limits of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.' " Id. 447 U S. 
at 238, 100 S.Ct at 2129 (quoting Brown v 
United States, 356 U.S 148, 156, 78 S.Ct. 
622, 627, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958)). 
[12] Hence, the prosecution may use a 
defendant's prearrest, pre-Miranda silence 
for impeachment purposes because, follow-
ing defendant's waiver of his right to si-
lence, justice demands the court's role in 
ascertaining truth outweigh the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Simply put, the 
courts cannot countenance perjury. How-
ever, the mere act of taking the stand does 
not independently make defendant's silence 
by the Fifth Amendment Jenkins, 447 U S at 
236 n 2, 100 SCt at 2128 n 2 
8. The Tenth Circuit, in a combined civil and 
criminal prosecution, may have reached a dif 
ferent conclusion However, we do not find the 
opinion's reasoning persuasive and think it may 
conflict with dicta in Doyle. In United States v 
Harrold, 796 F 2d 1275 (10th Cir 1986), cert 
denied, Harrold v United States, 479 U S 1037, 
107 S Ct 892, 93 L Ed 2d 844 (1987), the defen 
dant was subject to both a civil and a criminal 
investigation by the IRS Separate IRS agents 
relevant. The prosecution can only ques-
tion defendant regarding silence for im-
peachment purposes if, for example, the 
silence is inconsistent with the testimony 
the defendant offers at trial. 
[13] Subsequently, in Fletcher v. Weir, 
455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 
(1982) (per curiam), the Court allowed post-
arrest silence to be used for impeachment 
purposes where Miranda warnings were 
not given. Thus, after Doyle, Jenkins, and 
Fletcher, use of privileged silence for im-
peachment purposes is constitutional un-
less the silence was potentially induced by 
the government's delivery of Miranda 
warnings 
[14] The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has addressed 
the question before us. In United States 
v. Caro, 637 F 2d 869 (2nd Cir 1981), the 
court indicated prearrest, pre-Miranda si-
lence could not be admitted in the govern-
ment's case in chief. In Caro, the defen-
dant's luggage was searched at the border. 
Customs officials found counterfeit money 
hidden inside In the government's case in 
chief, the customs officer testified the de-
fendant said nothing when the money was 
found The defendant later took the stand 
and denied any knowledge of the money. 
In dicta, the court noted it "found no deci-
sion permitting the use of silence, even the 
silence of a suspect who has been given no 
Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, 
as part of the Government's direct case." 
Id. at 876. The court was "not confident" 
the Supreme Court would allow evidence 
"that a suspect remained silent before he 
was arrested or taken into custody to be 
used in the Government's case in chief." 
Id* See also United States v Blanton, 
conducted the investigations At trial, the gov-
ernment elicited testimony from each that the 
defendant invoked his right to silence The civil 
investigator did not read the defendant his Mi-
randa rights before the defendant invoked 
them The criminal investigator testified defen 
dant refused to reply to some questions after 
being apprised of his rights On appeal, the 
government conceded both sets of testimony 
were inappropriate and asserted a harmless er-
ror argument The court, however, ruled that 
the civil investigators testimony was proper 
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730 F.2d 1425, 1433-44 (11th Cir.1984) 
(recognizing Caro reasoning but not reach-
ing issue because any error was harmless); 
United States v. Lewis, 651 F.2d 1163, 
1169 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding post-Miranda 
prearrest silence inadmissible in govern-
ment's case in chief). 
Only one state court9 has addressed the 
issue we face head on. In State v. Fend, 
109 Wis.2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982), the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held "the protec-
tions of the Fifth Amendment do extend to 
pre-Miranda, prearrest silence." Id 325 
N.W.2d at 710. In that case, the prosecu-
tor, in opening and closing argument and 
through questioning of one witness, intro-
duced evidence that the defendant had stat-
ed he wanted to speak to his lawyer pnor 
to arrest or Miranda warnings. The court 
reasoned 
[t]he Fifth Amendment protects a person 
from compelled self-incrimination at all 
times, not just upon arrest or during a 
custodial interrogation. Any time an in-
dividual is questioned by the police, that 
individual is compelled to do one of two 
things—either speak or remain silent If 
both a person's prearrest speech and si-
lence may be used against that person, 
as the state suggests, that person has no 
choice that will prevent self-incrimina-
tion. This is a veritable "Catch-22." 
Thus the state's theory places an imper-
Id. at 1279. It reasoned he was conducting a 
civil investigation and had not given the defen-
dant any Miranda warnings According to the 
court "a comment on a defendant's silence is 
error only when the defendant remained silent 
in reliance on government action, ue., a Mi-
randa warning." Id (citing United States v 
Massey, 687 F 2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir 1982)) 
The authority the Tenth Circuit relied on, that 
arising in the Doyle and Fletcher lme of cases, 
concerned the use of silence for purposes of 
impeachment. In that area, the interest in pre 
venting perjury and furthering the truth finding 
function of the courts after a defendant's waiver 
of his right to silence weighs heavily in favor of 
allowing the silence for impeachment, yet the 
ambiguity that arises following a defendant's 
receipt of Miranda warnings tips the scale in the 
other direction The factors considered in an 
impeachment situation are not relevant in the 
inference of guilt setting Further, the Harrold 
court implies Fifth Amendment protections do 
not exist in civil investigations It is Hear that 
missible burden on the exercise of Fifth 
Amendment rights.10 
Id. 325 N.W.2d at 711. The court, howev-
er, found the erroneous admission of evi-
dence of the defendant's silence was harm-
less and affirmed his conviction. Id. at 
712. 
[15] The contested portions of the stipu-
lation in this case were used at trial in the 
prosecution's case in chief to infer defen-
dant exhibited a consciousness of guilt. 
Merely because an individual does not need 
to be advised of his right to remain silent 
until he is subject to a custodial interroga-
tion does not mean he should be penalized 
for invoking that right earlier To hold 
differently would impermissibly burden 
Fifth Amendment protections for any indi-
vidual who attempts to exercise them prior 
to a custodial interrogation. Such a rule 
would also encourage the authorities to 
refrain from issuing Miranda warnings as 
long as possible in an attempt to generate 
either inferential evidence of guilt from 
silence or an admission prior to custodial 
interrogation. Providing law enforcement 
an incentive to withhold Miranda warnings 
would be poor public policy and contrary to 
the spirit of Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence 
[16] Thus, we conclude admission of the 
portions of the stipulated testimony lmph-
this is not true See, eg, Estelle v Smith, 451 
U S 454, 462, 101 SCt 1866, 1873, 68 L Ed 2d 
359 (1981) (recognizing Fifth Amendment pro 
tections are available regardless of type of pro-
ceeding) 
9. At least two other courts have recognized the 
issue of the admissibility of prearrest, pre Mi 
randa silence in the prosecution's case in chief 
exists but have refused to reach the issue be 
cause they held any error to be harmless See 
Johnson v United States, 613 A 2d 1381, 1389-90 
(DCAppl992) . People v Hayes, 139 111 2d 89, 
151 111 Dec 348, 564 N E 2d 803 (1990). cert 
denied, Hayes v Illinois, — US , 111 S Ct 
1601, 113 L E d 2 d 664 (1991) 
10. This analysis has been criticized by one com 
mentator as incorrectly equating a requirement 
that a person make a difficult choice with gov 
ernment compulsion See Barbara R Sn>der, A 
Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of 
Silence in Criminal Trials, 29 Wm & Mary 
LRev. 285, 312-18 (1988) 
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eating defendant's decision to remain si 
lent, along with the prosecutor's cross ex 
animation of defendant and closing argu 
ments based on that testimony, used to 
demonstrate defendant had a consciousness 
of guilt was error Whether it was harm 
ful error is analyzed m conjunction with the 
other errors m this case 
III HARMFULNESS OF ERRORS 
[17] In summary, we conclude there 
w e r e m i m e r o u ^ e r r o i ^ n t n ^ t r i a ^ n n i s 
c a s ^ l T e y a r e H r t n e p r o s e c u t o r ' s ques 
lionT^ontaining unsupported innuendo (2) 
the prosecutors request that defendant 
comment on the veracity of E N and his 
mother's testimony, (3) the prosecutors 
misstatement of the evidence regarding the 
alleged lapsitting incident, (4) the prosecu 
tor's misstatement of the evidence regard 
mg the Rub-A-Dub Hot Tub business, (5) 
the prosecutor s statements directly contra 
dieting the only testimony about the con 
tent of the conversation between defendant 
and E N s mother and (6) the admission of 
the statements in the stipulated testimony 
and arguments based thereon regarding 
defendant s neutrality after accusation and 
desire to consult counsel Whether these 
errors can be classified ascurnulativeiy 
narmfuUuTnTon'TvlSn^lr^^ 
The conviction m this case is based al 
most entirely on the testimony of E N 
The numerous errors by the prosecutor all 
are attempts to bolster the credibility of 
E N and to attack the credibility of defen 
dant The unsupported innuendo in the 
prosecutor s question that defendant had 
expressed having inappropriate feelings for 
E N provided the jury a basis to impute 
motives to defendant that are not sup-
ported by any testimony By asking the 
defendant to comment on the veracity of 
E N and his mother the prosecution forced 
defendant into the position of assessing the 
credibility of sympathetic adverse witness 
es If a juror had reached a different 
conclusion as to the witnesses credibility 
defendant s speculation could cause the ju 
ror to become biased against defendant 
The comment on the alleged lapsitting sex 
ual contact could have caused the jurors to 
believe there was more evidence of guilt 
than had actually been introduced The 
comments on the hot tub business could 
have caused the jury to give E N ' s testimo-
ny greater credibility E N had expen 
enced other incidents of sexual abuse, but 
the evidence offered no other explanation 
for his knowledge of commercial hot tub 
establishments The comments on E N ' s 
mother's testimony improperly bolstered 
the prosecution's consciousness of guilt ar 
gument These comments made defendant 
appear more aware of the factual allega 
tions against him than the testimony dis 
closed The admission of testimony re-
garding defendant s exercise of his consti 
tutional nght to remain silent provided lm 
proper support for the prosecution's con 
sciousness of guilt theory and could have 
convinced the jury to convict 
turneapriTna?i!yTnine 
of the credibility of E N versusthe credi 
bilitv of defendant BecauseoOhenature 
of-the e v i o ^ n c ^ o i g u l i ^ n ^ t n ^ m m D e r o f 
s enouse r ro r s^we i rnd th^e r ro r scu imT^ 
confidence in the verdict 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the numerous errors in the 
pfo^eTuTJumTfTinls^^ 
verse de fenaan t?convTc t ion^" ' "^^" M ^ 
JACKSON and RUSSON JJ concur 
( o | KEY NUMBER SYSUM> 
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final and conclusive as to the Missouri, Kan-
sas & Northwestern Railroad Company. The 
defendant did not choose to intervene, but 
allowed the judgment to be taken in favor 
of the administrator against its privy and 
predecessor in interest, and cannot now open 
the adjudication with respect to parties,'any 
more than it could do so with respect to the 
amount of the judgment. Railroad Co. v. 
Murphy, 75 Kan. 707, 715, 90 Pac. 290. 
[2] It is claimed that the present action 
is barred by the statute of limitations; the 
defendant having taken possession of the 
right of way in 1902 and the increased award 
having been made by the district court in 
1906. This argument is based upon the im-
plied assumption that the defendant's liabili-
ty is something separate from and independ-
ent of the liability of its predecessor. Such, 
however, is not the case. By taking over 
and electing to keep the benefits of the ap-
propriation, the defendant became subject to 
the liability of the condemning company, 
whatever that might be, and whenever final-
ly ascertained. Railroad Co. v. Murphy, 75 
Kan. 707, 90 Pac. 290. The debt of the .de-
fendant not having been conclusively estab-
lished until the judgment of this court was 
rendered in 1909, the statute of limitations 
did not commence to run against a suit to 
recover that debt until that time. 
The judgment of the district court is af-
firmed. All the Justices concurring. 
STATE v. TOPHAM. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. May 4, 1912.) 
1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 71*)— 
CEIJTAINTY. 
To withstand either a motion in arrest or 
a demurrer, the indictment must inform accus-
ed of the crime charged with such reasonable 
certainty that a judgment thereon will be a de-
fense to a second prosecution for the same 
offense. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information. Cent. Dig. §§ 144, 174, 193, 
194; Dec. Dig. § 71.*] 
2. CKIMINAI, LAW (§ 314*) — A P P E A L — P B E -
SUMPTIONS. 
Since every man is presumed to be inno-
cent until proved guilty, he is also presumed 
to be ignorant of what is intended to be proved 
against him. except as informed thereof by the 
indictment, f 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal 
Law, Cent. Dig. § 747; Dec. Dig. § 314.*] 
3. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 110*)— 
LANGUAGE OF STATUTE—PANDERING. 
Sess. Laws 1911, c. 108, makes any per-
son who "shall by promises, threats, violence, 
or by any device or scheme, cause, induce, per-
suade, encourage, inveigle, or entice an inmate 
of a house of prostitution" to remain therein 
as an inmate, guilty of pandering. Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 4730, requires the information 
to contain a statement of the acts constituting 
the offense in ordinary and concise language so 
as to enable a person of common understanding 
to know what is intended. The information 
charged that accused did willfully, unlawfully, 
etc., "by promises, threats, and by divers de-
vices and schemes, cause, induce, persuade, and 
encourage" the woman named, "being then and 
there an inmate of a certain house of prosti-
tution, to remain therein as such inmate," de-
scribing and locating the house, llrfd, that 
the information was insufficient on demurrer 
and motion in arrest for not alleging the facts 
and circumstances constituting the promises, 
devices, etc., by which the female was induced 
to remain in the house of prostitution. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information, Cent Dig. §§ 2S9-294; Dec. 
Dig. § 110.*] 
4. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 110*)— 
STATUTORY OFFENSES—SUFFICIENCY. 
In order that an information charging a 
statutory offense may be sufficient by following 
the language of the statute, it must fully, di-
rectly, and expressly contain all the elements 
constituting the offense, and, if not sufficient 
to do so, the statutory language must be ex-
panded in the information, i 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 2S9-294; Dec. 
Dig. § 110.*] 
5. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 109*)— 
SUFFICIENCY. 
Essential elements of the offense not in-
cluded in the information cannot be supplied 
by the evidence. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 320, 535; Dec. 
Dig. § 1G9.*] 
6. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 55*)— 
NATURE OF " P L E A D I N G . " 
"Pleadings" are the juridical means of in-
vesting the court with jurisdiction of a sub-
ject-matter to adjudicate thereon. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information, Cent. Dig. § 174; Dec. Dig. 
§ 55.* 
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, 
vol. 6, pp. 5409-5411 j vol. 8, p. 7750.] 
7. PROSTITUTION (§ 1*) — ELEMENTS OF O F -
FENSE—PANDERING. 
Under Sess. Laws 1911, c. 10S, making a 
person who shall by promises, etc., cau.se or 
induce an inmate of a house of prostitution to 
remain therein guilty of pandering, the prom-
ises must have been«made with the purpose of 
causing or inducing the inmate to remain, and 
must have actually tended to cause such re-
sult, and the inmate must have been induced 
thereby to remain in the house, and the fact 
that accused told the inmate that, if the in-
mate's mother was willing to let her stay there, 
accused would fit the inmate out with nice 
clothes and send her to another house of pros-
titution run by accused did not show a promise 
by accused, within the statute. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Prostitution, 
Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 2; Dec. Dig. § 1.*] 
8. PROSTITUTION (§ 4*)—SUFFICIENCY OF E V I -
DENCE. 
Evidence In a prosecution for pandering 
contrary to the statute held not to show a 
Eromise by accused whereby an inmate of a ouse of prostitution was induced to remain 
therein. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Prostitu-
tion, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.*] 
9. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 161*)— 
AMEN DMENT—RIGHT. 
An amendment to an information for pan-
dering, charging accused with having induced 
a female to remain an inmate of a house of 
prostitution by promises and divers devices un-
1
 State •. Swan, 31 Utah, 336. 88 Pac. 12; State v. 
Williamson, 22 Utah, 248, 62 Pac. 1022, 83 Am. St. 
Rep. 780; Stato v. Evans. 27 Utah, 12, 73 Pac. 1047. 
•Por other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. DIR. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexei 
t State v. McKenna. 24 Utah. S17. 67 Pac 816. 
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named, so as to allege the promises made and [ 
devices used to induce her to remain, was as 
to a matter of substance and could not be made 
after judgment, so that, upon determining that 
the information was insufficient, accused must 
be discharged, under Comp. Laws 1907, § 4G94, 
permitting an information to be amended at 
any time after defendant pleads, and on trial 
as to all matters of form at the court's dis-
cretion, where it can be done without preju-
dice to accused. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 51G-523; Dec. 
Dig. § 161.*] 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; F. C. Loofbourow, Judge. 
- Dora B. Topham was convicted of pan-
dering, and she appeals. Reversed and re-
manded, with directions to discharge accused. 
E. A. Rogers and Powers & Marioneaux, 
all of Salt Lake City, for appellant. A. R. 
Barnes, Atty. Gen., for the State. 
STRAUP, J. The defendant was convicted 
of the crime of pandering, and was sentenced 
to imprisonment in the state prison for a 
term of 18 years. She appeals. 
The portion of the statute (Sess. Laws 
1911, c. 108) under which she was charged 
and convicted reads: "Any person who shall, 
by promises, threats, violence, or by any de-
vice or scheme, cause, induce, persuade, en-
courage, inveigle, or entice an inmate of a 
house of prostitution or place of assignation 
to remain therein as such inmate," is guilty 
of the crime of pandering and punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison for a term 
of not more than 20 years. The informa-
tion charged that the defendant on, etc., at, 
etc., "did then and there willfully, unlawful-
ly, and feloniously, by promises and threats, 
and by divers devices and schemes, cause, 
induce, persuade and encourage" a particu-
larly named female, "being then and there 
an inmate of a certain house of prostitution, 
to remain therein as such inmate; such 
house of prostitution being then and there 
known as No. 140 in what is commonly 
known as the stockade in Salt Lake City." 
To this information the defendant, before 
plea, interposed a general and a special de-
murrer alleging that the information did not 
state facts sufficient to constitute an offense, 
and especially did not sufficiently set forth 
the nature and cause of the accusation, nor 
the acts constituting the offense, nor the 
particular circumstances of the offense nec-
essary to constitute a complete offense. The 
demurrers were overruled. After verdict, 
and before sentence, the defendant on the 
same grounds also made a motion in arrest 
of judgment, which motion was also denied. 
These rulings and those relating to insuffi-
ciency of evidence to support the verdict are 
complained of. 
[11 The doctrine is fundamental, a n d , a s 
stated by the Supreme Court of the United 
•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER 1 
States in Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 
29, 16 Sup. C t 434, 40 1L Ed. 565, that "the 
constitutional right of a defendant to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation against him entitles him to insist, at 
the outset, by demurrer or by motion to 
quash, and after verdict, by motion in arrest 
of Judgment, that the Indictment shall ap-
prise him of the crime charged with such 
reasonable certainty that he can make his 
defense and protect himself after judgment 
against another prosecution for the same of-
fense;" and by Mr. Justice Sanborn in Flor-
en v. United States, 186 Fed. 961,108 C. C. A. 
577, that "On a motion in arrest of judgment, 
as well as on a demurrer, it is essential to 
the validity of an indictment that it con-
tain averments or tne racts wnicn constitute 
the offeng° jf, nhnrwy «n nortain and specific 
that upon conviction or acquittal thereon it, 
and the judgment upon it, will constitute a 
complete defense to a second prosecution of 
the defendant for the same offense." Many 
cases in support of this doctrine are there 
cited. 
[2] It is also elementary and, as stated by 
the Michigan court in People v. Marion, 2S 
Mich. 257, approved and quoted by this court 
in State v. McKenna, 24 Utah, 317, 67 Pac. 
815, that, "as every man is presumed to be 
innocent until proved to be guilty, he must 
be presumed also to be ignorant of what is 
intended to be proved against him, except as 
be^Js^nformed^^ 
tion." These doctrines are not here disput-
ed. Our statute is in harmony with them. 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 4730, provides that "the 
information or indictment must contain 
* * * a statement of the acts constituting 
the offense, in ordinary and concise language, 
and in such manner as to enable a person of 
common understanding to know what is in-
tended;" and by section 4732 that "the in-
formation or indictment must be direct and 
certain as it regards • • • the offense 
charged," and "the particular circumstances, 
when they are necessary to constitute a com-
plete offense." Here, then, we have a stat-
ute which in all cases requires the informa-
tion to contain "a statement of the acts con-
stituting the offense," and to be "direct and 
certain as it regards the offense charged, and 
the particular circumstances of the offense, 
when they are necessary to constitute a com-
plete offense." 
r31 Does the information meet these re-
quirements} if it does. It Is" iJWW> ifnTTft 
it is bad and will not support the Judgment. 
The material parts of the information in this 
respect are that the defendant did "by prom-
I ises and threats, and by divers devices and 
schemes, cause, induce, persuade, and en-
courage" an inmate of a house of prostitu-
tion to remain therein as such inmate. The 
offense is charged in the mere language of 
I the statute. That, the state urges, is suffi-
Q Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 
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cient But that is not what the statute de-1 
dares. 
[4] Of course there are cases where an in-
dictment or information in the language of 
the statute is good. But there are many 
where that is not true. Says Mr. Bishop in 
1 New Criminal Procedure, § 624: "The in-
dictment must fully state the offense; and, 
if the statutory words do not suffice for 
this, it must be expanded beyond them." 
Said the Supreme Court of the United States 
in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 *U. S. 
542, 23 L. Ed. 5SS: "It is an elementary 
principle of criminal pleading that where 
the definition of an offense, whether it be 
at common law or by statute, includes ge-
neric terms, it is not sufficient that the in-
dictment shall charge the offense in the same 
generic terms as in the definition, but it 
must state the species—it must descend to 
particulars." The same thought is expressed 
by Mr. Justice Frick in the case of State 
v. Swan, 31 Utah, 33G, 8S Pac. 12, that, 
"Where an act denounced by the statute is 
couched in generic terms, the information 
must go further in stating the offense than 
by merely using the language of the statute," 
and that an information in such language is 
not sufficient "in those cases where the acts 
constituting the offense are nearly as varied 
as the number of cases in which the charge 
is made." ! 
In order that an information merely in the 
words of the statute may be sufficient, the 
words of the statute themselves "must fully, 
directly, and expressly, without any uncer-
tainty or ambiguity, set forth all the ele-
ments necessary to constitute the offense in-
tended to be punished, and must state all the 
material facts and circumstances embraced 
in the definition of the offense." 22 Cyc. 
340; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 5S7, 
14 Sup. Ct. 034, 38 L. Ed. S30; United States 
v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611, 2G L. Ed. 1135. 
The Supreme Court of California well ex-
pressed the rule in People v. Peralcs, 141 Cal. 
581, 75 Pac. 170, in the following language: 
"While it is the general rule that it is suf-
ficient to charge an offense in the language 
of the statute, yet this rule is subject to the 
qualification that, where a more particular 
statement of facts is necessary in order to 
charge the offense definitely and certainly, 
it must be made. The statute may, and 
often does, define the offense by the use of 
precise and technical words which have a 
well-recognized meaning or designates and 
specifies particular acts or means whereby 
an offense may be committed. Under such 
circumstances, to charge the offense sub-
stantially in the language of the statute will 
be sufficient. When, however, the words or 
terms used in the statute have no technical 
or precise meaning, which of themselves im-
ply the offense, or where the particular facts 
or acts which shall constitute it are not spec-
ified, but, from the general language used, 
many thiDgs may be done which may con-
stitute an offense, it is then necessary, in 
charging an offense claimed to be embraced 
within the general language of the statute, 
to set forth the particular things or acts 
charged to have been done with reasonable 
certainty and distinctness, so that the court 
may determine whether an offense within the 
statute is charged or one over which it has 
jurisdiction, and so that the defendant may 
be advised of the particular nature of it in 
order to defend against it, and to plead in 
bar a judgment of 'conviction or acquittal 
thereof, if subsequently prosecuted." 
Said the court in Commonwealth v. Milby 
(Ky.) 24 S. W. 025: "The language of the 
statute cannot always be followed in pun-
ishments for offenses of either a criminal 
or a penal nature. Enough must be stated 
to enable the defendant to know in what 
particular he has violated the statute." And 
in State v. Frazier, 53 Kan. 87, 30 Pac. 58, 
42 Am. St. Rep. 274: "The physical acts 
done towards the commission of the oliense* 
should be stated in the information or in-
dictment, so that the court may see wheth-
er or not: the law has been violated, and so 
that the accused may know to what he must* 
jmikejyjsvv^^' To the same effect is Thomp-
son v. People, 90 111. 101, and are also many 
other cases. 
What are here the essentials of the charg-
ed offense? The state urges to cause, In-
duce, and encourage an inmate of a house 
of prostitution to remain therein as such 
inmate. That is one essential; but it is not 
all the essentials declared by the statute. 
It declares that "any person who shall, 
by promises, threats, violence, or by any 
device or scheme," cause, induce, etc.. an 
inmate of such a house to remain therein, is 
guilty of an offense. The act or conduct of 
the person who shall, by a promise or threat 
or violence, or by a device or scheme, cause, 
induce, or encourage, etc., is a necessary 
"act constituting the offense," and is a "par-
ticular circumstance of the offense to con-
stitute a complete offense." Without it no 
offense under the statute is committed. 
That is manifest from a reading of the stat-
ute. *-nd so did the pleader conclude, for 
the information charges, not that the de-
1 fendant caused and induced, etc., an inmate 
of a house of prostitution to remain there-
in, but that the defendant did, "by promises 
and threats and by divers devices and 
schemes, cause, induce," etc., such a person 
to remain in such a house as an inmate. 
The statute thus making such acts and con-
duct of a promise or threat or violence, or 
by a device or scheme, necessary acts con-
stituting the offense, and requiring "the par 
ticular circumstances necessary to consti-
tute a complete offense" to be stated, were 
they here set forth in the information with 
reasonable certainty and distinctness, so 
I that the court, in the language of the Call-
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fornia and other courts, could determine [ 
whether an offense within the statute had 
been charged, and so that the defendant 
could be advised of the particular nature of 
it in order to defend against it and plead 
in bar a judgment of conviction or acquit-
tal thereof If subsequently prosecuted? In 
other words, were the acts and particular 
circumstances of the offense set forth with 
such reasonable certainty and in ordinary 
and concise language and in such manner as 
to enable a person of common understand-
ing to know what particular acts or conduct | 
were complained of, what physical acts 
would be claimed the accused had commit-
ted, what things said or done by her, or of 
what particular conduct she was guilty, and 
which were intended to be proved against 
her? Should one assert to another that he 
had a "device or scheme" to accomplish a 
particular result, would that "in ordinary 
and concise language enable a person of or-
dinary understanding to know what was in-
tended" or meant? To enable such a per-
son to know what was intended, would not 
the first question necessarily be, "What is 
the device or scheme?" 
When the defendant was charged that she 
had "by divers devices and schemes" ac-
complished a particular result, who but the 
pleader knew what was intended or expect-
ed to be proved against her in such re-
spect? Or, 'if it should be claimed that she 
by "threats*' had accomplished such result, 
again, who but the pleader could know with 
reasonable certainty what menacing act or 
conduct of hurt or fear, or threatening men-
ace to inflict pain or punishment or injury 
to person, reputation, or property, or to re-
strain freedom of action, was intended or 
expected to be proved? Should one com-
plain of another that he "threatened" him, 
would not again the first question necessa-
rily be, in order to "enable a person of com-
mon understanding to know" what was 
meant or intended, "What did he say or 
do?" And, if it should be claimed that the 
defendant by "promises" had accomplished 
such result, again, could any one but the 
pleader know with reasonable certainty just 
what particular acts or conduct in that re-
gard was intended or expected to be prov-
ed? This information may be looked at 
with the utmost liberality, and yet what 
facts or circumstances or acts are there set 
forth from which the court may determine 
whether a promise or promises in law were 
made by the defendant, if it should be 
claimed that she, by such means, accom-
plished the charged result, or a threat made 
or device or scheme used or employed, if 
by either of these it be claimed the defend-
ant accomplished such result? Neither she 
nor any one else except the pleader could 
know whether he intended to prove some 
kind of a promise or a threat or a device or 
scheme. Under the information, if it is 
good, the state would be permitted to prove 
anything which the prosecution thought 
tended to show a promise, anything a threat, 
anything a device, anything a scheme, and 
no objection to the offer of any such evi-
dence could properly be made by the de-
fendant. If that be true, then the state 
might as well be permitted in an infor-
mation to generally charge the defend-
ant "with having committed the offense of 
pandering" and be allowed to prove any-
thing tending to show the commission of 
such an offense. 
Under this information, neither the court 
nor the defendant, until the evidence was 
adduced, could know what particular acts 
or conduct would be claimed had been com-
mitted by the defendant, and, until then, the 
court could not know whether an offense 
had been charged, nor the defendant what 
she was called upon to meet and answer. 
As the accused "must be presumed ignorant 
of what is intended to be proved against 
him except as he is informed by the infor-
mation or indictment," it is essential that 
the information or indictment, not the evi-
dence, apprise him with reasonable certain-
ty what is intended or expected to be proved, 
and what he is required to meet and defend. 
And, as repeatedly stated by the courts, the 
acts constituting the offense, and the particu-
lar circumstances of the offense, when they 
are necessary to constitute a complete of-
fense, are required to be stated in the infor-
mation, so that the court may determine 
whether the acts and conduct complained of 
constitute a violation of the statute. It 
surely cannot be contended that the deter-
mination of such a question is alone for the 
jury, and that it is at liberty to regard any-
thing a promise, anything a threat, any-
thing a device, anything a scheme. Should 
one either in a civil or criminal pleading 
charge another at a specified time and place 
"with having cheated and defrauded" him, 
without alleging the acts, the conduct, the 
facts constituting the cheat or fraud, cer-
tainly no one would contend that to be a 
sufficient pleading to withstand a demurrer. 
What more has been done here? The pleader 
has stated his conclusion that the defendant 
. has said or done something, that she has 
| been guilty of some kind of conduct, or com-
mitted acts of some kind, which in his opin-
ion amount to a promise or a threat or a 
device or a scheme, but withheld from the 
court and the defendant a statement of 
any acts committed, or things said or done, 
by her, or any facts or circumstances from 
which it may be determined whether in law 
a promise or threat was made, or a device 
or scheme used or employed, by her. The 
acts and conduct of the defendant, and the 
facts and circumstances constituting the 
promise, the threat, the device, the scheme, 
were required to be alleged in the informa-
tion, so that the, court could judge whether 
the accused should have been put upon tri-
I al, and that she might then know what she 
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was to defend against. Turnipseed v. State, j 
6 Ala. 664. The allegations here do not 
meet such requirements. In addition to the 
authorities already referred to holding such 
an information as this insufficient, we also 
refer to United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 
8 Sap. Ct 571, SI L. Ed. 51G; United States i 
v. Post (D. C.) 113 Fed. 852; Stewart v. 
United States, 119 Fed. 89, 55 C. C. A. 641;! 
Dalton v. United States, 127 Fed. 544, 62 C. 
C. A. 238; People v. Neil, 91 Cal. 4G5, 27 
Pac. 763; State v% Farmer, 104 N. C. S87, 10 
S. E. 563; Bowles v. State, 13 Ind. 427; 
State v. Bennett, 102 Mo. 356, 14 S. W. 805, 
10 L. R. A. 717; Id. (Mo.) 11 S. W. 264. 
In United States v. Hess, supra, and in 
the federal cases just cited, it was held that 
an indictment based on and in the language 
of the statute directed against "devising or 
intending to devise any scheme or artifice 
to defraud," to be effected by communication 
through the post office, must not only al-
lege that the person did devise a scheme or 
artifice to defraud, but it must set out 
clearly and distinctly what that artifice was, 
wherein the fraud consisted, the facts and 
circumstances by which it was to be ac-
complished, the facts which constitute the 
specific scheme or artifice so devised by the 
defendant, and that this must be done, not 
inferentially, but by direct and positive aver-
ments. • 
In People v. Noil, supra, It was held that 
an information charging that the defendant 
"fraudulently voted at an election when he 
was not entitled to vote," though in the 
language of the statute, is not sufficient to 
state an offense, but must set forth the facts 
relied on to show fraudulent voting and the 
particular fact or facts showing that the 
defendant was not entitled to vote. 
In State v. Farmer, supra, it was held 
that an indictment against a physician, in 
the language of the statute, for giving a 
false and fraudulent prescription for liq-
uors, must set out not only that the prescrip-
tion was either false or fraudulent, but al-
so the facts and particulars constituting the 
falsity or fraud. 
In State v. Bennett, supra, an information 
charging in the language of the statute that 
the accused "did enter upon and exercise and 
continue the exercise and practice of a busi-
ness, avocation, or profession of a private 
detective," without stating facts to show in 
what way he acted as such, was held fatal-
ly defective. 
The insufficiency of the information is thus 
shown by numerous authorities. We have 
been referred to no case which In our judg-
ment supports the information. The Attor-
ney General has referred us to a number of 
cases, but upon a careful examination of 
them it will be found that they lend but lit-
tle support to his contention. He starts with 
the proposition that "it is the universal rule 
that statutory offenses should be alleged in 
the words of the statute." But that, under 
all the authorities, is stating the rule much 
too broadly. The rule is this, and as we 
have already indicated, especially by the cas-
es of People v. Perales and State v. Swan, 
where the statute creating the offense defines 
it by the use of precise words and designates 
and specifies particular acts or means where-
by the offense may be committed, it is suffi-
cient to charge the offense in the language of 
the statute; but where the particular facts 
or acts which constitute it are not specified, 
and from the general language used in the 
statute many things may be done which may 
constitute the offense, it is then necessary, 
in charging an offense claimed to be embrac-
ed within the general language of the stat-
ute, to set forth the particular things or acts 
charged to have been done with reasonable 
certainty and distinctness, so that the court 
may determine whether an offense within 
the statute Is charged. 
The Attorney General refers us to State 
v. Williamson, 22 Utah, 24S, 62 Pac: 1022, 
83 Am. St. Rep. 780, and to State v. Evans, 
27 Utah, 12, 73 Pac. 1047, where informations 
in the language of the statute were held 
good. But in those cases the offense charged 
was, in the one having carnal knowledge, and 
in the other attempting to have carnal knowl-
edge, of the body of a female under IS years 
of age. The statute there specified the par-
ticular act declared to be the offense—hav-
ing carnal knowledge of the body of a fe-
male. The Information which charged that 
the accused "had carnal knowledge of the 
body" of a woman described the particular 
act or conduct of which complaint was made. 
No language, however artful or replete with 
literary foliage, could describe that act or 
conduct more precisely or certainly. It de-
scribes not many or divers acts or things, 
but one particular, precise, and definite act. 
Contrast that with this information: "Did, 
by promises, threats, and divers devices and 
schemes, induce," etc.—generic terms broad 
enough to embrace almost innumerable spe-
cies and particulars, and about every con-
ceivable thing which may be called a prom-
ise, a threat, or a device or scheme. Under 
it, not only one or several precise or definite, 
but many and divers, acts and things are 
embraced. Let the language of the court in 
United States v. Cruikshank, supra, again 
be noticed: "Where the definition of an of* 
fense, whethe^TrTe"aFTo^QS5nT5wMoTTy 
Jeneric terms, it is not sum* . ictment should charge the MIEI&lIjMnii 1 lii the same generic terms as 
definition; but it must state the species—It 
m3sT35S!m![[^^rl!c^^57'™7rnTsprTn7TpIe 
was recognized in the cited case of State v. 
Evans, for the court there well observed: 
"This is not a case where the accused, un-
der such an information, may be taken by 
surprise, as in case of a crime which may 
be committed in several different ways or 
with various means, and therefore the rea-
son of the rule which requires the overt act 
Utah) STATE v. TOPHAM 893 
or acts by which a crime was committed to 
be pleaded does not apply, and hence the 
rule itself ought not to be enforced." The 
court could have gone further by saying 
that the "overt act" was particularly describ-
ed by the use of the words "carnal knowl-
edge"; they having such a precise and well-
recognized meaning as to enable a person of 
common understanding to know just what 
is intended. 
We are also referred f ^ h e case of State v. \ 
Bauguess, 106 Iowa, 107, 76 N. W. 50S. But 
in that case the same principle was also rec-
ognized. The court said: "It has been re-
peatedly held that an indictment is sufficient 
if it charges the offense in the language of 
the statute, when that shows the material 
facts which constitute the offense." Theie 
the accused was charged in the language of 
the statute with having made "an indecent 
exposure of the person." The court proper-
ly held the indictment good, for, as there 
stated by the court, the offense was both 
named and particularly described, the phrase 
"indecent exposure of the person" having a 
well-settled and commonly accepted signifi-
cation and meaning the exhibition of such 
parts of the person as modesty or a sense 
of self-respect requires to be kept usually 
covered. The court well distinguished that 
case from a prior decision of the same court 
(State v. Butcher, 79 Iowa, 111, 44 N. W. 239), 
where it was held that an information in the 
language of the statute charging the accused 
with having "willfully and unlawfully inter-
rupted and disturbed a public school" was 
fatally defective for "the acts constituting 
the offense should be set out in the informa-
tion in order that it might appear whether 
they amounted to a crime." 
The Attorney General strongly relies on 
the case of State v. Porter, 105 Iowa, 677, 75 
N. W. 519, seemingly, not so much on the 
exact point decided as on particular lan-
guage jthere employed. In that case the in-
dictment charged that the accused suborn-
ed and procured a witness in a certain cause 
to falsely testify to certain facts specifically 
set forth in the information. The insuffi-
ciency of the indictment was urged on the 
ground that it failed to state the means and 
"methods by which the accused suborned the 
witness and procured him to falsely testify 
to the alleged facts. The court, in hold-
ing the indictment good, well observed that 
"if the defendant induced" the witness "to 
testify falsely, and did so knowingly, it is 
quite immaterial what means he used, wheth-
er in themselves illegal or not. The crime 
does not inhere in the method or means, but 
In the result—the procurement." This lan-
guage is pointed to and sought to be applied 
thus: That the gravamen of the charged of-
fense here is to "cause, induce, persuade, or 
encourage" an inmate of a house of prostitu-
tion to remain therein, and that the means 
or method employed to accomplish such re-
sult are immaterial and unessential. That 
leads to the conclusion that the means and 
method were employed to accomplish the 
charged result need not be and were unnec-
essarily alleged, and that an information 
charging that the accused caused, induced, 
persuaded, and encouraged an inmate of a 
house of prostitution to remain therein would 
be a good information. But a glance at the 
statute shows such a position wholly unten-
able. As already observed, the fanguage of 
the statute here is not that "any person who 
shall cause, induce," etc., an inmate of a 
house of prostitution to remain therein is 
guilty of an offense, but that "any person 
who shall by promises, threats, violence, or 
by any device or scheme cause," etc., an in-
mate to remain in such house is guilty of an 
offense. In the Iowa case the means and 
method of procuring the false testimony to 
be given were not by statute made essential 
parts of the offense. Here the means and 
method employed by which an inmate of a 
house of prostitution is caused or induced 
to remain therein are expressly made essen-
tial parts of the offense. Unless one or more 
of the means or methods so stated by the 
statute are employed, no offense is commit-
ted. 
The case of State v. George, 93 N. C. 507, 
is also cited. The indictment there charged 
that the defendant, at a specified time and 
place, willfully and unlawfully "did abduct" 
a child under 14 years of age from the cus-
tody of her father, and induced her to leave 
him, etc. The court very properly held the 
indictment not bad because it failed to al-
lege the means by which the abduction was 
effected. Again the court observed that the 
term "abduction" has a well-known significa-
tion and means "the taking and carrying 
away of a child," etc., and that "when a stat-
ute makes the particular act an offense, and 
sufficiently describes it„ by terms having a 
definite and specific meaning, without speci-
fying the means of doing the act, it is enough 
to charge the act itself, without its attendant 
circumstances." But here the statute does 
describe the means of doing the act, not in 
terms having a definite or specific meaning, 
but in generic terms having a general, com-
prehensive, and a varied meaning, and under 
which many things may be done which may 
constitute the offense. 
We do not deem it necessary to further 
review cases. We have reviewed those ap-
parently most relied on by the state, and 
have carefully considered all cited by it. We 
do not think any of them support its conten-
tion. To the contrary, the authorities, with 
substantial unanimity, hold such an infor-
mation as this, under similar statutes as 
here, fatally defective; and such, in effect, 
has been the holding of this court since its 
organization. 
A further rather ingenious argument is 
made by the state that, when the evidence is 
looked to, it will be seen that "the prosecu-
894 123 PACIFIC REPORTER (Utah 
tion did not attempt to show at the trial i 
any threats, devices, or schemes, but did 
show, as we contend, certain promises by 
which the inmate of a house of prostitution 
was induced and persuaded to remain there-1 
in as such inmate." 
[fy 61 Firstly, an information wanting in 
css^ntiaTs^annoT be helped or aided by evi-
aence, and its sufficiency in suehregar5 
cannot be determined by what the state prov-
ed or fanW io prove. If anything is__estab-
Mshed and set at rest in the law, it is tha^ 
defects in substance of an information or 
indictment are not cured bv evidence or ver-
dict. And so does our statute expressly pro-
vide, for it permits, after verdict, a motion 
in arrest of judgment founded on defects of 
the information or indictment in failing to 
substantially conform to the requirements of 
Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 4730 and 4732, here-
tofore referred to. That must necessarily 
be true, for it is an orient peak in the law 
that pleadings are the juridical means of] 
investing a court with jurisdiction of a sub-1 
ject-matter to adjudicate it, and, for res ad-
judicata, that matter must be described with 
reasonable certainty and particularity. Sec-1 
ondly, following the argument of the Attor-1 
ney General, how did the defendant know 
by the information that the state would only 
attempt to prove "certain promises?" Un-
der the information, if it is good, the state 
was equally entitled to prove any kind of a 
threat, or a device, or a scheme. In that 
respect the defendant was left in the dark! 
by the information until the evidence wasl 
adduced; and thus the evidence, and not 
the information, apprised her what was in-j 
tended to be proved against her and what 
she was required to meet and defend. But 
what were "the certain promises" which she 
by the information ought to have known 
were intended to be proved against her? 
Promises of employment or of remuneration, 
investment, gift, forbearance, or to do or not 
to do one or more of almost innumerable and 
inconceivable things? Who, by-the informa-
tion, could know until the evidence was ad-
duced? When in a pleading it is alleged that 
one promised employment or reward or com-
pensation, or to pay money, or to give some-
thing, or to do or not to do one or several 
particular things, something has been de-
scribed with at least some degree of certain-
ty or understanding. But what matter or 
thing is here so described by the information 
which, by the use of the generic and va-
riant term "promises," embraced a hundred 
or more indefinite and uncertain things, all 
equally described by it? 
Furthermore, much of the evidence relat-
ing to the question * in hand—the certain 
promises, the only thing which the state 
claims was attempted to be proved—is as 
vague and uncertain as the information it-
self. It is shown that in Salt Lake City 
there was maintained a "stockade," an in-
closed cluster of houses of prostitution. The 
houses were occupied and the business of 
prostitution conducted therein by different 
so-called "landladies" who received and em-
ployed their own inmates and prostitutes. 
The buildings were owned by an investment 
company of which the defendant was a stock-
holder and in which she was interested. 
She rented them to different landladies, col-
lected the rents, maintained an office in the 
stockade, and was a sort of supervisor or 
director of the stockade. She had nothing 
to do with procuring or employing the in-
mates. So far as disclosed by the evidence, 
she exercised no control or direction over 
them except the inmates were required to 
report at her office for a physical examina-
tion as to health and cleanliness by a physi-
cian employed for such purpose. The physi-
cian reported to the defendant the result of 
the examination, and she gave the inmate a 
certificate, either of health or for free en-
trance to a hospital for treatment if diseas-
ed or sick. The inmate of one of the houses 
of prostitution, No. 140, whom the state 
claimed and alleged was an inmate therein, 
and whom it is alleged the defendant, by 
promises, etc., caused and induced to remain 
therein as such inmate, voluntarily entered 
the house of prostitution occupied and con-
ducted by one of the landladies, and there 
for hire voluntarily prostituted her person 
to divers men, some of whom had roomed at 
her mother's rooming house and with whom 
she was acquainted. She at will left the 
house in the morning and returned in the 
evening. The next day, she with other in-
mates, voluntarily reported to the defend-
ant's office for an examination. There she 
met the defendant. It is not charged or 
claimed that the defendant had anything to 
do in causing or inducing the inmate to en-
i ter the house of prostitution. Upon the rec-
ord, i t . is conceded that the defendant did 
not know she was there until the inmate re-
ported at the defendant's office for an ex-
j animation, or that the defendant then knew 
that she was or had been such an inmate. 
From a conversation then had between the 
inmate and the defendant, and things said 
by the defendant thereafter, the "certain 
promises" of the defendant, which it is claim-
ed induced the inmate to remain as such in-
mate, are deduced. We give them as testi-
fied to by the inmate herself, and on whose 
testimony alone the state relied to show the 
promises. On her direct examination she 
testified that she knew the defendant, but 
had not seen her since she was a child; 
that the defendant was also acquainted with 
her mother; that the defendant asked her 
how old she was, and that she told her be-
tween 16 and 17; and that "I talked with 
her (the defendant) before and after I was 
examined. She asked me what my name 
J was and I told her [first an assumed name 
I and then her right name]. She said, 'You 
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ought to know me,' and I said 'Yes, ma'am;! 
I do/ She said, 'Where have I seen you,' 
and I said, 'In Ogden' [where the inmate and 
her mother formerly lived]. I asked her if 
I was not too young to be down there, and 
she said, 'No, you are just the right age.' I 
She said 1 was a blonde and could make 
good money down there; that there were 
several calls for blondes. She said I could 
make good money, and I could get me some 
good clothes." Then, after testifying as to 
her examination, she further testified in 
response to a question if anything else was 
said, that "there was one thing I forgot, 
down at the preliminary hearing, she (de-
fendant) said, 'I don't know w hy your moth-
er should have any objections for you to do 
a little sporting when you have had one sis-
ter down here who has been doing sport-
ing.' " She further testified that a night or 
two thereafter she saw the defendant in the 
dance hall and the defendant "told me to 
get in and hustle. I asked her if she would 
telephone to my mother, and she said, 'Yes.' | 
Then she told me to get in a hustle." This 
is all that was testified to by her on her di-
rect examination relating to conversations 
had with, or things done by, the defendant. 
She testified to no additional things in that 
respect on her cross-examination. At the 
conclusion of her cross-examination a recess 
was had. Thereafter she was recalled for 
lurther direct examination. She was asked 
and answered: "Q. I understand you to say 
that it was on Tuesday morning that you 
were examined in No. 10? A. Yes, sir. Q. 
And is that the time that the statement 
was made to you, something about your 
clothing by" the defendant? "A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did you stay there after that? A. 
Because," the defendant "said that if my 
mother was willing to let me stay there she I 
would fit me out with nice clothes and send 
me to Ogden. Q. Is that the reason you 
stayed? A. Yes, sir." On recross-examina-
tion she testified that during the recess the 
district attorney had talked to her and "just 
asked me about this question, and if I re-
membered that. That was something that I 
had forgot this morning and forgot at the 
preliminary examination. I was going to 
say it but forgot it. The district attorney 
asked me why I stayed there and I told him." 
On the recross-examination the witness sev-
eral times testified that what the defendant! 
said to her was "if your mother don't ob-
ject I'll buy you a nice suit of clothes and 
send you to Ogden," or "if your mother 
don't object she would send me to Ogden 
and give me some clothes." Neither on her 
direct nor cross-examination did she testify 
that the defendant said to her that if she 
remained or stayed, or if her mother was 
willing to let her stay, the defendant would 
buy her clothes or do anything, but that if 
her mother did not object the defendant 
would buy or give her clothes and send her 
to Ogden. 
This is all the evidence in the record on 
the part of the state bearing on the ques-
tion of any promises having been made by 
the defendant, or of her causing, persuading, 
or inducing the inmate to remain an inmate 
of a house of prostitution, and is all in sup-
port thereof that is pointed to by the state. 
Putting it in the Attorney General's own 
language, the defendant said to the inmate 
"that she was not too young to be in that 
business; that she was just the right age; 
that she was a blonde, and that blondes took 
well. She told her to get in and hustle, ©he 
told her that she could make good money 
and could get some good clothes. She told 
her that she did not know why her mother 
should have any objection for her to do a 
little sporting when she had one sister down 
there (in the stockade), and in addition to 
I this she further made the further promise 
that, "if her mother was willing to let her 
stay there (at the stockade), she would fit 
her out with nice clothes and send her to 
Ogden" (where the defendant was also In-
terested in a "red light district"). These. 
| and only these, are the "certain promises" 
claimed to ha\e been made by the defend-
ant and which caused, induced, and persuad-
ed the inmate of a house of prostitution to 
remain therein as such inmate. Let them be 
looked at singly or collectively, and yet what 
reasonable certainty of a promise or prom-
ises is shown? What declaration or offer, 
either express or implied, made by the de-
fendant and accepted or acted on by the 
inmate, to do or forbear some act or thing 
calculated, or having a natural tendency to 
cause, persuade, or encourage such an in-
mate to remain in the house of prostitution, 
or tending to show any causal connection be-
tween the claimed promises and the contin-
uance of the inmate in the house of prosti-
tution, or one designed to produce such a 
result and made for such purpose? Many 
of them cannot even be called any kind of 
a promise. The only thing approaching it 
is the reason given by the inmate why she 
remained; the claimed promise that the de-
fendant would buy her clothes and send her 
to Ogden if "her mother," not the defend-
ant, "was willing to let me stay." Giving 
this language the most liberal meaning, it 
is plainly seen that the promise to fit the 
inmate out with nice clothes and send her 
to Ogden was not conditioned on the defend-
j ant's wish or will that the inmate remain 
or stay, but on the wish or will of the moth-
er, if she, not the defendant, "was willing to 
let me stay there" in the stockade. That 
but implies if her mother was willing she 
could stay, if she was not willing, the nega-
tive is equally implied, and thus the staying 
or remaining of the inmate was conditioned 
on the will of the mother, and not of the de-
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fendant. Brit, when the inmate was asked i 
what in fact the defendant said to her with 
respect to giving or buying her clothes, she 
each time testiOed, not that the defendant 
said that she would buy or give her clothes 
if she remained or stayed, or if her mother 
was willing for her to remain or stay, or 
that the defendant said or offered to do any-
thing of that kind on any such conditions, 
but what the defendant in fact did say was, 
"If your mother don't object, I will buy or 
give you* clothes and send you to Ogden." 
[7] It is not enough that the defendant 
made some kind of a promise to the inmate; 
it must also appear that the promise was 
made with the design or purpose of causing 
or inducing the inmate to remain in the al-
leged house of prostitution, and that it was 
one fairly calculated or naturally tending to 
produce such a result, and that the inmate 
in fact did so remain, not as evidenced by 
a state of mind expressed on the witness 
stand, but as evidenced by some act or con- j 
duct on her part, or by something said or 
done by her, showing, or tending to show, 
that she acted on, or was induced or in-
fluenced by, the promise, and by reason 
thereof remained in the house of prostitu-
tion. And while she was asked why she re-
mained at the stockade, the very issue to be 
determined, she gave as a reason "because" 
the (iefendant "said that, if my mother was 
willing to let me stay there, she would fit 
me out with nice clothes and send me to 
Ogden," but, when asked what it was that 
the defendant said to her in that respect, 
she repeatedly answered that "I could make 
good money and I could get me some nice 
clothes," and "if your mother don't object I 
I will buy or give you a nice suit of clothes 
and send you to Ogden." Nowhere does the 
record disclose that the defendant asked, re-
quested, or invited the inmate to remain, or 
that the defendant did or said anything that 
if the inmate did remain the defendant would 
do anything for her, or give her anything, or 
that the defendant declared or offered to do 
or not to do anything whatever on condi-
tion or an understanding of any kind that I 
the inmate remain* Nothing of that kind was 
testified to by the inmate or by any one else. 
As testified to by the inmate, the day after 
she entered the house of prostitution she 
took the examination, on a Tuesday. On 
Wednesday or Thursday following she, ac-
cording to her testimony, asked the defend-
ant to telephone to her mother, who, in Salt 
Lake City, was conducting an uptown room-
ing house, and, according to the testimony 
of the defendant, the defendant telephoned 
the mother against the protest of the inmate. 
No matter about that, for the evidence shows 
beyond dispute, and as testified to by the 
mother herself, that the defendant did tele-
phone the mother, who, in response to the 
message, visited the defendant's office at the 
stockade on the Friday following. The in-
mate was brought Into her presence, and 
the mother, as testified to by her, said to 
her, "Why are you here? Aren't you asham-
ed of yourself?" The inmate, as testified to 
by herself, began to cry and said, "I couldn't 
help it," and that, upon her mother's stating 
that she would "whip me when she got me 
home," the defendant asked her not to do 
so, and said "if she had a daughter who 
went out that way she would take her back, 
because she was her own flesh and blood." 
After further conversations, in which the 
mother and the inmate did not remember 
what was said, the two left the stockade. 
No act or conduct on the part of the inmate, 
nor anything said or done by her during the 
time she was in the stockade and before 
she left it, is shown from which it may be 
inferred or implied that by reason of any-
thing said or done by the defendant the in-
I mate remained in the house of prostitution, 
or was caused, induced, or persuaded to do 
so. The evidence, without dispute, shows 
that the inmate during the time she was in 
the stockade at will and voluntarily left it 
each morning and returned in the eve-
ning to ply her calling. Thus, looking at 
the portion of the evidence most favorable 
to the state relating to the question in hand 
—the alleged promises—it is seen that the 
j defective information is even in that par-
ticular also unsupported by evidence. 
We have thus reviewed such matters, not 
from the standpoint of the defendant's evi-
dence, but wholly from that of the state. 
Nor does the evidence of the defendant aid 
the state in that regard, for she and other 
witnesses testified that the inmate, when 
she applied for the examination, gave an 
assumed name and stated her age to be be-
tween 19 and 20, and that the defendant did 
not then know her. A day or two after that 
the husband of the inmate's sister, and who 
was a piano player in one of the houses, in-
formed the defendant who the inmate was 
and told her that the inmate was his wife's 
sister. Thereupon the defendant sent for 
the inmate and asked her her name. She 
declined at first to give it, but finally admit-
ted who she was. The defendant then stat-
ed to her that she would telephone the in-
mate's mother, but the inmate protested and 
asked her not to do so. The defendant, how-
ever, on the following day telephoned the 
mother, who, in response to the message, 
came to the stockade and took the inmate 
with her. 
There is other evidence relating to the in-
mate's conduct in entering the house of pros-
titution and becoming an inmate therein, but 
as it is not charged or claimed that she was, 
against her will, caused or induced to enter 
the house and to become such inmate, or that 
the defendant had anything to do in causing 
or inducing her to do so, we have not in de-
tail referred to that. There is also much 
evidence to show the manner in which the 
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unlawful and disreputable business was car- [ 
ried on in the stockade, the defendant's in-
terest in, her connection with and supervi-
sion over it, and that she was an active and 
the principal factor in fostering and main-
taining it. The evidence amply shows that 
the law in such particulars was violated, that 
the business ought to have been suppressed, 
and the defendant and all other offenders 
prosecuted and punished for such violations. 
But she was not charged with, nor tried for, 
or convicted of, that. There is also evidence 
to show that the defendant told one of the 
witnesses who also was charged with pan-
dering "to lie like hell," and some to justify 
the inference that both the mother and. the 
inmate were unwilling witnesses for "the 
state, and that they, especially the mother, 
through collusion or otherwise with the de-l 
fendant seemingly colored their testimony in 
the defendant's favor, and, in some particu-
lars, attempted to shield her and evaded an-
swering direct questions put to them by the 
district attorney. While such conduct of the 
defendant and the witnesses were matters 
affecting their credibility, the weight of their 
testimony, and the merits of the defendants 
defense, yet they, in themselves,. could not 
supply a want of evidence of necessary af-
firmative facts. 
[8J And so, while we have not for these 
reasons in detail referred to all the evidence 
relating to the stockade, the disreputable 
and unlawful business carried on therein, 
the defendant's conduct with respect to it, 
nor the conduct of the inmate in entering the 
house of prostitution and becoming an in-
mate, yet we have in detail referred to all the 
evidence in any manner relating to a prom-
ise or promises made by the defendant to the 
innTate and to all that was said or done by 
the defendant and the inmate in respect of 
that question, the only thing claimed by the 
state on the evidence by which the inmate 
was caused or induced by the defendant to 
remain an inmate in a house of prostitution. 
Even though the evidence should support a 
good information, yet, for the reasons al-
ready stated, yie prosecution must fail be-
cause of the fatally defective information; 
such a defect being incurable by evidence or 
verdict. An Information or Indictment when 
assailed as to snTsTanTe^mSsT^tana or rail 
toy its own structure, i t is not a technical, 
but a sound and fundamental, rule In the 
law of criminal procedure that the accused 
•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER 
123 P.-57 
prescribe one rule for a keeper or director 
of a house of prostitution and another for a 
nun, nor one rule for one offense and another 
for another offense. 
[9] The conclusion reached holding the in-
formation defective in the particulars stated 
not only works a reversal of the judgment 
but a discharge of the defendant We have 
a statute (C. L. 1907, § 4694) which provides 
that "an information may be amended in 
matter of substance or form at any time be-
fore the defendant pleads, without leave of 
court. The information may be amended at 
any time thereafter and on the trial as to 
all matters of form, at the discretion of the 
court, where the same can be done without 
prejudice to the rights of the defendant." 
An amendment supplying proper allegations 
and curing the defects of this information 
is matter of substance, not form. The par-
ticular defects were, before plea, specifically 
pointed out by the special demurrer. The 
| undoubted right to amend the information in 
; respect to the particulars wherein it is de-
j fective then existed. Instead of amending it, 
when an amendment was permissible, the 
I hazard of a trial and a conviction on a bad 
information was taken. The right to now 
! amend is lost. The statute, whether wisely 
| or unwisely, forbids it. 
[ The order therefore is that the judgment 
| of the court below be reversed, and the case 
remanded to the district court, with direc-
tions to discharge the defendant 
FRICK, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur. 
STATE v. GUSTALDI. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. May 10, 1912.) 
1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 140*)— 
I MOTION TO QUASH—WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION. 
! A person accused of crime may on motion | to quash an information show that he did not 
waive a preliminary examination before a mag-
istrate, although the magistrate's transcript re-
cites that the examination was waived. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment 
and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 474, 475; Dec. 
Dig. § 140.*] 
2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 224*)—PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION—NECESSITY. 
Where a magistrate who holds a person 
to answer a complaint charging him with a 
felony files a transcript of his proceedings in 
the district court, such court has jurisdiction 
until a motion to quash the information is sus-
tained, although accused had no preliminary 
examination, or did not have one in compliance 
with the statute. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal 
Law, Cent Dig. §§ 4G6-467; Dec. Dig. § 224.*] 
3. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 225*)—PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION—WAIVER. 
Under Const, art. 1, § 13, providing that 
offenses theretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment may be prosecuted by informa-
tion after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless an examination is waived, 
J where the committing magistrate files a tran-
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LAW Incident Offenses Detail: 
OFFENSE CODES 
Seq Code Description Amount 
1 ASIM Assault, Simple 
2 DOMV Domestic Violence 
0.00 
0.00 
LAW Incident Responders Detail 
RESPONDING OFFICERS 
Sea Mane 
1 Mallon B 
2 Lindquist K 
3 Wiler M 
4 Gay F 
Unit 
101 
80 
115 
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LAW Incident Circumstances: 
COHTRIBUTING CIRCUMSTANCES 
Seq Code Description Miscellaneous 
1 DOMV Domestic Violence 
2 &T14 Hotel/Motel/Etc. 
3 WPERS Personal Weapons Used Hands 
narrative: 
At 1912 I was dispatched to a possible domestic/assault situation. The 
dispatcher advised me that UHP trooper Doug Anderson had been told by some 
citizens that they had just dropped off a female subject at the Days Inn 
motel. The RP's told the trooper that the female had been assaulted by a man 
who was driving a black Laredo Jeep, and that he was following her to the 
motel. 
The female was described as blonde, wearing a white shirt and white shorts. I 
went to the Days Inn and asked the desk clerks if a woman had just come in who 
matched that description, and which room she was staying in. They refused to 
give me any information, although they admitted she was there, and a male 
subject was there also. I advised them of the situation, and that I needed to 
check her welfare, but they continued to refuse any assistance. Finally they 
did tell me that the couple was in room 124. 
I went to Room 124 and could hear yelling inside. I knocked on the door, and 
a man answered it immediately. Right behind him was a blonde female, who as 
soon as the door opened tried to exit the room, but the man moved in front of 
her, blocking her exit, and shoved her back into the room. He invited me into 
the room, saying there was no problem there. 
TJi^ £g__jwer^ _jiimerous liquor bottles on tables and dressers in the motel room, 
SOK^ 
sir6Jf8 lwinWB^^ '6iri nxs breeffi 
s u E ^ ^ 
arL_ir^qxicat iorr '?Rarge was no t*Tn^^ 
rr? 
I asked if everything was alright, and the female said, "Yes, if I can just 
get out of here*" The man told me everything was alright, that I could leave, 
but she said "No, please don't, I need to go with you." 
The man, later identified as Mike Giolas, turned toward the female, Becky 
Giolas, and shoved her. backwards onto the bed, then leaned very closely over 
her, saying -Becky, don't do this, listen to me" in what I perceived as a very 
threatening manner. She rolled out from under him and got up, and he grabbed 
her by the left arm and spun her around, saying "Don't do this" again several 
times* 
Becky began backing away from Mike, and he walked towards her, about one foot 
away from her, forcing her back into a corner of the motel room. He kept 
repeating "Don't do this.'8 When she ducked out of the corner and tried to get 
to the door, he grabbed her by the arm again and pulled her back. I told him 
to let go of her, and she picked up her bags and went out into the hallway. 
I asked Mike to remain inside the room while I spoke with his wife in the 
hallway, but I remained by the door, holding it slightly open, because it had 
an automatic lock on it. Mike stood right on the other side of the door, and 
kept pulling the door open and trying to participate in the conversation, 
saying "She's crazy, nothing happened, everything's okay." I had to repeatedly 
tell him to step back away from the door. 
Jecky told me that she and Mike had gone on a Jeep Safari trail during the 
iay, and were on their way back to the motel, when a verbal argument began. 
Vro 
She said Mike "backhanded" her at least three times while they were driving 
north on Main St, telling her to "shut up," and once shoved her head down onto 
the gear-shift knob, holding it there for a short time. When they stopped at 
Center and Main, and he hit her again, she got out of the vehicle and ran. 
She was offered help by some bystanders, who took her to the motel, and then 
apparently flagged over the trooper to report the incident. (Those citizens 
were never identified, and left the area before I could make contact with 
them). 
Several of Becky's friends/travelling companions were waiting in the hallway, 
and she went with them to another room while I talked with her husband. I 
went back into room 124, and asked Mike to tell me what had happened. By this 
time Sgt. Lindquist had arrived, and also Ann Twitchell who had been riding 
with him* 
Mike told me that he had not struck Becky, but that she had scratched his face 
and thrown a beer bottle at him. He had no scratches or other injuries 
visible, except two small red marks on his left cheek that looked like razor 
cuts . llgMM^ i^.d_that^  Becky has> emotional problems^ is taking anti-depressant 
medication, and kaa TeerT^ 3r?Ji^ xnS!!rin? thai 1 
I told Mike to wait in the room for me, and Sgt. Lindquist stayed there with 
hi» while I went to speak with Becky again. She told me that she and Mike 
have a history of domestic violence, that he has assaulted her many times, and 
that there are several law enforcement agencies in northern Utah that are very 
familiar with their history. Becky's friends confirmed this information 
stating that they were very frightened for their own safety and for Becky's, 
because they were helping her. They said they have witnessed numerous 
assaults by Mike against Becky, and also against previous girlfriends-
However, they declined to provide specific information or witness statements, 
saying they were afraid he would "hunt them down" if he got a copy of the 
police report. Becky said that was true, that he had taken such action before 
in similar situations. They requested that their names or any information 
they provided not be included in the report for that reason. 
Becky had a large red mark on her right cheek area, which faded somewhat 
during aty contact with her. She also had bruises on both sides of her neck, 
which she said had been caused by Mike on the previous night, at which time he 
told her that because she was his wife, he could injure her in any way he 
wanted to. The injuries were photographed later at the PD, and booked a 
evidence, and her written statement is included. 
I went back into room 124 and advised Mike that he was under arrest for 
domestic Assault. He told me that I wasn't justified in making an arrest, and 
suggested that Sgt. Lindquist "pull rank" on me and prevent me from taking 
my action. At my request, Mike stood up and placed his hands behind his 
>ack. He was taken into custody without incident, although because of his 
lusculature it was difficult for him to place his arms behind his back. At 
lis request Sgt. Lindquist and I carried his possessions out of the room and 
;o his pickup out in the parking lot while he accompanied us in handcuffs. 
fhen we reached the pickup, I asked Mike where the keys to it were, and he 
ttated, "They're in my pocket, go ahead and reach in there, so I can add 
jiother charge to what I file against you." At that time, and with Sgt. 
dndquist observing, I performed a cursory search, patting him down for 
eapons and locating the vehicle keys in the right side pocket of his shorts. 
16 
Giolas was wearing loose, baggy shorts, and the side pockets hung down the 
outside of his thigh, Sgt. Lindquist placed Mike's possessions into the 
pickup and secured the vehicle. 
Kike had become progressively more verbally abusive, and resisted when I 
attempted to search him, pulling away from me and calling to some men who were 
across the parking lot to "come over here and help me." When he continued to 
pull away and try to walk away from me, I took hold of his left arm and walked 
with him to my patrol car, which was across the parking lot. All the way to 
that location, Mike kept pulling away from me and trying to stop. I tried 
numerous times to use a wrist-lock as a control hold, but Mike is an extremely 
large, muscular man (6'3H, 255 lbs). He kept pulling away from me whenever I 
tried to get hold of his hand, and I was unable to exert any control on him at 
all. I continued to hold his left arm with my right hand and walk along with 
him. When we got to the patrol car, with Trooper Anderson standing by, I had 
Mike lean frontwards against the car while I searched him, emptying his 
pockets onto the roof of my vehicle and placing his possessions in an evidence 
bag. Mike then entered the back seat of the patrol car and seated himself 
without any assistance, after which I fastened his seat belt. 
AtT_the____PD/ Officer Fred Gay helped Giolas out of my vehicle and into the 
Suilalnc^ the booKinqT"l'7?j^ Ias refused to answer any questions^ 
saying "You're tne smart si^cnT you fcxcmre ifc Aut." Tfl&h fih fealfl Hft£t Rfe 
thought his shoulder was dislocated, saying "I Know my rights, and I want to 
see a doctor.1' I asked him if he was saying that I had dislocated his 
shoulder, and he said yes, that I had. I asked him exactly when it happened, 
but he refused to answer, although he did say it was an "old wrestling 
injury." Officer Gay transported Giolas to Allen Memorial Hospital, where he 
was assisted by Sgt. Lindquist who eventually transported Giolas directly to 
the Sheriff's Office. I had no further contact with Mike Giolas. 
Becky Giolas came to the PD, accompanied by two friends, and brought me her 
written statement. It was at this time that I took the photographs of her 
injuries, at 2045 hrs. While Becky was in my office, we contacted the Lehi 
Police Department dispatcher, who in turn contacted Detective Chad Smith for 
information concerning previous dealings with Mike Giolas. 
Detective Smith, through the dispatcher (Tammy), advised me that Mike Giolas 
is an extremely violent subject, that his department and others have had 
numerous past incidents involving him, and that if he were released from jail 
that -something worse would happen, for sure.M Smith also stated that he had 
numerous photographs in evidence of previous serious injuries to Becky, caused 
by Mike Giolas. 
Becky Giolas suggested that this agency contact several different law 
enforcement agencies in northern Utah, including Lehi PD, Utah County SO, 
South Jordan PD, West Valley City PD, South Salt Lake City PD, and Salt Lake 
County SO, who all have had incidents involving Mike Giolas. Again, this 
Information was confirmed by the people travelling with them. 
Becky told me that she was afraid for her life if he bailed out of jail, 
laying that he has completely disregarded protective orders in the past, and 
*as highly unlikely to start obeying them now. Her companions verified this 
Information, saying that they were also very frightened of him, and requesting 
;hat he not know they had participated in this incident in any way because he 
tould retaliate violently. I also received a telephone call from a relative 
v< 
in Lehi, who basically stated the same thing, and requested anonymity. 
I contacted County Attorney Bill Benge_and relayed this information to him, 
requesting a "No-Bail" order until Gioias went r>etore a •Tu85gT*M*n5gTOe 
authorised No Bail, and advised tl^ e'Tfie^  
he had done s o . •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••^^ 
The Lehi Police Department asked that Becky Gioias immediately notify thorn 
when she returned home, as they were aware of Mike's behavior and would take 
precautions. Becky told me that she has a residence in Lehi, and that Kike's 
hose is in River ton, and she will obtain a Protective Order as soon as 
possible on Monday to prevent him from contacting her. She also signed the 
MCPD domestic violence victim's form stating that she did not wish to waive 
the No-Contact order. 
Repgr^^ 
ife 
________ Moab P.I 
22:36 Warrantless Arrest Probable Cause Statement Page: ise Stater 
The undersignedt, fae^^L* /MtUOftlot the Moab Po l i ce 
under oa ih siafces that ther™ exls tef l probable cause tor the arres t without 
warrant o'f ihe person nam^fbel&W ftflfilfl UBftft EMU lUllWlftfli 
i ante of person a g i s t e d : Michael B Giolas DOB: 04/22/6 
__ 4it4v,i^4«ttf»nr-;it—»,fnnn»ntt.tnn 
The above-named person is currently being detained on the following 
charges t 
Offense Date/Time Statute Code CC Bail Amt 
Assault 19*45:00 04/10/93 76-5-102 BM 
The undersigned believes that probable cause existed for this warrantles£ 
arrest and the continued detention of the above-named person based upon the 
following information which was either known by the undersigned personally or 
was obtained by the undersigned in his/her capacity as a peace officer: 
I was dispatched to the Days Inn when citizens reported to a UHP trooper that 
they had transported a female to the Days Inn who had been involved in a fight 
with her husband, and that he was violent and looking for her. I located the 
couple in Rm 124 at the Days Inn motel. When Mr. Giolas opened the door, 
Mrs. Giolas tried to get by him. and exit the room, but he shoved her back 
into the room, telling me that there was no problem and inviting me inside the 
room. 
While I was in the motel room, I observed Mr. Giolas push Mrs. Giolas onto 
the bed once, take her by the arm and spin her around at least twice, and back 
her into a corner in a threatening manner. 
Mrs. Giolas said her husband had slapped her face twice on the right side 
with the back of his hand three times, and shoved her head down, holding it 
against the gearshift. Mr. Giolas denied doing that, but there were red 
narks on her face, and also bruised on Mrs. Giolas' neck which she stated 
were caused by her husband. 
Mr. Giolas had a strong odor of^lcohol and there were 
numerous nqeur potties, HJKMKT^ 
some entirely empty, strewn about the room. » • • » • » » » — — 
Giolas was placed under arrest for Domestic Assault JJQJiJLJUlfij^ ^ (DV 
related). When ne submitted io an IniAHlvzer fcesi at the Sheritt's urrice. 
Domestic Assault!^^ •———••———--—-•••-••••••••• 
I contacted the Utah County/Lehi Police Department, and through a dispatcher 
information was relayed to me from Detective Chad Smith concerning past 
domestic incidents involving Mike Giolas. His agency has responded several 
times to reports of violence at this couple's address in the past few months. 
Detective Smith described Mr. Giolas as "extremely violent," saying he had 
numerous photographs of serious physical injuries to his wife from those past 
Incidents. Detective Smith also stated "There will be worse trouble if he is 
2S 
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released." Mrs. Becky Giolas stated to me that she was afraid for her life if 
he was released, that he has always disregarded ex parte protective orders and 
court orders in the past. Friends, who were with the Giolas' and staying in 
thm same motel, also stated that they were afraid for their safety if he was 
released, but they refused to give nie statements or even identify themselves 
in fear that if he found out they had said anything, he would -hunt them 
down.* 
I contacted County Attorney Bill Benae, who authorized a "No Bail" order 
Holding Giolas in :teiluntil ire sees a judge. 
The undersigned requests the magistrate to whom this statement is 
presented to execute an order determining that probable cause existed for the 
above-described warrantless arrest, authorizing the continued detention of the 
above-named person on the stated charges, and setting appropriate bail, if any. 
State of Utah 
County of Grand 
Sworn to before me this /O day of ^j&S?' (~» 
NOTARY PUBLIU 
nwayne R. Sehoeknmyerj 
e2?KsnoCrt«k0Wd #C4 
Moab. Utah 84532 
My Commission Extras 
<;«pt<wnbort6.1995 
STATE OF UTAH 
Judge/Not 
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INTOXILYZER* INSTRUMENT-4011 MODELS 
CvSZ££E&£\ INSTRUMENT PRINT CODE~ 
A — AIR BLANK 
B - BREATH 
C — CALIBRATOR (Simulator) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED 
CHECK LIST 
A 
B 
A 
0 
0 
0 
INSTRUMENT LOCATION 
INSTRUMENT SERIAL NUMBER 
JLiMtJ-fHsf OBSFfr MS> PRvcK Z(3o 
INTOXILYZER 
OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST - D (ASA) 
O B J E C T ^ L W _ A ^ _ D A T E * - , O *93 T,„r j?fJO 
INSTRUMENT ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ L O C A T I O N ^ ^ a ^ £ , . . „ ~ < l 
OPERATOR ])£sf<1,> L^niP ( " 
POWER SWITCH ON, READY LIGHT ON. 
1^5. 
I A/ -i • »~ • u i u n i urii 
[V^2. CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO PUMP TUBE. INSERT TEST RECORD 
CARD. 
PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 2. 
PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 3. 
DISCONNECT PUMP TUBE FROM BREATH TUBE, EXTEND BREATH 
TUBE AND INSERT MOUTHPIECE. - TAKE BREATH SAMPLE. 
(NOTE TIME) LIGHT 4 WILL COME ON AFTER SAMPLE IS 
TAKEN. 
REMOVE MOUTHPIECE, HOUSE BREATH TUBE AND CONNECT TO 
PUMP TUBE, PRESS ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 5. REMOVE TEST 
RECORD CARD. 
[ ) 7. POWER SWITCH OFF. 
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